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ABSTRACT 
 
Development economists generally argue that poor countries at their early stages 
of development are often faced with limited domestic resources for development, and can 
therefore borrow from the developed nations to boost their rate of growth and 
development. This financing gap problem, which is based on the Harrod-Domar growth 
theory, has made developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, to accumulate 
large amount of external debt that they could no longer sustain. Moreover, there is now a 
growing concern that the large external debt service payment is retarding economic 
growth and investment in the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), while also 
displacing current expenditure in priority sectors like health, education, and social 
infrastructure.  
This dissertation therefore, examines the impact of external debt on economic 
growth and investment in ECOWAS Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980-1999. 
Unlike the traditional debt and growth studies that use a-spatial methods, this study 
employs spatial autoregressive growth and investment models to determine the effects of 
spatial interaction and spatial dependence among ECOWAS countries during the period 
of the crisis. It is obvious that countries are spatial entities that interact with one another, 
and as such, the growth trends in one country may actually depend on the growth 
trajectories of others.  
Based on the above assumptions, the models use external debt service and total 
debt stock ratios, which are extracted from the World Bank and African Development 
Bank databases, as key or control variables plus other explanatory variables. The 
maximum likelihood estimation of both models yield mixed results across time. The 
results indicate the presence of both positive and negative spatial dependence in 
ECOWAS countries across time. While external debt service ratio is found to have an 
inverse relationship with economic growth in most periods under investigation, the total 
debt stock to GDP ratio only affect growth in fewer periods than expected. With regards 
to public investment, the external debt service ratio is found to have no impact on public 
investment in ECOWAS countries.  
However, the total debt stock to GDP ratio is found to have a negative relationship 
with public investment in most periods, which suggest that relying on foreign capital to 
boost growth and investment could be counter productive in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
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Kurzfassung  
 
Entwicklungsökonomen nehmen im Allgemeinen an, dass Entwicklungsländer in den 
ersten Stufen ihrer Entwicklung oft mit beschränkten eigenen Ressourcen konfrontiert 
sind, und daher von den entwickelten Ländern Kredite nehmen um ihre Wachstumsrate 
und Entwicklung zu steigern. Diese Finanzierungslücke die mit der Harrod-Domar-
Wachstumstheorie begründet wird, hat Entwicklungsländer, insbesonders im Afrika 
südlich der Sahara, dazu gezwungen, hohe externe Schulden aufzuhäufen, die sie nicht 
länger bedienen konnten. Weiters gibt es eine wachsende Sorge, dass die großen externen 
Schuldenrückzahlungen das ökonomische Wachstum und die Investitionen in den schwer 
verschuldeten Ländern behindern sowie Ausgaben in prioritären Sektoren wie 
Gesundheit, Bildung und sozialer Infrastruktur verdrängen. 
 
Diese Dissertation untersucht daher den Einfluss externer Schulden auf das ökonomische 
Wachstum und die Investitionen im Afrika südlich der Sahara (ECOWAS) im Zeitraum 
1980-1999. Im Gegensatz zu traditionellen Schulden- und Wachstumsstudien, die die 
räumliche Dimension nicht berücksichtigen, verwendet diese Studie  räumliche 
autoregressive Wachstums- und Investitionsmodelle um den Effekt räumlicher 
Interaktion und räumlicher Abhängigkeit zwischen den ECOWAS-Ländern während des 
Zeitraums der Krise zu untersuchen. Es ist offensichtlich, dass Länder räumliche 
Einheiten sind, die miteinander interagieren. Daher können die Wachstumstrends in 
einem Land von den Wachstumstrajektorien anderer Länder abhängen. 
 
Auf den oben genannten Annahmen aufbauend verwenden die Modelle externe 
Schuldenrückzahlungsraten und Gesamtschuldenraten, welche aus Datenbanken der 
Weltbank und der afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank extrahiert wurden, als Schlüssel- und 
Kontrollvariablen (zusammen mit anderen erklärenden Variablen). Die Maximum-
Likelihood-Schätzung beider Modelle führt zu gemischten Resultaten im Zeitablauf. Die 
Resultate deuten auf die Anwesenheit sowohl positiver, als auch negativer räumlicher 
Abhängigkeit in den ECOWAS-Ländern im Zeitablauf hin. Während die externe 
Schuldenrückzahlungsrate in den meisten Untersuchungsperioden in negativem 
Zusammenhang mit dem ökonomischen Wachstum steht, beeinflusst die 
Gesamtschuldenrate das ökonomische Wachstum in weniger Perioden als erwartet. In 
Hinblick auf öffentliche Investitionen hat die externe Schuldenrückzahlungsrate keinen 
Einfluss auf öffentliche Investitionen in den ECOWAS Ländern. 
 
Die Gesamtschuldenrate allerdings steht in negativem Zusammenhang mit öffentlichen 
Investitionen in den meisten Perioden, was darauf hindeutet, dass es für die Länder im 
Afrika südlich der Sahara kontraproduktiv sein könnte, Wachstum und Investitionen in 
Abhängigkeit von fremdem Kapital anzukurbeln. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0    INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A fundamental question relevant to regional economic development relates to 
whether regional economic growth is converging. That is, whether per capita output 
growth in one region converges to levels reached by neighbouring regions. This question 
is of great interest to regional scientists and policy-makers who believe that large 
differences in economic growth among regions are undesirable. Since the beginning of the 
1990s, there has been massive empirical literature on the issue of regional growth 
convergence - prominent among them include Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1991); Carlino and 
Mills (1993, 1996); Vohra (1998); Rey and Montouri (1999); Drennan and Lobo (1999); 
Bernat (2001); Lall and Yilmaz (2001).  
Although such empirical studies started emerging over a decade ago, majority of 
them only focused on the traditional a-spatial methods, which deals with spatial entities 
in isolation (Quah, 1996a). The traditional empirical approaches have not explicitly 
considered the geographic space in which economic relationships take place. Martin and 
Sunley (1998, p. 206-207) argue that traditional growth convergence approach “fails to 
take into account how different countries or regions relate and interact with one another, 
citing that the growth trends of a country or region may actually depend crucially on the 
growth trajectories of others.” Despite the fact that technological spillovers have been 
acknowledged as a key contributor to economic growth and convergence, this process has 
explicit spatial components. However, the role of spatial dependence effects on regional 
growth and income convergence process have been largely ignored (Baumol 1994; Temple 
1999). 
From a policy perspective, new insights into spatial dependence in regional 
growth and income convergence may have an important effect that allows regional 
economic policy that considers the specific geographies of growth and income 
convergence, and hence provide hints on spatial interaction and regional policy 
coordination to start a virtuous circle of regional economic growth. However, it was not 
until recently that the possibility of spatial dependence effects was explicitly considered in 
the regional growth and income convergence studies. The results of Rey and Montouri 
(1999) represent the first detailed evidence on the role of spatial effects in a regional 
income study. Although their study reconsiders the question of income convergence from 
2   
 
 
a spatial econometric perspective, it should be noted that they used states as observational 
units in the analysis of regional convergence. 
In this context, this dissertation assesses how the external debt crisis affects 
economic growth and investment in twelve ECOWAS countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 
particular, it investigates the effects of spatial dependence and spatial interaction among 
these countries during the debt crisis covering the period 1980-1999. The rest of the 
dissertation is organised as follows. Chapter I provide a brief background of the third 
world external debt and the nature of the African debt crisis and how it evolved. The 
chapter continues with the problem statement, the research question and the importance 
of the study.  
Chapter II provides a survey of the relevant literature relating to the relationship 
between external debt and economic growth and investment in developing countries. 
Chapter III highlights the characteristics of Sub-Saharan African economies. In particular, 
it reviews the historical and recent economic performance, and elaborates on the factors 
that explain slow economic growth in the region. Chapter IV looks at the theoretical 
framework of budget deficit as one of the main catalysts of external indebtedness. The 
chapter also discusses the relationship between capital flight and external debt in 
developing countries, debt sustainability and debt ratios used as yardsticks in debt 
sustainability assessment. Chapter V deals with debt relief mechanisms in developing 
countries. In particular, it elaborates on the conventional methods of debt relief used by 
external creditor’s vis-à-vis the debtors. The chapter also clarified the composition of the 
traditional creditors, and discussed the recent debt relief initiatives such as the heavily 
indebted poor country initiative (HIPC) and its enhanced framework and the G-8 debt 
cancellation agreement. 
Chapter VI describes the spatial data used in this dissertation, the data sources, 
and the estimation methodology. It describes the spatial econometric models employed 
and their estimation techniques. The estimated results are presented and discussed. 
Finally, chapter VII presents the summary and conclusions of the dissertation.    
 
1.1 Background of the Third World External Debt 
 
The twenty first century ushered in an era of change in the attitude of richer 
nations towards their poorer counterparts in the developing world. With the adoption of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000, the international community has set 
itself a target of reducing poverty, income inequality, hunger and increasing human 
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development by 2015. However, many observers have expressed doubts that, on the 
current trends, it is unlikely that this objective can be achieved in the poorer countries, 
especially in Africa at any time close to that date (Brown, Wolfensohn, 2004). 
In order to meet the target of poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa by 2015, the 
current GDP growth rate in the region would have to be increased and sustained to levels 
of at least 7 to 8 percent per annum, implying doubling the current aid inflow and 
maintaining it at that level for at least a decade (UNTAD, 2000). Pursuing such an action, 
with the right mix of international support and appropriate domestic policies, would 
generate enough savings for investment that would put Africa on a sustainable growth 
track and graduate it from debt burden and aid dependency.  
Africa’s external debt problems and its resource requirements are directly related 
to its capacity to accumulate capital and to grow. However, since the inception of the 
crisis in the early 1980s, the debtor countries have been transferring billions of dollars 
every year to the richer nations in debt-service at the cost of providing domestic services 
in the affected poor countries. Debt service is accounting for a larger percentage of 
Africa’s GDP annually.  
Three decades after independence, a good number of countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa experienced major episodes of financial crisis that were characterised by 
unsustainable fiscal deficits. During this period, however, current account deficits were 
considered normal. Therefore, countries were encouraged to borrow from abroad to 
finance their deficits and to create a conducive environment that attracts foreign 
investment to boost economic growth. In this process, little attention was paid to the 
individual countries’ absorptive capacities and ability to repay the borrowed funds. The 
deficits raised the level of external public and publicly guaranteed debt through more 
external public borrowing for financing purposes (Mahdavi, 2004, p. 1139). It was not 
until August 1982 when Mexico, despite being an oil exporter, declared that it could no 
longer service her debts. Since then, the problem of external indebtedness became a great 
concern to the international financial community. 
Meanwhile, the debt crisis facing SSA has consistently occupied the international 
media. Since its inception in the 1980s the international financial community has been 
providing help to debtor countries in an attempt to reduce their external debt burdens, 
foster growth, reduce poverty, and attain external viability (IMF, 1999, p. 2). This 
assistance has taken the form of providing concessional financing from the international 
financial institutions, debt relief from official creditors mainly in the context of the Paris 
Club rescheduling and restructuring, and in some cases, through bilateral action by 
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creditors. These measures have resulted in considerable success in alleviating the external 
debt burdens of many middle-income countries. However, many poor countries, 
especially those in SSA, continue to suffer from unacceptable levels of poverty, civil and 
regional conflicts, high external debt burdens and low economic growth. 
Today, the international community is constantly engaged in discussions and 
analysis of the problems of the continent. The World Bank produced several reports 
during the 1980s diagnosing in detail the problems of SSA and recommended several 
policy measures for restoring economic growth and long-term development. Member 
countries in the region also carried out series of studies and adopted numerous 
comprehensive programmes for achieving specific regional goals and objectives (Iqbal 
and Kabur, 1997). There was a continuous flow of information about the region’s 
problems but opinions were, however, different as to the causes and what should be done 
to restore growth and promote sustainable development. The World Bank, for instance, 
blamed domestic mismanagement and other factors for the region’s poor economic 
performance, while many countries considered external factors as largely responsible for 
their economic woes. 
Heavy external indebtedness and rampant corruption in SSA have not only had a 
negative effect on economic growth and development, but also derailed efforts at 
economic recovery and market enhancing initiatives (Richards, Nwanna, and Nwankwo, 
2003, p. 304). The continent is the world’s most relatively indebted and aid-dependent 
region of the world. Much of the resources that could have been ploughed back into 
investments are used to service debt or embezzled by corrupt African leaders. Out of the 
44 countries classified by the World Bank as “heavily indebted poor countries,” 33 are in 
SSA. These countries are so burdened and overwhelmed by debt-service obligations that 
their economies and financial systems have practically crippled as they struggle to evolve 
a way of servicing their foreign debts. In this process, their economic and social welfare 
systems have deteriorated beyond expected levels (Richards, Nwanna and Nwankwo, 
2003, p. 304). Although the international creditors seem to be flexible in debt rescheduling 
and restructuring, nonetheless, no signs of marked improvement have been noticed in the 
debtor countries. The continued deterioration of economic conditions rallied sympathetic 
calls by a network of activists, civil society and NGOs for debt relief and cancellation. 
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1.1.1 The Dynamics of External Debt  
 
External borrowing is considered a common phenomenon for all developing 
countries at their early stages of economic development since domestic capital is scarce 
for investment purposes (Todaro and Smith, 2006). These countries face extreme resource 
constraints owing to their very low-income per capita, and consequently, their low 
domestic savings compared to the developed nations. Moreover, their current account 
deficits are very high and to augment domestic resources, the inflow of capital from 
abroad is an urgent requirement. Prior to the 1970s, developing countries’ external debt 
was relatively small and primarily official, meaning that majority of the loans were taken 
from foreign governments and international financial institutions such as the Breton 
Woods Institutions and regional commercial banks. Majority of the loans were 
concessional, that is, secured below market interest rates to finance development projects 
as well as to increase the import of capital goods.     
However, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, commercial banks pushed a large 
volume of OPEC money in the form of loans to developing countries to support deficit 
balance of payments and for the expansion of their export sectors. External borrowing has 
both benefits and costs to the debtor countries. However, in the current trend of the debt 
crisis, the costs of foreign borrowing seem to exceed the benefits for many developing 
countries especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The main benefit of foreign borrowing is that it 
makes resources available to debtor countries for the promotion of economic growth and 
development, while the cost is linked to debt-service obligation. Debt-service is the 
successive payment of principal plus the accumulated interest, which is also referred to as 
amortization through the life of the loan. The burden of debt-service is determined by the 
size of the debt and the interest rate. As the volume of the debt grows or the interest rate 
rises, so do the debt-service burden. 
Since foreign debt is usually contracted in foreign currency, debt-service payment 
must also be made in foreign currency. In other words, debt-service payment is done by 
the use of foreign exchange or export earnings. However, debt-service difficulty may 
occur in a situation where the export earning declines or where interest rate rises, causing 
an unprecedented increase in debt-service payments. This has been the experience of most 
heavily indebted developing countries including sub-Saharan African countries.  
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1.1.2  The Mechanics of Basic Transfer 
 
The concept of basic transfer is explained by Todaro and Smith (2006) to clarify the 
mechanics of resource inflow and outflow from a borrowing country. Todaro and Smith, 
defined basic transfer of a country “as the net foreign exchange inflow or outflow related 
to its international borrowing”.1  This concept is measured as the difference between the 
net capital inflow (that is, capital inflow minus capital outflow) and interest payments on 
the existing accumulated debt. The net capital inflow is simply the difference between the 
gross inflow and the amortization on past debt. The significance of this concept is that it 
indicates the amount of foreign exchange a developing country is receiving or losing 
every year as a result of international capital movement. For most indebted poor 
countries, the basic transfer had been negative, resulting to the loss of large foreign 
exchange during the onset of the crisis in the 1980s. 
Using the formulation of Todaro and Smith (2006), we can illustrate the basic 
transfer in an equation as follows: let NF , which expresses the rate of increase of total 
external debt, represents the net capital inflow, and D to represent accumulated total 
external debt, while d stands for the percentage rate of increase in that total debt, thus 
                                          NF dD=                                                                                    (1) 
Since every year interest must be paid on the accumulated debt, we let r represents the 
average rate of interest. Therefore, the total annual interest payment equals to rD. The 
basic transfer (BT) is then computed by subtracting the interest payments from the net 
capital inflow, that is:    
                                               BT = dD – rD = (d-r)D                                                                    (2) 
 
A developing country will be gaining foreign exchange if the basic transfer (BT) is 
positive. This implies that d is greater than r. Conversely, if r is greater than d, the basic 
transfer (BT) would be negative, meaning that the country is losing foreign exchange. 
 When a developing country’s total debt stock, D, is relatively small, the percentage 
rate at which the total debt increases, d, would be high because most of the development 
aid  or loans at the early stages of debt accumulation comes from official sources such as 
the international financial institutions or foreign governments. Such debt is contracted at 
concessional terms with long maturity periods, which implies that the rate of interest, r, is 
less than the percentage rate at which debt increases, d. If the borrowed resources are 
                                                 
1
 Michael P Todaro, and Stephen C Smith: Economic Development. 9th Edition, 2006. p 674 
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invested in productive projects that yield a rate of return higher than the cost of 
borrowing, r, then the generated resources or foreign exchange would be used to pay back 
the accumulated debt and interest by the debtor country.  
 However, Todaro and Smith (2006), argued that difficulties in debt and interest 
payment may arise for the debtor country in any of the following situations: when 
1. the accumulated debt becomes very large to the extent that its rate of increase, d, 
begins to decline as amortization rises relative to rates of new gross inflows; 
2. the sources of foreign capital switch from long-term official flows on fixed, 
concessional terms to short-term, variable rates of private bank loans at market 
rates that causes r  to rise;  
3. the country begins to experience severe balance of payment problems as 
commodity prices fall and the terms of trade rapidly deteriorates; 
4. a global recession or some other external shock, such as an increase in oil prices, or 
a change in the value of the US dollar in which most debts are denominated; 
5. lenders loss in confidence in the debtor country’s ability to repay its debt, and  
6. a substantial outflow of resources from the debtor country in the form of capital 
flight caused by domestic participants in fear of macroeconomic policy changes 
such as currency devaluation. 
If any of the above situations take place, the interest rate, r, would increase and the 
percentage rate of increase of total debt, d, would fall. Thus, the basic transfer becomes 
negative and capital will then flow in the opposite direction, that is, from poor 
underdeveloped countries to the developed world. The outflow of capital from the 
underdeveloped countries depletes foreign reserves, hampers investment and 
development, and thus, precipitates a debt crisis. 
 
1.1.3    The Nature of the African Debt Crisis 
 
A major part of the African debt stock was contracted mainly from multilateral 
financial institutions and bilateral creditors, while private commercial bank borrowing 
constitutes the bulk of middle-income developing countries debt (Daseking and Powell, 
1999, p. 4). By 1995, more than 75 percent of Africa’s publicly guaranteed debt was official, 
making the continent’s debt crisis more of an official than a commercial debt crisis. 
(UNTAD, 2004). Africa’s external debt exploded to unsustainable levels between 1970 and 
1999. Starting with just US$ 11 billion, Africa’s external debt rose to over US$ 120 billion 
during the oil shocks of the early 1980s. The debt situation became worsened in the 1980s 
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and early 1990s when structural adjustment programmes were introduced. The year 
before the launching of the HIPC Initiative, the debt stock reached a peak of about US$ 
340 billion. 
During the 1970s, Africa’s average external debt stood at US$ 39 billion, but 
exploded to more than US$ 317 billion by the late 1990s.2 The total debt service for the 
entire continent during the same period rose from US$ 3.5 billion dollars to a record peak 
of US$ 26 billion.3 The table below provides a breakdown of Africa’s External Debt Ratios 
from 1970 to 2002. 
 
Table 1.1: Africa’s External Debt Ratios, 1970 – 2002 (US$ Millions and Percentages) 
 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 1990-1996 1997-1999 2000-
2002 
  Africa  
Total Debt Stocks 39 270 180 456 303 232 297 191 317 235 292 561 
Principal arrears 648 9 102 34 284 31 621 40 496 26 259 
Total debt Service paid 3 347 18 591 25 800 25 683 26 075 23 706 
Total Debt Stocks/XGS 91.0 195.2 234.3 242.8 217.6 168.6 
Total Debt Service Paid/XGS 7.8 20.1 19.9 21.0 17.9 13.7 
Principal Arrears/XGS 1.5 9.8 26.5 25.8 27.8 15.1 
Total Debt Stocks/GDP 24.2 51.7 65.3 67.0 61.8 54.6 
Total Debt Service paid/GDP 2.1 5.3 5.6 5.8 5.1 4.4 
Principal Arrears / GDP 0.4 2.6 7.4 7.1 7.9 4.9 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  
Total Debt Stocks 21 859 104 676 208 436 202 821 221 821 208 334 
Principal Arrears 602 5 988 33 539 30 743 40 064 25 600 
Total debt Service Paid 1 667 8 823 12 415 11 463 14 637 12 872 
Total Debt Stocks/XGS 66.0 159.0 237.5 243.2 226.3 184.2 
Total Debt Service Paid/XGS 5.0 13.4 14.1 13.7 15.0 11.4 
Principal Arrears/XGS 1.8 9.1 38.2 36.9 40.9 22.6 
Total Debt Stocks/GDP 17.7 44.0 67.5 67.6 67.4 63.7 
Total debt Service paid/GDP 1.4 3.7 4.0 3.8 4.5 3.9 
Principal Arrears/GDP 0.5 2.5 10.9 10.2 12.2 7.8 
 Source: UNCTAD, 2004. p. 6 
Note: XGS = Exports of goods and services; GDP = gross domestic product 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 UNCTAD, 2004  
3
 Ibid 
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1.1.4  Evolution of the Africa Debt Crisis 
 
The debt crisis of the third world, especially that of Sub-Saharan Africa evolved 
from a complex combination of factors, some of which are external while others were the 
result of the internal policies pursued by the African governments. A major cause of the 
African debt crisis was the two oil price shocks of the early and late 1970s. To be precise, 
the oil price hikes of 1973 to 1974 and 1979 to 1980 changed the international environment, 
leading to macroeconomic deterioration in Africa that lasted until 1982. The 
unprecedented increase in oil prices distorted the trade balance of oil importing countries 
and created fiscal deficits that undermined domestic investment (UNCTAD, 2004). 
The situation became worse during the second oil shock which happened jointly 
with a sharp increase in world real interest rates. The global recession of 1981-1982 
compounded the problem by adversely depressing demand for the key exports of 
developing countries. Moreover, the deteriorating terms of trade caused by the recession 
created balance of payment problems for oil exporters and worsened those of oil 
importers.  However, based on the assumption that the global recession would be short-
lived and that prices of non-fuel commodities would recover quickly, most of these 
countries resorted to heavy external borrowing to finance the fiscal and external 
imbalances.  
In Asia, many countries whose industrial base is strong decided to hold back on 
their external borrowing, and expanded their volume of exports through a variety of 
export promotions and industrial policies (UNCTAD, 1988; Balassa, 1981 and 1985; 
Kuznet, 1988). On the contrary, many African countries had no alternative to external 
borrowing due to mostly their non-diversified economies and the continued decline in 
their export commodity prices during the global recession period of 1981 and 1982. The 
debt ratios of Sub-Saharan Africa rose sharply between 1980 and 1987.  The debt to GDP 
ratio rose from 38 percent to 70 percent, while the debt to export ratio rose from 150 
percent to 325 percent. During this same period, income per capita declined by 14 percent.  
Multilateral and bilateral creditors reviewed their lending policies to low-income 
countries, especially to Africa by stipulating that further loan disbursement will be based 
only on economic reforms in the context of structural adjustment programmes. Before the 
launch of the HIPC Initiative, the total long-term outstanding debt of Sub-Saharan Africa 
increased by more than 200 percent between 1980 and 1995. During the same period, 
multilateral and official debt stocks increased by more than 500 percent and 300 percent 
respectively. The structural adjustment programmes failed woefully to deliver the 
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promised growth and development in many African countries due to heavy debt-service 
obligations. 
Brooks et al, (1998), and Daseking and Powell (1999) grouped the factors that 
caused the debt crisis of developing countries including sub-Saharan Africa into the 
following: (a) the recurrent external shocks such as the decline in terms of trade and 
unfavourable weather conditions which hard hit countries that depend on primary 
exports; (b) weak and inappropriate macroeconomic and structural policy response to the 
shocks; (c) non-concessional lending terms by creditors with short-term repayment 
periods; (d) imprudent external debt management policies by debtor countries and the 
investment of borrowed funds in unproductive projects that did not yield returns capable 
of repaying the loans; and (e) the internal instability such as civil wars in the borrowing 
countries.4   
A profile of Africa’s accumulated external debt between 1972 and 2002 shows that 
Africa received about US$ 540 billion in loans from both multilateral and bilateral 
creditors but paid back about US$ 550 billion in principal and interest payments.  
However, Africa still has to pay a total debt stock of US$ 295 billion to its creditors. On its 
part, Sub-Saharan Africa accumulated US$ 294 billion in loans between the same period 
and paid a total of US$ 268 billion in debt-service, but still has to pay some US$ 210 billion 
(UNCTAD, 2004). 
Africa’s large accumulated debt stock is thwarting the region’s prospects and 
efforts in achieving increased saving and investment, which consequently dwindles 
economic growth and poverty reduction. The debt overhang of the region has affected 
public investment in both physical and social infrastructure due to the massive outflow of 
resources in debt-service payment. Similarly, it has inhibited private investment, since 
private investors are scared of policy distortions in environments marred by severe 
external imbalances and fluctuating exchange rates. By investing less in public health, 
social infrastructure and human resource development, implies that the external debt 
burden has compromised some of the essential conditions for sustainable economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  
It is now generally accepted that a lasting solution to the external debt problem in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is to double of official aid inflow and open Western markets for the 
debtor countries to freely buy and sell, so that they can attain sustainable growth and 
development and to meet the development challenges facing the region, particularly that 
                                                 
4
 UNCTAD, 2004 
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of reducing poverty by 2015. Moreover, the agricultural and the industrial sectors of their 
economies need to be protected as well as encouraged to boost exports, which is their 
main foreign exchange earner. To achieve the Millennium Development Goals, Sub-
Saharan Africa would need to generate a growth rate of at least 7 to 8 percent per annum 
and sustain this growth for not less than a decade.        
 
1.1.5  Structural Adjustment as a Response to the Crisis 
 
One of the most dramatic forms of external intervention in the debt crisis in 
developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, over the last two decades has been 
what is usually  referred to as “structural adjustment”, which are programs designed by 
the IMF and World Bank to get the indebted poor countries to reform their economies 
structurally and institutionally. Structural adjustment has been linked to the issue of debt 
and is viewed by the international creditor community as the way to reverse the decline of 
the poor countries in the global world economy (Callaghy, 2004).  
However, many of these developing countries have seen structural adjustment 
programs and their associated conditions as a major threat to their political sovereignty. 
Some have often resisted the program by partially implementing the imposed reforms. 
This has resulted to poor or no results in such countries. In addition, an important new 
force in international economic relation is the growth in trans-national advocacy networks 
of non-governmental organizations and civil society movements, which view the IMF and 
World Bank structural adjustment programs as increasing the problem of external debt 
and poverty rather than reducing it (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). 
One of the primary results of structural adjustment in developing countries has 
been domestic economic hardship and rising levels of external debt.  This is mostly official 
debt owed to major Western countries and the Breton Woods Institutions. Since the late 
1950s bilateral debt has been restructured by creditor countries through the Paris Club 
mechanism, while multilateral debt could not be rescheduled. The Paris Club became the 
core solution to the international debt regime for the official debt of countries unable to 
service their bilateral debt. 
The rising debt burden of poor developing countries, most of which are in Sub-
Saharan Africa, became an increasing concern of key international actors such as creditor 
countries, international NGOs, civil society groups, the United Nations System and the 
debtor countries themselves. During the negotiations of the New International Economic 
Order in the late 1970s, and early 1980s, the debtor countries insistently demanded more 
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relief of sovereign debt, which is simplified debt restructuring process for the poorest 
debtor countries. They wanted a reform of international governance processes on 
sovereign debt. However, their demands were not considered (Callaghy, 2004). 
Yet by the late 1980s, the Paris Club countries began to slowly but increasingly 
offer more generous debt relief for its poorest debtors, and occasionally for some of its 
biggest and most strategically important debtors. By the end of the 1990s, however, the 
debt regime for poor countries had changed dramatically, first with the advent of the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) in 1996 and then a major revision of it in 
1999, creating the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. 
 
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
 
Before exploring the problem of external debt that is ravaging Sub-Saharan Africa 
in general, I would first of all like to clarify the concept of external debt. “External debt 
may be broadly defined as the outstanding amount of those actual current, and not 
contingent liabilities that require payment(s) of principal and or interest by the debtor at 
some point(s) in the future and that are owed to non residents by residents of an 
economy” (IMF, 2003. p. 7). The issue of the third world debt especially that of Sub-
Saharan Africa has been on the centre stage in international discussion for the past three 
decades. The external debt crisis of the third world, and indeed Sub-Saharan Africa has 
imposed enormous costs on the debtor countries, most notably, low economic growth and 
crowding out of public investment.  
Although a substantial proportion of Sub-Sahara Africa debts are development-
related, the ability to service them does not only depend on growth and development in 
the debtor countries, but also on a healthy and expanding world economy. Neither of 
these conditions was obtained during the 1980s (Abbott, 1993). The presumed growth and 
development did not take place, and instead of promoting the growth and development 
process, the development loans retarded it by pre-empting an increasing share of their 
limited foreign exchange resources for debt-service payments. This problem was further 
aggravated by the large number of bogus projects and over ambitious development plans 
which negatively affects the development effort in the region. 
 In spite of the economic reforms, such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAP) pursued since the 1990s, the region recorded only modest growth with successive 
levels of high inflation and unsustainable balance of payment deficits. Moreover, Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to experience worsening economic conditions that encouraged 
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high levels of foreign borrowing. Since the inception of the crisis, the growth performance 
has been very disappointing due mostly to the increased outflow of resources in debt-
service payments. The acquired loans did not yield a rate of return higher than the cost of 
borrowing to repay the debt.  Moreover, the region’s economies have had a history of 
debt-servicing difficulties due to insufficient domestic resources. This was evidenced by 
the fact that on several occasions the countries were in debt-service arrears. 
Notwithstanding previous debt relief, rescheduling and restructuring initiatives, Africa’s 
debt problems and economic situation remained fragile.  
The high external debt-service has depleted the savings and foreign exchange 
earnings that could have been used in domestic investments and in the provision of social 
services for the growing population. In addition, the region’s mounting debt stocks have 
discouraged the inflow of foreign resources in the form of foreign direct investment for 
fear of high taxation rates and macroeconomic policy distortions. Instead of attracting 
resources from abroad, domestic resources flee to the developed nations either for safe 
keeping or to be invested. Domestic capital flees abnormal risks at home or escapes the 
control of domestic authorities. Extensive debt-driven capital flight has taken place in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in Ghana the rate of capital flight to GNP and capital 
flight to external debt in 1991 was 25 percent and 41 percent respectively (Valpy and 
Cobham, 2000).  
Meanwhile, in Sub-Saharan Africa today, millions of people are suffering from 
acute hunger and malnutrition due to frequent draughts and poor weather conditions that 
could have been averted by domestic resources. In many countries, a large number of the 
population relies on food aid for survival. Millions of children are malnourished while 
millions die every year from complications of curable diseases like measles, diarrhoea and 
malaria before their first birthday. Majority of the population have no access to clean 
drinking water, electricity and adequate shelter. The resources that could have been used 
to build health care centres, schools and other social infrastructures are been used in debt-
service payments. Public sector investment, which provides employment for the majority 
of the population has fallen considerably as a result of the external debt burden. Similarly, 
human capital and technology as a key factor in promoting growth and development is 
no longer affordable for similar reasons (Richards, Nwanna et al., 2003).  
Even though Structural Adjustment Programmes have been implemented since 
many years ago, Sub-Saharan economies are still weak, vulnerable and not sufficiently 
transformed to sustain accelerated growth and development. For example, in many 
countries of the region, the total debt stock in 1999 was almost equal in size to their GDP 
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and the cost of debt-service relative to export earnings was more than 25 percent of the 
countries’ export earnings. In 2000 for example, an estimated cost of external debt-service 
by the Ghanaian ministry of finance was found to be equivalent to 55 percent of 
government’s total tax revenues, which implies that the government could no longer meet 
its domestic expenditures from domestic revenue without additional borrowing from 
foreign sources.  
Furthermore, since governments could no longer generate enough revenue to 
service foreign debts due to the deteriorating terms of trade and the narrow tax base, 
debt-service obligation could only be met by reducing expenditures in priority areas such 
as education, health care systems, welfare and social services or by additional foreign 
borrowing. This has resulted to high fiscal deficits and inflation rates. Moreover, low 
public investment has resulted to lower overall investment since public investment is a 
significant proportion of total domestic investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and may also be 
complementary to private investment. Lower overall investment means reduced potential 
for medium and long-term growth. Finally, high external debt-service obligation has 
made Sub-Saharan African economies to rely more on foreign sources for budgetary 
support.  
 
1.3     Research Question 
“What are the Impacts of External Debt Service on Growth and Investment in Sub-
Saharan Africa?” 
1.4    Hypothesis  
This study proceeded based on the following hypothesis: that 
1. high external debt-service has a negative effect on growth in Sub-Saharan Africa; 
2. high external debt-service crowds out public investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1.5   Limitation and Delimitation 
The research explores the external debt crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa in general, but 
the empirical analysis focuses only on ECOWAS member countries in West Africa.5 Due 
to the unavailability of data, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mauritania are excluded 
from the analysis. The study covers the period from 1980 to 1999. 
 
 
                                                 
5
 These countries would include Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Burkina Faso, Benin, Nigeria, Cape Verde, The 
Gambia, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, Niger, and Mali. 
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1.6    Significance of the Study 
 
Since growth is the engine of economic prosperity of any nation, this study will 
contribute to the development of policies and strategies that seek to promote growth in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. A growth in annual output is what translates to an increase in income 
per capita. A higher per capita income in turn, increases the market basket of goods a 
citizen can afford. Large external debt burden has, however, encouraged a continuous 
outflow of resources from Sub-Saharan Africa in debt-service payment, and thus, 
retarding the region’s economic growth and development. The study is therefore, relevant 
for the social, political, and economic development of Sub-Saharan African economies. 
Meanwhile, as every nation is today striving hard to increase its national output, 
reduce income inequality and improve the standard of living of its citizens, sub-Saharan 
Africa is no exception. All things remaining the same, saving and investment are 
prerequisites for economic growth while heavy external debt burden depletes domestic 
savings and retards growth. The study will contribute to the scholarly discussion on the 
implications of heavy external indebtedness especially in the context of ECOWAS 
countries in Africa.  
Low levels or debt free SSA will benefit the region in the following ways: firstly, it 
will encourage voluntary capital inflows from abroad in the form of foreign direct 
investment and eliminate the uncertainties associated with heavy debt burdens. This will 
create job opportunities for the unemployed masses, improve the standard of living of the 
citizens and reduce crime rates among the youth. Foreign and domestic entrepreneurs, for 
example, may not hesitate to invest for fear of restrictions on their abilities to finance 
imports or repatriate profits.  Secondly, the social conditions and quantity and quality of 
public services in such crucial areas like education, health, transport and infrastructure 
will be improved through increased government spending. The spread of poverty and 
decline in the provision of public and social services in SSA is largely blamed on the 
outflow of capital in debt-service payments.  
Finally, with adequate knowledge and understanding of the causes and effects of 
heavy external debt burden on an economy, government leaders of SSA will adopt 
appropriate policies geared towards minimizing macroeconomic imbalances and 
eliminate economic distortions caused by heavy debt obligation. Trade and investment 
policies and regulatory frameworks will be streamlined. Private savings and investment 
will be encouraged through financial liberalization. Public investment programs will 
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compliment private sector initiatives and concentrate on infrastructural deficiencies and 
human resource development. 
 
1.7   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter introduced the importance of spatial interactions and spatial 
dependence in regional growth and income studies that the traditional literature ignored. 
It also briefly discussed the third World external debt problems, in particular, the external 
debt dynamics, and the basic transfer and how it can lead to external indebtedness. The 
chapter further elaborates on the nature of the African debt crisis and how it evolved over 
time. It also highlighted some structural adjustment mechanisms used as a response to the 
debt crisis. Finally, the problem is stated and elaborated, which ultimately led to the 
research question and the working hypothesis. The importance of the study is also 
presented. 
Since the inception of the external debt crisis, the indebted poor countries 
including Sub-Saharan Africa have been paying billions of dollars every year in debt-
service to the richer nations. This outflow of resources have crippled many countries in 
Africa, retarding their economic growth and making them unable to meet the costs of 
social needs such as education, health, infrastructure etc, of their population. A major part 
of the African debt stocks was officially contracted from multilateral financial institutions 
and bilateral creditors. Starting with an average debt stock of US$39 billion in the 1970s, 
Africa’s debt exploded to more than US$317 billion by the late 1990s. External debt-
service for the entire continent rose from US$3.5 billion to US$26 billion in the 1970s and 
1990s respectively.  
The explosion of the debt crisis in Africa is blamed on many factors, key among 
them are two oil shocks of the early and late 1970s, which created fiscal deficits and worse 
current accounts balance for many African countries. Moreover, the deteriorating terms of 
trade during the global recession of the early 1980s catalysed the problem by creating 
adverse balance of trade problems. In addition, weak and inappropriate macroeconomic 
and structural policy response to shocks contributed to the explosion of the problem. To 
finance the fiscal and external imbalances, these countries resorted to large external 
borrowing, thus, accumulating large and unsustainable external debt stocks. 
In order to overturn the declining situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, dramatic 
external intervention programs often known as structural adjustment programs were 
launched by the creditor community. These programs were designed by the IMF and 
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World Bank to get the indebted poor countries to reform their economies structurally and 
institutionally. The aim was to reverse the declining growth trends of debtor countries 
and to allow them to exit from the external debt burden. However, the structural 
adjustment programs have not resolved the problem; instead they accelerated the 
domestic economic hardship and exacerbated the external debt problem. Finally, the 
external debt problem of Sub-Saharan Africa requires the concerted action of all creditors 
as well as debtors if future financial problems are to be averted. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
2.0 EXTERNAL DEBT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
In ordinary language, we may broadly define economic development as the 
process of increasing the living standards of people within the boundaries of a specific 
location through the efficient and sustainable allocation of scarce resources (Kondonassis, 
A.J, 1991). Traditionally, economic development can also be used to mean economic 
growth with structural change. This means that economic growth is a necessary condition 
for economic development. It should be noted, however, that while economic 
development concentrates on the transformation of economic structures and institutions, 
the study of economic growth emphasises on the use of mathematical models that 
describes the quantitative relationships between economic variables. Academic research 
on external debt and its impacts on growth have only exploded after the debt crisis that 
hit many developing countries in the early 1980s. Therefore, this chapter presents some 
relevant literature on growth and external indebtedness in developing countries. 
 
2.1   Economic Growth 
   
Theoretical work on economic growth dates back many centuries ago. Although 
classical economists like Adam Smith (1776), Thomas Malthus (1798) and David Ricardo 
(1817) did not formally study economic growth, however, they outlined the basic 
ingredients of economic growth. Recent neoclassical economists regarded as pioneers of 
economic growth analysed economic growth with rigorous models. They include Allyn 
Young (1928), Frank Ramsey (1928), Joseph Schumpeter (1934), Ray Harrod (1939), Frank 
Knight (1944), and Evsey Domar (1946). The main contributors to neoclassical growth 
models are Ramsey (1928), Solow (1956), and Swan (1956), while Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988) initiated economic growth theories that are known as endogenous growth theories.     
Economic Growth is that part of economic theory that explains the rate at which a 
country’s economy grows over time. It is usually measured as the annual percentage rate 
of growth of the country’s major national income accounting aggregates, such as the 
Gross National Product (GNP) or the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with appropriate 
statistical adjustments to discount the potentially misleading effects of price inflation 
(Johnson, 2000). Every country’s economy will show sizable year to year and quarter to 
quarter fluctuations in its economic growth rate, however, theorists tend to concentrate 
their efforts on analysing and explaining the variations in the longer-term trend or 
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average rate of economic growth over longer periods such as a decade or more. Specialists 
in Business cycle theory are often left with the explanation of the shorter-term fluctuations 
around the longer-term trend because investigation has shown that the predominant 
influences on short-term growth rates seem to differ in important ways from the 
determinant of an economy’s long-term average growth performance. 
 
2.1.1   The Harrod-Domar Growth Model 
 
The Harrod-Domar growth model shows through a mathematical equation, the 
existence of a direct relationship between savings and the rate of economic growth, the 
indirect relationship between capital and economic growth. The model, which attempts to 
integrate Keynesian analysis with elements of economic growth, assumes that economic 
growth is a direct result of capital accumulation in the form of savings. The Harrod-
Domar growth model has been used by development economists to estimate the financing 
gap of a developing economy. Assuming that there is abundant supply of labour, they 
claim that scarcity of capital is the only constraint to production (Effendi, 2001). The 
model itself predicts that growth will be proportional to the rate of investment. That is, 
growth will be equal to investment divided by the Incremental Capital Output Ratio. If a 
target growth rate is set, the required investment to meet this target can be estimated by 
multiplying the target with the incremental capital output ratio.  
The financing gap is thus, the gap between the available financing for investment 
and the required investment. By filling this gap with imported foreign capital such as 
foreign debt or aid, developing countries will get the required investment that will yield 
the target growth rate. Empirical evidence does not, however, support this theory because 
the massive external debt that has accumulated in developing countries since the 1960s 
was not accompanied by an increase in per capita income. 
To illustrate the Harrod-Domar growth model, let savings (S) be some proportion, 
s, of national income (Y) such that S = sY. Investment (I) is defined as the change in capital 
stock, K, and can be represented by K∆ such that I = K∆ . Total capital stock, K, is directly 
related to national income, Y, as represented by the capital-output ratio, k, such that K/Y = 
k. This capital-output ratio can also be written in its marginal value as /K Y∆ ∆ = k, which 
is popularly known as the incremental capital-output ratio. Since the equilibrium saving, 
S, must equal total investment, I, it follows that sY = k Y∆  or in a more familiar 
expression, Y∆ /Y = s/k. This equation tells us that the rate of growth of output is 
determined jointly by the national savings ratio, s, and the national capital output ratio, k. 
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It also says that the growth rate of national income will be directly related to the saving 
ratio and inversely related to capital-output ratio. 
On theoretical grounds, the Harrod-Domar growth model suffers a shortcoming, 
which is that the equilibrium is unstable since it requires the equalization of warranted 
and natural growth rates and uses production functions with little suitability among the 
inputs. The production function used in this model is of Leontif type with fixed 
proportion of inputs.6 These weaknesses have made economists to pay less attention to 
the Harrod-Domar growth model in favour of growth models that are less rigid and 
empirically more applicable. Despite these flaws, the Harrod-Domar growth model was 
very popular after the great depression until the early 1950s and has generated many 
papers in the field of economic growth. 
2.1.2 The Neo-classical Growth Model 
The shortcomings of the Harrod-Domar growth model was solved by the growth 
model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), which is referred to as the neoclassical growth 
model. They used production functions that exhibit constant returns to scale, diminishing 
returns to each input, and positive substitutability to inputs. The production function is 
assumed to be a function of capital, labour and technology. By assuming a constant rate of 
saving the model predicts that growth in the long-run is a function of only technical 
change and not of saving or investment. Saving will have an effect on the level of income 
but not on its growth rate. This prediction implies that in the absence of continuous 
improvement in technology, per capita growth will eventually cease.  
For a formal exposition, the standard production function in neoclassical growth 
model is Y = 1 ,Ae K Lµ α α− where Y is gross domestic product, K is the stock of human and 
physical capital, L is unskilled labour, A is a constant reflecting the base level of 
technology, and eµ  represents the constant exogenous rate at which technology grows. In 
this formula α  represents the elasticity of output with respect to capital, which is the 
percentage increase in gross domestic product from a one percent increase in capital. 
Empirically, α  is measured as the share of capital in a country’s national income 
accounts. This formulation of the neoclassical growth model yields diminishing returns to 
capital and labour since α  is assumed to be less than one and private capital is assumed 
to be paid its marginal product.  
                                                 
6
 The Leontif production function with two inputs is stated in a general form as Y = min ( ),K Lα β , where 
Y is national output, K is capital input, L is labour input, and  and α β are constants.  
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In this model, an increase in saving, which is reflected in investment, will generate 
additional temporal growth. However, as the ratio of capital to labour increases, the 
marginal product of capital will decline and the economy will move back to a steady state 
in which output, capital, and labour are all growing at the same rate. Growth in per capita 
income will continue and will equal µ , which is the annual rate of productivity 
improvement. The constant, µ  can be interpreted in several ways such as the 
improvement of organizational knowledge, rearrangement of the flow of materials in a 
factory, or better management of inventory. The central issue, however, is that the 
determinants of the size of µ , the rate of growth of per capita income are left unexplained 
within the model.  
Neoclassical growth theory suggests that two countries with the same technology 
will have the same steady state growth rate of per capita income. This implies that a 
country with lower capital-labour ratio will have a higher per capita growth rate than a 
country with a high capital-labour ratio. This phenomenon is called an absolute 
convergence. Conditional convergence, on the other hand, is a situation in which a 
country will have a higher growth rate if that particular country has a lower starting level 
of real per capita income relative to the long-run or steady state position. This conditional 
convergence prediction that comes from the Solow-Swan (neoclassical) model has been 
exploited extensively as an empirical hypothesis with mixed results. For example, Barro 
and Sala-I-Martin (1992) observe convergence among the 48 states of the US in terms of 
the growth rates of their per capita income and per capita gross state product, while 
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) cite the lack of convergence of the growth rates of different 
countries. Both Barro and Sala-I-Martin argue, however, that conditional convergence is 
more likely if regions or countries are more homogenous as in the case of the 48 states in 
the US. 
Another important neoclassical growth theory, beside the Solo-Swan model, is the 
Ramsey model. The Ramsey model is a refinement of the Solow-Swan model. 
Chronologically, Ramsey’s growth theory was developed before the Solow-Swan’s. In the 
literature, however, his model is usually put after the Solow-Swan’s. One of the key 
features in his model is the assumption that households optimise their utility over time. 
This assumption essentially makes the model dynamic. Using Ramsey’s model as their 
starting point, Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) recast the saving rate that is exogenous 
under Solow-Swan model as endogenous. Even though this is considered a refinement of 
the neoclassical growth model, it does not eliminate the dependence of the long-run 
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growth rate on exogenous technological progress. The works of Cass and Koopmans 
mark the end of the basic neoclassical growth era.  
 
2.1.3  Endogenous Growth Models 
 
In recent years, growth theory has received renewed attention with the rise of a 
new line of research that explains growth rates endogenously. It was first started by the 
work of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Unlike the Solow-Swan model in which the long-
run growth rate is determined by an exogenous technological progress, Romer and Lucas 
suggest a model that endogenises the growth rate of the economies. Models that have 
endogenous source of per capita economic growth are called endogenous-growth models. 
Endogenous growth models are similar to neoclassical models but they differ 
considerably in their underlying assumptions and suggested conclusions. Three 
distinctions between the two are obvious: First, the neoclassical assumption of 
diminishing marginal returns to capital is discarded. Second, the model also envisages 
increasing returns to scale in aggregate production, and third, the model recognizes the 
role of externalities in determining the rate of return on capital. 
Endogenous growth theory can be expressed in a simple equation Y = AK. Where 
A can be interpreted as representing any factor that affects technology, while K represents 
both human and physical capital. Notice here that there are no diminishing returns to 
capital, a feature that can be achieved by invoking some externality that offsets any 
propensity to diminishing returns. Investment, whether physical investment by a firm or 
human capital investment by an individual, leads to an increase in productivity that 
exceeds the private gain. This model leaves open the possibility that an increase in the 
investment rate, either in physical or human capital, can lead to sustained growth if 
strong external economies are generated by investment itself so that α  in the neoclassical 
model becomes unity. 
In this case, the growth equation 1Y Ae K Lµ α α−=  reduces to the endogenous 
equation Y Ae Kµ= . The net result is sustained long-term growth resulting from 
increasing returns to scale. This model offers an alternative to the diminishing returns and 
absence of any sustained impact on growth that is characteristic of the basic neoclassical 
growth model. Another way of obtaining an equation like Y = AK is to postulate that an 
increasing variety or quality of machinery or intermediate inputs offsets the propensity to 
diminishing returns. To summarize, in endogenous growth models diminishing returns 
do not occur or if it does it is offset by some other forces.  
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Endogenous growth theory can help explain anomalous international flows of 
capital that exacerbate wealth disparities between developed and developing countries. 
Developing countries potentially have high rate of return on investment due to the law of 
diminishing returns. However, this is eroded by lower levels of complementary 
investments in human capital, infrastructure, or research and development. As a result, 
developing countries benefit less from broader social gains associated with each of these 
alternative forms of capital expenditure. Endogenous growth models also suggest an 
active role for public policy in promoting economic development through direct and 
indirect investment in human capital formation and foreign private investment. 
Within this new growth theory, one approach posits that the government supplies 
productive services that increase the marginal product of private capital and, thus, 
positively influence economic growth. If the production function is homogenously linear 
in private and public capital simultaneously, and government expenditures are 
endogenous, this approach yields an endogenous rate of growth. Arrow and Kurz (1970) 
were the first to introduce productive public capital in growth models, but in their model 
growth is still determined by exogenous factors. Barrow (1990) used this approach to 
present a model with endogenously determined growth rates and a balanced budget. 
However, he assumed that government spending as a flow variable enters the 
macroeconomic production function, whereas Arrow and Kurz suppose that the stock of 
public capital shows productive effects. 
Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993) presents an endogenous growth model where 
the stock of public capital has positive effects with regards to the marginal product of 
private capital, thus, leading to endogenous growth. Van Ewijk and Van de Klundert 
(1993) analyse the impact of different budgetary regimes for the dynamics of growth and 
public debt in a conventional growth model. They find that the regime where the 
government keeps the budget deficit constant is less favourable with regards to 
productivity growth as compared to a regime where the government may vary the budget 
deficit. 
Two important shortcomings of the endogenous growth models are that the 
models do not predict convergence either in absolute or conditional and that it has only 
limited empirical support. 
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2.2     Growth Convergence Debate 
 
Economists have long debated whether different countries and regions within 
countries are converging over time in terms of growth in per capita GDP. In the last 
decade the convergence debate captured the attention of mainstream macroeconomic 
theorists and econometricians. Sala-I-Martin, (1996a, b) argue that the reasons for the 
sudden increase was two fold. Firstly, the existence of convergence across countries was 
proposed as the main test of the validity of modern theories of economic growth and as a 
distinguishing feature between the earlier Solow model and the endogenous growth 
models. Secondly, the evolution of the convergence debate was due mainly to the 
availability of international GDP data, which makes it possible for the comparison of GDP 
across a large number of countries and its evolution over time.  
Mankiw et al., (1992), in their study of convergence in 98 countries over a 25-period, 
made an assumption of a common rate of technological progress. This has been criticized 
by Grossman and Helpman (1994). These new growth theorists have pointed out the 
failure of per capita output to equalize across developed and developing countries. They 
showed that the  growth rates in developing countries fail to exceed those of advanced 
countries, which is an evidence that there is little observable tendency for poorer 
economies to catch-up with the richer ones. Such evidence is supported by Lee et al.(1995) 
who found no evidence of convergence on examining 102 non-oil producing countries 
over the period 1960-1989 and stated that ‘it seems unlikely that there is common 
equilibrium across all countries’.  However, Baumol, Blackman and Wolf (1989) argue that 
if low-income, middle-income and high-income countries are examined separately, there 
is evidence of convergence within each group.  
Within the recent literature on growth, a great deal of effort is spent at questions of 
convergence and conditional convergence across countries, and to some extent, across 
states and regions. A significant contribution to this revival has been the use of the 
convergence hypothesis as the main way to differentiate between the two leading current 
approaches to economic growth – the neoclassical and endogenous growth models 
discussed above. The Solow model in its simplest form predicts that growth rates in 
output per capita and income per capita converge to a constant and identical levels across 
countries, states and regions. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992, 1995), Jones (1995), Mankiw 
et al. (1992) and others emphasize that a number of factors can give rise to growth 
convergence. These are diminishing returns to capital within each country or region; 
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spatial capital mobility, spatial labour mobility; and the diffusion of innovations across 
countries and regions.   
The prediction of absolute convergence is tested by a number of growth theorists. For 
example, Baumol (1986) examines the absolute convergence for a small sample of 
industrial countries (16) between the years 1870-1979. He finds a high degree of growth 
convergence. However, DeLong (1988) disputed the results of Baumol’s study. He added 
seven countries to Baumol’s sample and found that the rate of convergence falls to about 
half the estimate obtained by Baumol. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) examine growth 
convergence across US states for nine periods from 1880 to 1988 and found evidence of 
convergence. They find that the gap between the rich and poor states decreases by 2 
percent per year.  
Most studies conclude that there appears to be unconditional convergence among 
richer countries of the world, but little evidence of convergence is found in poorer 
countries (Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al. 1992).  Quah (1993) and Ben-David (1995) recently 
show that unconditional convergence is not a trait that characterizes just the richest 
countries. They argue that it is a phenomenon that is also common among the poorest 
countries. The convergence hypothesis states that countries with relatively low initial per 
capita income (poor countries), grow faster than those with high initial per capita income 
(rich countries) so that over time income levels converge across countries. The recent 
literature on the subject has examined the evidence relating to this hypothesis in much 
detail and has provided significant theoretical contributions explaining the circumstances 
where there may be divergence in income levels.  
There are two main reasons for expecting convergence of per capita income across 
countries: the first is the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to physical capital in 
the neoclassical model (Solow, 1956; Koopmans, 1965). Countries with low initial income 
per capita have low capital-labour ratios, and hence a higher marginal product of capital 
(or higher rate of return to capital).  Foreign capital would flow to countries with 
relatively high rates of return, meaning that capital will flow to countries where there is 
relative scarcity of capital. With time, the capital-labour ratios and factor prices will 
equalize. Similarly, because of the inflow of capital from rich to poor countries, income in 
poor countries would grow faster than incomes in rich countries and the two would 
eventually converge. This is the classical theory of the neoclassical growth model with 
decreasing returns.   
The basic model suggests that the returns to capital must be by far higher in 
developing countries than in developed countries. However, although there has been 
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considerable transfer to poorer countries, the inflow is by far less than the size predicted 
by the standard model. As highlighted by Lucas (1988), the predicted resource flows by 
the Solow model is not observed and capital does not seem to be flowing from rich 
countries to poor countries to facilitate per capita income convergence. This may be due to 
poor infrastructure, capital market imperfection, inadequate institutional structures, 
managerial skills and government tax policies and for fear of expropriation and political 
instability in developing countries.   
 
2.3   External  Debt - Growth Relationship 
 
The economic literature of recent times on open economies shows that reasonable 
levels of external borrowing by a developing country can enhance its economic growth 
through capital accumulation and productivity growth. This in turn, leads to faster 
convergence of per capita income between nations  (Barro et al. 1995; Pattillo, Poirson and 
Ricci, 2004). Countries at their early stages of development have small stocks of capital 
and are likely to have investment opportunities with higher rates of return. However, due 
to the  low volume of savings in developing countries, which reflects their low incomes, 
domestic savings should be supplemented by foreign resources. As long as these 
countries use the borrowed funds for productive investment and do not succumb to 
macroeconomic instability and policies that distort economic incentives, or sizable 
adverse economic shocks, growth should increase and allow for timely debt repayments 
(Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2004).  
Notwithstanding the above, economists and policy makers have had doubts about 
the beneficial impacts of foreign resources on the economies of developing countries, 
especially since the 1970s. Neither the presumed positive impact of foreign resources on 
the volume of savings, nor the presumed growth is  supported by empirical evidence. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, recurrent economic crises have led to poor growth performance and 
most of these countries continue to experience difficulties in servicing their external debt 
(Claessens et al, 1996). Although the literature on debt hardly explains why these 
countries have not been able to use the borrowed funds to generate sufficient output, 
critics of foreign aid in general maintain that it does more harm than good.  
However, it is often argued that an increase in a country’s external debt beyond a 
critical level can lead to unsustainable debt and insolvency of the country. The debtor 
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country may lose its creditworthiness, leading to a sudden reversal of capital flows.7 This 
in turn may lead to a currency and financial crisis and a large output loss. Moreover, debt 
cycles exist in international borrowing and lending (Nishimura and Ohyama, 1995). 
Nishimura and Ohyama show empirically that a number of countries including Europe 
went through those debt cycles in the past.  
Furthermore, the external debt and growth literature suggests that there is a uni-
directional causal link between indebtedness and growth (Choudhry and Arvin, 1998). De 
Pinies (1989) focuses on debt sustainability and adjustment, and argues that as the 
international credit market imposes severe credit rationing on the heavily indebted Low 
Income Countries (HILICs), they were in effect imposing excessive import restraints, 
which is one of the major obstacles to a debtor country’s growth prospects. Selowsky and 
Tak (1986) indicate that since heavily indebted low-income countries have been servicing 
their debt by squeezing imports and investments to generate trade and equivalent saving 
surpluses, they have also been paying a high price in terms of forgone consumption and 
output growth.  
Since these countries cannot be expected to sustain such policies for very long, 
Selowsky and Tak advocate a growth-oriented debt policy wherein creditors provide new 
financing, at least until the structural adjustment programmes take effect. Roubini (1985), 
Sachs (1985), Kaminarides and Talbert (1989), and Kaminarides and Nissan (1993) all 
examined the consequences of debt within a multi-country framework. Their studies 
suggest that at the aggregate level, debt adversely affect economic growth and the 
causality is a uni-directional one, that is, growth is adversely affected by a higher debt 
burden.  
 
2.3.1   Non-linear Effect of External Debt on Growth—Theoretical Models 
 
Academic scholars have written widely on the relationship between the stock of 
external debt and growth of economies. It is shown in various theoretical models that 
reasonable levels of current debt inflows are expected to have a positive effect on growth. 
In traditional neoclassical models, which allows for capital mobility, and the possibility to 
borrow and lend from foreign sources, debt increases transitional growth. There is an 
incentive for capital-scarce countries to borrow and invest since the marginal product of 
capital is above the world interest rate (Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2002).  
                                                 
7
 The empirical studies of Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (1996, 1997) of the Asian Financial Crisis show such 
reversal of capital flows. 
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Some endogenous growth8 models have similar implications. For instance, Eaton 
(1993) extends the Uzawa-Lucas models and shows that an increase in the cost of foreign 
capital that lowers external borrowing leads to lower long-run growth. Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, (1995); Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin, (1995), assert that models with perfect 
international capital mobility are based on unrealistic assumptions and have empirical 
implications that are counterfactual. They argue that a more realistic assumption is that 
countries may not be able to borrow freely because of the risk of debt repudiation or 
moral hazards: If the borrowing country can hide its actions from the lender it may choose 
to consume or reinvest abroad some of the borrowed funds (Gertler and Rogoff, 1990).   
One important question on debt-growth theory that would come to mind is that, 
why would large levels of accumulated debt lead to lower growth? A well known 
explanation comes from the “debt-overhang hypothesis”, which state that external debt 
burden provides a disincentive to domestic investment in developing countries and thus 
slows economic growth since any additional foreign exchange earnings would have to be 
stashed away by foreign creditors. Krugman (1988) defines “debt-overhang as a situation 
in which the expected repayment on external debt falls short of the contractual value of 
debt.” If the country’s debt level is expected to exceed the country’s repayment ability, the 
expected costs of debt-service will discourage further domestic and foreign investment, 
which consequently result to lower economic growth (Krugman, 1988; Sachs, 1989).  
Because of the fear that the domestic economy will be effectively “taxed” the 
higher the volume of output that is produced to service the external debt, potential 
domestic and foreign investors will be unwilling to increase their today’s investment 
expenditures for the sake of future increased output, and thus, economic growth is 
discouraged. The debt-overhang theory spins around the adverse effects of external debt 
on investment in physical capital. However, the theory has a much broader scope. A high 
level of external debt can also reduce the government’s incentive to carry out structural 
and fiscal reforms, since any strengthening of fiscal position could intensify pressure to 
repay foreign creditors (Clements, Bhattacharya, and Nguyen, 2003).   
In addition, investment and growth are also plummeted by debt overhang through 
increasing uncertainty. As the size of the public debt increases, there is growing 
uncertainty about actions and policies that the government will pursue in order to meet 
                                                 
8
 Endogenous growth economists believe that improvement in productivity can be linked to a faster pace of 
innovation and extra investment in human capital. They stress the need for government and private sector  
institutions and markets which nurture innovation, and provide incentives for individuals to be inventive. 
Endogenous growth theory predicts positive externalities and spill-over effects from development of a high 
valued-added knowledge economy which is able to develop and maintain a competitive advantage in growth 
industries in the global economy. 
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its debt-servicing obligations which adversely effects investment. In particular, as the 
stock of public sector debt increases, there may be expectations that the government’s 
debt-service obligations will be financed by distortionary measures like inflation tax 
(Agenor and Montiel, 1996). Serven (1997) argued that in conditions of uncertainty on 
investment, potential private investors will prefer the option of waiting if they consider 
investing to be costly. A highly uncertain environment may also lead to misallocation and 
poorer quality investment that slows productivity growth. However, any investment that 
takes place is likely to be diverted to activities with quick returns rather than to long-term, 
high risks, and irreversible projects. Rapid accumulation of debt can also be accompanied 
by increasing capital flight if the private sector fears imminent devaluation and increase in 
taxes to service the debt (Alesina and Tabellini, (1989); Tornell and Velasco, (1992); Oks 
and Wijnbergen, (1995).  
The theoretical literature further suggests that foreign borrowing has a positive 
effect on investment and growth up to a certain threshold level, beyond which its impact 
is negative. As indicated in Cohen (1993), the relationship between the face value of debt 
and investment can be represented in a debt “Laffer Curve,” which explains that as 
outstanding debt increases beyond a certain threshold level, the expected repayment 
begins to fall. The Debt Laffer Curve may also depict the relationship between a country’s 
nominal debt obligation and the market expectation of repayment. The repayment can be 
measured by the secondary market price of debt multiplied by the existing debt stock. The 
relationship is expressed as sec  V p D= × . Where V  is the market value of debt, secp  is 
the secondary market price, and D  is total debt stock. A debt overhang would exist when 
further increases in obligations are discounted at higher rates that are associated with a 
decline in the market value of the debt stock. Normally, the Debt Laffer curve is used with 
reference to borrower’s prospects for repaying loans after a critical limit of debt 
accumulation is reached. The upward-sloping part of the curve implies that an increase in 
the face value of debt leads to an increase in the expected debt repayment up to that 
threshold level, while the downward-sloping part of the curve indicate that increases in 
debt reduces expected debt repayment (Chike, 2001).  
The Debt Laffer Curve below shows the relationship between economic growth 
and debt accumulation. At all points to the left of D  on the X-axis, increasing levels of 
debt increases economic growth. However, after growth level A  on the curve, economic 
growth begins to increase at a declining rate until the peak level E , which corresponds to 
debt stock *D , where additional levels of debt decreases economic growth. The right 
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angle θ , shows that the probability of repayment falls below unity at debt levels above 
point A . Therefore, *D  is the limit at which further debt accumulation starts to impact 
negatively on growth. The expectation that some portion of the debt will have to be 
forgiven can also discourage private foreign investors from providing new financing, thus 
lowering capital accumulation and growth (Helpman, 1989; Krugman, 1988). 
 
 
      Source: Adapted from Krugman (1989b) 
 
2.3.2  Empirical Analysis 
 
Relatively few empirical studies have assessed the effects of debt-service on 
private investment and public spending and growth. External debt service, in contrast to 
the total debt stock, can potentially affect growth by crowding out private investment or 
altering public expenditure. All things remaining the same, higher debt-service can raise 
the government’s interest bill and the budget deficit, thus, reducing public savings. This 
may either raise interest rates or crowds out credit available for private investment and 
dampening economic growth. Higher debt service payment can also have adverse effects 
on the composition of public capital, with negative effects on growth (Clement, 
Bhattacharya, and Nguyen, 2003). High external debt-service is one of the key obstacles to 
meeting the basic human needs in developing countries (Oxfam 1999). Studies carried out 
by Greene and Villanueva (1991); Serieux and Samy (2001) find that external debt 
dampens private investment, and consequently lowers growth. In another study using a 
large sample of developing countries including some HIPCs, Savvides (1992) finds that 
debt-service crowds out public investment spending. Using a panel data of 24 African 
HIPCs, Stephens (2001) finds that each additional US$ 1 in debt-service results in a US$ 
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0.33 decrease in education spending, a US$ 0.14 - 0.23 fall in government wage 
expenditure; and a US$ 0.12 - 0.23 increase in health spending. However, his results 
indicate that an increase in debt-service may not necessarily lead to a decline in 
investment in human capital. 
Some scholars have found mixed empirical support for the “debt overhang” 
hypothesis and its impacts on growth. Studies that have econometrically assessed the 
direct effects of the debt stock on investment and growth are relatively few. In most 
studies, reduced-form equations for growth are used, under which the stock of debt is 
presumed to affect growth both directly by reducing the incentives to undertake 
structural reforms and indirectly via its effects on investment (Clements, Bhattacharya, 
and Nguyen, 2003). Empirical theory suggests that debt may have non-linear effects on 
growth, either through capital accumulation or productivity growth. This debt-growth 
relationship was observed in a study using a large panel data of 93 developing countries 
over the period 1969-1998 (Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci, 2002).  
Pattillo and others used various non-linear specifications to identify the levels of 
debt at which the average and marginal impact of debt on growth becomes negative. By 
holding all other growth determinants constant to establish the non-linear relationship 
between debt and growth, they confirm that the average impact of debt becomes negative 
at the intercept of the function on the horizontal axis, while at the turning point of the 
function, the marginal impact of debt becomes negative. Their finding suggests that the 
average impact of debt becomes negative at about 160-170 percent of export or 35-40 
percent of GDP. This results indicates that the marginal impact of debt starts being 
negative at about half of these values on average. The quantitative effects of high debt 
were found to be quite substantial. They concluded that for a country with average 
indebtedness doubling the debt ratio would reduced the annual per capita growth by 
between half and one percentage point, while countries that are to benefit from debt 
reduction under the HIPC initiative, per capita growth might increase at one percentage 
point, unless constrained by other macroeconomic and structural distortions. 
Cohen (1997) also empirically investigate the non-linear effects on growth and 
pointed that the probability of debt rescheduling, which positively depends on external 
indebtedness significantly lowers growth. He concluded that debt becomes excessive 
when it reaches levels of the order of 50 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports. 
Elbadawi et al,. (1997) considered non-linear effects of debt on growth directly by using a 
quadratic specification and controlling for country effects. They report a growth 
maximizing debt to GDP ratio of 97 percent, which Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004) 
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viewed as being too high compared to their own finding of around 70 percent. They also 
pointed the non correction of biases arising from the endogeneity of several regressors, 
particularly the debt variables, and the presences of unobserved country-specific effects in 
a dynamic panel model. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) find much lower 
thresholds for the probability of a debt crisis. Although they do not directly investigate 
the relationship between debt and growth, their result suggests that risks of a debt crisis 
with expected negative consequences for growth increases significantly at debt levels as 
low as 15 percent of GNP for countries with a weak default and inflation history. 
Although most of the empirical literature show evidence of the negative effect of 
debt on growth, Easterly (2001) argues that the causality runs in the opposite direction, 
that is, slow growth leads to indebtedness. He argues that the global slowdown in growth 
after 1975 contributed to the debt crisis of the low and middle-income countries in the 
1980s and the HIPCs in the 1980s and 1990s. He points that lower growth lowers tax 
revenue and primary surpluses, which increases the probability of debt ratios to explode. 
Choudhry (2001) provides supporting evidence that the causality runs from debt to 
growth. Using panel causality tests based on a dynamic linear model, he finds a 
significant and negative causal impact of debt on growth both in HIPC and non HIPC 
developing countries. 
 
2.3.3  Growth Accounting and Determinants of Total Factor Productivity Growth 
 
In a follow-up paper by Pattillo, Poirson, and Ricci, (2003), it was proved that high 
debt stocks affect growth through their dampening effects on both physical capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity growth (TFP). Growth accounting decomposes 
output growth into changes of the various factor inputs. There are relatively few studies 
that have done growth accounting decomposition. Pattillo and others employ a growth 
accounting framework to a group of 61 developing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East, Asia and Latin America over the period from 1969 to 1998. Their findings 
suggests that on average, doubling debt reduces by almost one percentage point of both 
growth in per capita physical capital and growth in total factor productivity. Fisher (1993) 
found a cause-effect relationship between macroeconomic policy and growth, and 
showed that high budget deficits and inflation reduced growth both by lowering capital 
accumulation and productivity growth. Bosworth and Collins (2003) find that life 
expectancy and changes in the terms of trade and the quality of institutions have greater 
effects through total factor productivity growth, while budget deficits affects capital 
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growth. Moreover, the policy environment also affects the debt-growth relationship. In 
contrast to theoretical predictions and other empirical studies, trade openness is found to 
affect growth through capital accumulation, rather than total factor productivity (Collins 
and Bosworth, 1996). 
Similar studies by Easterly and Levine (2001) show strongly that total factor 
productivity (TFP) and not capital accumulation drives growth, implying that priority 
should be given to policies and institutions that are conducive to growth. Some empirical 
literature focuses mainly on the role of openness. Edwards (1998), for example, uses 
alternative openness indicators to demonstrate that more open countries experience faster 
total factor productivity growth than less open ones. Coe et al,. (1997) show that 
developing countries that trade with R&D intensive industrial countries have higher 
productivity growth. In low-income countries human capital is found to boost total factor 
productivity only when countries achieve certain levels of openness (Miller and 
Upadhyay, 2000).  
In contrast to both the theoretical and empirical evidence in support of the debt 
overhang hypothesis, Hansen (2001) finds no significant negative effect of external debt 
on growth in a sample of 54 developing countries including 14 HIPCs.9  Moreover, 
Borensztein (1990) and Arrau (1990) have attempted to estimate the impact of the debt 
crisis on investment and growth by simulating conventional optimal growth models 
along the lines suggested by supporters of the debt-overhang hypothesis. Borensztein 
(1990) simulates an optimal growth model parameterized to resemble a representative 
debtor country. Contrary to the presumptions of the theoretical literature, he finds that 
debt relief does not have any important quantitative effect on growth. He finds that if the 
representative country is forced to transfer 5 percent of its output every period and cannot 
borrow in international capital markets, investment will be 22.5 percent of output. If the 
transfer is zero, investment will only increase to 24.3 percent of output, while 
consumption will increase from 68.5 percent to 71.1 percent of output. The result of 
Borensztein and Arrau suggest surprisingly that the outward resource transfer, although 
a burden, is not a crippling burden. Contrary to the predictions of the debt-overhang 
theory, their results suggest that the debt crisis cannot explain the collapse of investment 
and the decline of economic growth. 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 He included three additional variables (the budget balance, inflation and openness) 
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2.4  Debt Service and Current Expenditure 
 
A number of authors have argued that a key aspect of the debt crisis during the 
1980s was the impact of debt-service on non-interest expenditure.10 Reisen and Van 
Trotsenburg (1988) were among the first to research on the ‘internal transfer problem’. 
Based on a sample of seven largely indebted countries, they tested for evidence of 
crowding out based on a government budget constraint of the form: 
 
                              *G NFT M D D Tα+ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +                (12) 
 
where α  is the fraction of net financial transfers for which the government is responsible, 
G is the government spending, M∆ is the monetaization of the budget deficits, D and D* 
are domestic and foreign debt respectively and T is fiscal revenue. The authors find that 
governments adjusted to higher debt-service payments principally by cutting back on 
non-interest expenditure, particularly government investment. 
 Dornbusch (1988) also focused on the problem faced by countries where net 
transfers  turned negative and where governments were obliged to meet debt-service 
payments from sources other than new lending. Faced with a choice between politically 
difficult measures such as raising taxes, cutting subsidies, downsizing the public 
administration and building up wage arrears, on one hand, or printing money and issuing 
domestic debt on the other, it was no accident that Argentina and Brazil experienced 
extraordinary inflation in the aftermath of the debt crisis.   
 Within the context of Africa, evidence of the internal transfer problem is limited 
and mixed. Gallagher (1995) uses African Development Indicator Data for 16 African 
countries and regresses changes in the share of education, health and other spending 
categories as a share of total spending and in interest payments as a share of total 
spending. The change is measured between averages for the period 1980 to 1985 and 1985 
to 1993. The study also pools all available annual data using fixed coefficients to control 
for differing country experiences. The study tests four hypotheses: (1) that rising interest 
payments have crowded-out other types of spending; (2) that total capital spending is 
reduced earlier and more than is recurrent spending; (3) that governments cut 
expenditures on operations and maintenance while protecting employment; and (4) that 
                                                 
10
 other Channels beyond the debt overhang and internal transfer problem – through which debt may affect 
performance might include: (1) the uncertainty generated by debt reschedulings and the negative impact of 
this on investment; (2) the administrative costs of repeated reschedulings. 
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defense spending is more likely to be protected than health and education. While few of 
the results are significant at the 95 percent level, the study did find evidence – significant 
at 90 percent level of crowding-out of capital spending by interest payments. The cross-
country estimation results also indicated significant crowding-out of education spending 
by increases in interest payments, although the fixed effect estimation results failed to 
yield similar significant results. 
More generally, Fielding (1995) tests a model designed to measure the relationship 
between revenue and expenditure in SSA. The model assumes that the government 
maximizes the present discount value of utility of government spending and private 
disposable income subject to the constraint that the sum of these discounted values be 
equal to current wealth plus the present discount values of future national income. 
Assuming rational expectations and no liquidity constraints, public expenditure should 
follow a random walk, while the reverse happens if taxation and borrowing are 
constrained. The study regresses public expenditure on a number of variables for a panel 
of 12 African countries from 1970 to 1989 and finds that current expenditure is 
significantly dependent on current revenue and that the more highly indebted countries 
are, the more they face severe constraints. 
As noted earlier, the extent to which debt service crowds-out other spending 
depends in part on the extent to which new lending helps to cover the debt-service due. In 
general, balance of payment support is more easily used to cover debt-service payments 
than investment lending, which is tied to projects. However, to the extent that either form 
of assistance is used to finance the purchase of goods and services that would have been 
purchased anyway by the government, they free up domestic resources for debt-service 
payments. 
Several studies, including McGuire (1978) and Feyzioglu et al (1998), have 
examined the fungibility of aid. Feyzioglu et al, find evidence that aid is fungible at the 
aggregate level of public spending and also results in reduction in tax collection efforts. 
The authors also find evidence at the disaggregated level that loans to certain sectors 
including education are diverted to other ends. Deverajan et al (1998) modeled the 
difference in objective functions between donors and recipient governments that gives 
rise to the issue of fungibility. Using African data, the authors find that governments do 
not generally spend all sectorial aid in the intended sectors except on education. They also 
find little evidence that aid leads to greater tax relief and that an equal amount of aid goes 
toward repaying the principal on past loans as on operations and maintenance spending.   
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In sum the existing theoretical and empirical literature provides limited evidence 
on how external indebtedness affects economic growth and investment in SSA. In 
particular, no specific study on the crisis focusing on how spatial dependence and spatial 
interaction is related to the crisis since its onset in the 1980s. This study therefore, attempt 
to fill this existing gap. 
 
2.4 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter reviewed some of the existing literature on the relationship between 
external debt and economic growth in developing countries. Growth models are also 
discussed. In particular, the traditional growth theories such as the Harrod-Domar, Neo-
Classical and Endogenous growth models were presented. Moreover, the growth 
convergence debate between developing and developed countries is highlighted. The 
chapter finally reviewed the theoretical and empirical models that assessed the effects of 
external debt and debt-service on growth and investment in third World countries.  
The issue of economic growth is of great importance to any nation state because it 
is the country’s total output that determines the general welfare (per capita income) of the 
citizens. Many economists have formulated economic models that explain growth and 
how it is influenced by exogenous and endogenous factors. Key among them is the 
Harrod-Domar Growth Model, which argues that growth is directly related to the savings 
ratio, but inversely related to the capital ratio. The model assumes that economic growth 
is a direct result of capital accumulation in the form of savings. The higher a country’s 
savings ratio, the higher the growth rate and vise versa.  However, the model’s 
shortcoming is that the equilibrium is unstable since it requires the equalization of 
warranted and natural growth rates. Also, it uses production functions with little 
suitability among the inputs. 
The model of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), also known as the neo-classical model  
resolved the flaws of the Harrod-Domar Model. It uses production functions that exhibits 
constant returns to scale, diminishing returns to inputs, and positive substitutability to 
inputs. The production function is assumed to be a function of capital, labor, and 
technology. It predicts that growth in the long run is a function of only technological 
change and not of savings or investment. The model further suggest that two countries 
with the same technology will have the same steady state growth rate of per capita 
income, implying that a country with a lower capital-labor ratio will have a higher per 
capita growth rate than a country with a higher capital-labor ratio.  
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In the recent years, Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) developed models known as 
endogenous growth models. Unlike the Solow-Swan model in which the long-run growth 
rate is determined by an exogenous technological progress, Romer and Lucas suggest a 
model that endogenises the growth rate. The endogenous growth models are similar to 
neo-classical models, but differ in their underlying assumptions and their suggested 
conclusions.  
Meanwhile, since the explosion of the debt crisis in the 1980s, many scholars have 
written  extensively on the relationship between external debt and growth in developing 
countries. Development economists acknowledge that poor countries at their early stages 
of development have small stocks of capital and are likely to have investment 
opportunities with higher rates of return. Therefore, these countries can borrow to 
augment their limited domestic capital and hence promote growth and development 
through productive investments. Once growth is achieved, the returns of the invested 
resources should be used to service the debt.  
However, many recent empirical studies on developing countries shows that 
external borrowing, instead of positively promoting economic growth and investment, it 
retards growth and investment. This is because high external indebtedness discourages 
the inflow of foreign capital in the form of investment for fear of ill macroeconomic 
policies that distort the economy. Debt-service, which is the immediate impact of large 
external debt, drains the debtor countries of resources that could be invested to promote 
growth. Owners of domestic capital withhold investment plans in fear of nationalization, 
thus, affecting growth. From evidence of the reviewed literature, I conclude that large 
external debt negatively affects economic growth and Investment.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38   
 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
3.0     CHARACTERISTICS OF SUB-SAHARAN ECONOMIES 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), excluding South Africa, is comprised of 45 countries 
covering the whole of Africa south of the Sahara. It covers a total area of more than 22 
million square kilometres. Although SSA countries share many common features, 
however, they differ in size, geographical and climatic conditions, population, natural 
resource endowment, and political, economic, social and cultural characteristics. In size, 
the countries range from Sudan, which has a total land area of more than 2.5 million 
square kilometres, to Seychelles and Sao Tome and Principe, which are small island states 
of less than 100,000 square kilometres (Abbott, 1993).     
The region’s population in 2005 ranged from Nigeria, with over 128 million11, to 
Seychelles and Sao Tome and Principe, each with a population of less than 200, 000.12  The 
population densities also show similar disparities with higher densities in smaller states 
than in bigger ones. For example, Mauritius has a population density of 574 persons per 
square kilometre as compared with a population density of two each in Botswana, 
Mauritania and Namibia. With a rapid growing population of some 480 million, SSA had 
a total GNP of only 315 billion in 1999 (Forbes, 2002). A major share of the African 
population lives and works in the rural sector. 
The geographical and climatic conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa range from 
tropical rain forest to semi-arid and desert conditions. The region is also endowed with 
large deposit of natural resources. For example, six countries: Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, 
Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Congo are major oil exporters, while the others are 
endowed with extensive deposit of precious metals and minerals. Among those with 
mineral resource deposits are Botswana, whose diamond deposits are among the best in 
the world. Guinea and Sierra Leone are endowed with substantial deposits of high-grade 
bauxite, while substantial deposits of Gold can be found in Ghana. High-grade deposits of 
uranium and iron ore can be found in Niger and Liberia respectively, where as Zambia 
and Congo DRC are rich in copper. The region is also endowed with rich fishing, forestry 
and energy resources which is largely unexploited.  
Agriculture, which is the backbone of SSA economies has not seen technological 
development, and is still conducted largely in the traditional production systems because 
                                                 
11
 CIA World Fact Book 2006 (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html) 
12
 Ibid 
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of the lack of tools and technology. The production base is narrow both in terms of size 
and range of goods produced (World Bank 1990b). Commercial activities are crucially 
dependent on imported factor inputs, and exports are based on only few primary export 
commodities. Savings are limited and continuous inflow of external financial resources is 
required to maintain domestic absorption, including a low rate of capital formation (Tarp, 
1993) 
However, differences exist among countries in respect of economic, financial and 
political systems and forms of governments. Countries of the former French colony are 
members of a single currency, the CFA franc that has fixed exchange rate with the then 
French franc, but now the Euro. A similar arrangement with the pound sterling existed in 
the former British colony, but was abolished after independence. There is a marked 
difference in social, cultural, and linguistic traditions between francophone and 
Anglophone Africa.  
The regional differences enable international organizations and institutions to 
classify SSA into categories. For example, the World Bank uses a per capita income cut-off 
point of  US$ 48013 to differentiate between low-income and middle-income countries. 
Others distinguish these countries as oil-importing and oil-exporting SSA, while others 
classify them as land-locked and island economies; producers of primary commodities, 
heavily indebted and debt distressed countries, etc (Abbott, 1993). 
Despite the distinct differences in the existing conditions and characteristics, Sub-
Saharan countries share many similarities in terms of the basic structure, problems and 
performance of their economies. Income per capita is low in most of these countries and 
the population growth rate is high with wide spread abject poverty. The region is 
characterised with recurrent droughts and famine, and there is lack of basic health, 
education and social infrastructure, making these countries the poorest in the world.  
However, Sub-Saharan economies are open economies, with most of them 
depending entirely on one or two export crops as foreign exchange earner. This makes 
them vulnerable to the changing conditions of the world market. Foreign trade accounts 
for about 20 percent of the region’s GDP. Income from exports has declined dramatically, 
and there is growing dependence on imports of food and food aid. In addition, the region 
is heavily burdened by debt-service obligation which is greatly aggravated by reduced 
capital inflows and the steady deterioration of its capital stock.  
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 This is 1987 per capita  
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Despite considerable progress in macroeconomic conditions since independence, 
government administrations and institutions are critically weak, corrupt and inefficient. 
The mismanagement of the domestic economies is widespread and unabated. Moreover, 
the acute shortage of trained human power at many levels of management has 
constrained efficiency and the capacity to govern effectively, and the consequent reliant 
on expatriate advisers, willingly supplied through the international system of technical 
assistance has had mixed results.14 The lack of institutional capacities is rampant and 
major social problems are building up as increasing numbers of people migrate to the 
cities and towns. The region is also facing devastating environmental degradation 
through a reinforcing process of desertification, deforestation and land degradation.   
 
3.1  A Review of Economic Performance of SSA (Historical Perspective) 
 
For decades, the performance of African economies has been disappointing, with 
the 1980s being extremely disastrous for most of sub-Saharan Africa. However, progress 
was made in economic performance immediately after independence. Many countries 
experienced considerable progress, and indeed, the whole region performed well in most 
economic indicators in the 1960s. The 1970s witnessed variance in performance record and 
there were signs of future problems on the horizon. Notwithstanding the foreseen bleak 
future, sub-Saharan economies survived the 1974 - 1976 external shocks successfully 
(Helleiner, 1986b).  
The average annual GDP growth rate, which reached a level of 5 percent from 1965 
to 1973, declined to only 3.2 percent during the later part of the 1970s. This growth rate 
further dropped to 2.1 percent in 1980. With a rapidly growing population, the real GDP 
per capita fell by 1.1 percent during the 1980s. Furthermore, real GNP per capita 
measured in 1980 prices, which grew at 1.7 percent from 1965 to 1973, declined by 1.2 
percent annually from 1980, resulting to a stagnating annual growth rate of GNP per 
capita at 0.3 percent from 1965 to 1989 (Tarp, 1993).  
The industrial sector, which had registered progress two decades after 
independence, grew only moderately from 1980, while agricultural production declined 
more than the rate of population growth. Per capita food production had fallen by 45 
percent of the level of 1980 between 1987 and 1989, resulting to wide spread hunger and 
malnutrition among the population. The share of both agriculture and industry stagnated 
                                                 
14
 for a broader analysis of the impact of Official Development Assistance, see Cassen et al (1986), Mosley 
(1987b); and Riddell (1987) 
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at around 60 percent of GDP from 1965 to 1989. However, while agriculture increased its 
share from 28 to 32 percent from 1980 to 1989, the industrial share fell from 32 to 27 
percent in the same period.  
Notwithstanding the decline in the industrial sector, manufactured exports, which 
accounted for only 5 percent of merchandise exports in 1980, rose to 11 percent in 1989. 
This illustrates the importance of relatively better export prices, but also that total 
merchandise exports contracted considerably in volume terms. Data on trade vary in 
coverage and are not directly comparable, but taking account of the rate of population 
growth of 3.2 percent per year, per capita merchandise exports dropped by 29 percent 
between 1980 and 1989 (Tarp, 1993). The table below presents some basic indicators of 
sub-Saharan Africa between 1965 to 1989 measured in annual percentage change.  
 
Table 1.2:  GDP, Aggregate Demand and other Economic Indicators, 1965 –1989 (average 
annual percentage change) 
 
aIndicator  1965 – 73 1973 – 80 1980 – 89 
GDP 4.8 3.2 2.1 
GDP per Capita 3.3 - 0.3 - 1.1 
Agricultural Production 2.4 1.1 2.0 
Industrial Production 10.4 4.3 0.7 
Service Production 3.4 4.2 2.3 
Government Consumption 9.0 7.0 1.1 
Private Consumption 3.9 2.6 0.7 
Gross Domestic Investment 9.8 4.0 - 3.9 
bMerchandise Exports  15.1 0.2 - 0.6 
bMerchandise Imports  3.7 7.6 - 5.9 
GNP per capita 1.7 0.6 - 1.2 
Inflation 7.5 6.8 19.0 
Terms of Trade - 6.7 5.4 - 4.9 
Long-term Debt Outstanding and 
cdisbursed  20.1d  23.9 14.5 
Population growth 2.6 2.8 3.2 
Source: Finn Tarp, 1993 
Notes: 
a  Data refer to changes unless otherwise indicated 
b  Do not include services 
c  Average annual percentage change of nominal amount  
d  Data refer to 1970 - 73 
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From 1980 on wards the import of merchandise per capita started declining at an annual 
average rate of 9.1 percent, and had dropped by 57.6 percent in volume terms by 1989. 
The terms of trade, which have been favourable mostly for the oil exporting countries in 
Africa in the 1970s, deteriorated considerably. Thus, the net inflow of foreign resources 
started to decline, paving the way for long-term borrowing. 
 Long-term external debt continued to rise in nominal terms during the 1980s, but 
at a reduced pace as compared to the 1960s and 1970s. It is however, worth noting that the 
increase of external debt in real terms in 1980 was modest (IMF, 1990). From 1973, a high 
volume of long-term debt was contracted at variable interest rates, which raised debt-
service payment to levels of 5.9 and 22.2 percent of GNP and total exports in 1989 
respectively. As a result of these developments, a wide resource gap developed, with 
inflation rate skyrocketing at unprecedented levels averaging over 19 percent annually 
from 1980, while past investment and consumption levels became unsustainable. 
Similarly, from 1980 to 1989, government and private consumption, together with gross 
domestic investment dropped in real terms by 17, 20 and 48 percent per capita 
respectively.  
That notwithstanding, the share of total absorption: consumption and investment 
as a share of GDP indicated an increasing trend during 1965 to 1989. Therefore, gross 
domestic savings fell from a level of 21 percent of GDP in 1980 to only 13 percent of GDP 
in 1989, which is lower than the savings rate in 1965. If Nigeria is excluded, it would be 
clear that gross domestic savings fell by two percent points from 13 percent of GDP in 
1980 to 11 percent in 1989 (World Bank, 1989a) 
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the social and economic progress made in 
Sub-Saharan Africa during the 1960s was lost during the 1980s. Important economic and 
social infrastructure has deteriorated, human suffering has increased and the utilization 
rates as low as 30 percent of industrial capacity have been reported in some countries 
(World Bank, 1989b). The quality of health care and education was declining almost 
everywhere, the supply of expendables was grossly insufficient and maintenance budgets 
are inadequate. Progress in reducing child mortality rates has slowed down and in some 
cases even reversed, while population growth rate continues soaring. 
The table below outlines the aggregate demand, external resource balance and external 
debt in Sub-Saharan Africa for 1965, 1980, and 1989. 
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Table 1.3: Aggregate Demand, External Resource Balance and External Debt 
aIndicator  1965 (%) 1980 (%) 1989 (%) 
General Government Consumption 10 13 14 
Private 
bConsumption  73 66 73 
Total Consumption 83 78 87 
Gross Domestic Investment 14 20 15 
Absorption 97 98 102 
Gross Domestic Savings 14 21 13 
- Nigeria 18 13 11 
Exports of Goods and non factor services 23 26 25 
Resource 
cBalance  1.0 1.0 - 3.0 
- excluding Nigeria d1.4  - 6.1 - 5.4 
Total External Debt (Percentage of GNP) d13.4  27.4 g98.3  
Debt-Service ( )ePercentage of GNP  d1.4  3.1 g5.9  
Debt Service as share of total 
eexports  d7.1  10.9 g22.2  
Debt Service as share of scheduled 
fobligation  - 96.6 38.9 
Share of long-term debt with variable interest d6.3  23.7 23.8 
Source: Tarp, F, 1993 
Notes: 
a Stated in percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated.  
b Includes some statistical discrepancies (World bank 1989b: 285). 
c   Resource balance shows the difference between exports and imports of goods and non factor 
 services or the difference between gross domestic savings and gross domestic investment 
d Data refer to 1970. 
e Data on debt service in 1970 excludes interest payments an short-term debt 
f Calculated by adding outstanding arrears as well as principal and interests forgiven  
g 1990 figures for  the debt/GNP ratio, the debt ration and the debt service ratio are  
 111.9, 7.8 and 24.2, respectively, as projected by the World Bank (1990c). 
 
3.2   Recent Economic Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.2.1 Growth in Output 
 
 From the mid 1960s until the end of the 1970s, Africa experienced moderate 
growth in output. While this average growth rate was far below the rate attained in some 
East Asian countries, it exceeded the growth rate achieved by many developing countries 
in other parts of the world. As can be depicted from table 1.4 below, Sub-Saharan Africa 
attained a notable increase in output growth during the 1970s due to a rapid boom in 
commodity prices in the world market and increased inflow of foreign aid. In many 
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countries of the region, the growth in output resulted in an increase in investment by 
more than 25 percent of GDP (UNCTAD, 2001).  
Despite the previous growth achievements, economic performance deteriorated rapidly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Unlike many countries in other 
developing regions which managed to restore growth after the lost decade of the 1980s, 
stagnation and decline continued in Sub-Saharan Africa until the first half of the 1990s 
due to a combination of adverse external and internal developments, external debt 
burden, structural and institutional setbacks and policy slippages (UNCTAD, 1998; 1999).  
The continued deterioration of the socio-economic conditions and its subsequent 
ramification into political and civil unrests resulted to the launching of various initiatives 
by the international community including the United Nations New Agenda for the  
Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF), to address the problems faced by the 
countries in the region. The African countries themselves adopted structural adjustment 
programmes developed by the World Bank and IMF, constituting rapid and extensive 
liberalization, deregulation and privatisation of government economic activities in search 
for a solution to economic stagnation and decline. Although most African countries 
adopted structural adjustment programmes more frequently and intensively than any 
other developing region, relatively, very few countries exited the programme with success 
in establishing conditions for rapid and sustainable economic growth. 
 
Table 1.4 : The Annual  Average GDP Growth in Africa, 1965 – 1999 (in percentage) 
 1965-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 1990-1994 1995-1999 
Africa 4.5 4.2 2.5 2.3 0.9 3.5 
North Africa 5.3 6.7 4.2 3.1 2.1 4.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 4.0 2.1 2.4 0.8 3.9 
Incl. South Africa 4.2 3.3 1.7 2.0 0.4 3.2 
Excl. Nigeria 3.5 3.9 2.5 2.3 0.3 4.2 
 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001 p. 4 
 
However, the decline in economic performance started an upturn in the mid 1990s 
with an average income growth rate that exceeds the rate of population growth for four 
consecutive years. This resulted in gains in per capita income across Africa for the first 
time in many years. It can be depicted from table 1.4 that the economic performance of 
Sub-Saharan Africa was even stronger without Nigeria, where growth remained below 
average compared to other countries in the region. Similarly, South Africa had a relatively 
poor performance, especially towards the end of the decade. Combined growth in South 
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Africa and Nigeria, which account for about 50 percent of the total GDP of the continent 
excluding North Africa, was about 2.2 percent per annum during 1995 to 1999, while the 
remaining countries in Sub-Saharan Africa had a moderate growth rate of 4.2 percent per 
annum over the same period. 
Nevertheless, there was a generalized slowdown at the end of the decade 
throughout the region including North Africa, which appeared to have continued through 
2000, when the growth rate of Sub-Saharan Africa fell to 2.7 percent, equivalent to the 
growth rate of the population.15 Despite the recent upturn in growth, per capita income in 
Sub-Saharan Africa at the turn of the new century is 10 percent below the level reached in 
1980, and the gap is even larger compared to the level attained three decades earlier. 
Economic growth remains well below the target of 6 percent per annum. For the region as 
a whole, only Uganda and Mozambique that met this target during the past decade. 
 
Table 1.5:  Annual Rates of GDP Growth in Africa, 1990 – 1999 (in percentage) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
North Africa 3.4 2.0 2.0 0.5 3.9 1.5 6.5 2.6 5.6 3.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 1.8 -0.3 0.0 0.9 4.3 5.3 3.8 3.2 2.7 
Incl. South Africa 1.1 0.4 -1.2 0.6 2.1 3.7 4.7 3.2 2.0 2.0 
Excl. South Africa & Nigeria 1.4 1.2 -1.0 0.5 1.1 4.7 5.5 4.1 3.7 3.1 
 
 Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2001. Note: Growth rates are calculated from regional aggregates of 
GDP in constant (1995) dollars. 
  
3.2.2   Sectorial Developments 
  
In spite of the recent developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, industrial growth has 
fallen far behind GDP growth since 1980. The elasticity of industrial value added as a 
share of GDP measured in period averages during the 1960s and 1970s was 1.10 and 103 
respectively. However, this ratios declined to 0.75 in the 1980s and to 0.65 in the 1990s, 
constituting a remarkable shift from an emphasis on industrialization. In many African 
countries, de-industrialization appears to have been associated with trade liberalization 
and the decline of state-owned enterprises, which in many countries, had constituted the 
major segment of large-scale industry. Today, industrial growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
largely dependent on growth in the agricultural sector. 
                                                 
15
 Population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa declined from 28 percent in the 1970s to 2.6 percent in the late 
1990s. North Africa, on the other hand, experienced a more rapid decline, from 2.4 percent to 1.7 percent 
over the same period. 
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 The Agricultural sector has been the main engine for African economic growth 
since independence. The average agricultural growth rate in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa 
and North Africa in the 1990s were respectively 2.6, 2.5 and 2.8 percent. While the growth 
rate of agricultural output was slightly below the rate of  population growth in Sub-
Saharan Africa (2.6 percent per annum), it exceeded the 1.6 percent annual population 
growth in North Africa. Thus, per capita agricultural output increased significantly. 
However, cereal output fell behind the population growth in both Sub-Saharan Africa and 
North Africa. Between 1990 and 2000, about thirty countries in Africa experienced a 
decline in per capita agricultural output, ten had moderate increases that was less than 
one percent per annum and twelve had increases of more than one percent per annum. 
Favourable weather conditions in most of Sub-Saharan Africa  boosted agricultural 
growth, which averaged 3.9 percent per annum from 1993 until 1998, with the exception 
of 1997, which had an average growth of only 3.1 per cent per annum. 
 There seems to be a very weak relationship between agricultural policy reforms 
and output growth. Deregulation of agricultural markets seems to have failed to generate 
the expected supply response in most countries.16 Increases in agricultural output in the 
mid 1990s were associated with improved terms of trade, which played a major role in the 
acceleration of overall growth in the second half of the 1990s. But agricultural 
performance generally deteriorated due to adverse weather conditions and the declining 
terms of trade  towards the end of the decade. The situation continues to be worrying 
especially for food crops. Recurrent droughts, prolonged dry spells and floods since 2000 
have undermined optimism and raised doubts about the sustainability of rising crop 
yields and resulted in much lower agricultural output in the continent. 
 Moderate growth in agriculture and the poor performance of industry has meant 
that much of the African growth in the past decade came from the services sector. 
Between 1980 and 1990, the share of services as a percentage of GDP rose from 38.7 
percent to 48.6 percent, while the share of agriculture and industry during the same 
period declined respectively from 22.3 percent to 19.5 percent and from 39 percent to 31.9 
percent. The rapid decline of industrial share especially at the early stage of 
industrialization and development suggest that the growth process in the region is highly 
fragile.       
 
                                                 
16
 Out of the ten countries in SSA where agriculture grew significantly faster than the population during the 
1990s, only Ghana, Malawi, and Nigeria were considered by the World Bank to be among the “core group of 
adjusters” in 1993 (UNCTAD, 1999). 
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Table 1.6: Total Agricultural and Cereal Output from 1992 to 2000                                    
(index numbers, 1989 – 1991 = 100) 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Africa          
Agriculture 104.2 107.1 109.7 112.8 124.0 122.1 126.8 129.2 128.8 
Cereals 98.0 101.6 110.2 105.5 129.3 115.1 123.5 121.0 118.0 
North Africa          
Agriculture 105.3 107.1 106.6 105.1 132.3 120.7 129.3 132.9 130.8 
Cereals 105.1 86.1 94.2 82.5 155.5 89.0 122.8 106.5 94.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa          
Agriculture 104.2 107.4 110.4 115.0 121.5 122.0 125.8 128.0 127.9 
cereals 98.4 106.1 109.9 112.0 123.4 119.3 123.2 123.0 122.0 
Source: UNCTAD, 2001. p. 8 
 
3.3  An Overview of the West African Regional Economies (ECOWAS) 
 
The West African economies consist of sixteen regional states, which formed the 
regional group called the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). By 
virtue of their small sizes and markets, the creation of this body was considered important 
for the economic development of the sub-region. The sixteen member states, though were 
members of different colonies, have strong historical and cultural relationships. Most of 
the countries in the sub-region have very low income per capita, and carry the burden of 
large external debts. 
The West African economies represents 25 percent of Africa’s land area, which 
covers a surface area of about 6,142,000 sq. km. The population is 34 percent of Africa’s 
total, and 15 percent of its 1998 GDP. The sub-region stretches from the southern edges of 
the Sahara desert to the Atlantic Ocean along the Gulf of Guinea to Biafra and from the 
eastern shores of the Atlantic from Senegal to lake Chad. The climatic and geographical 
conditions of these countries range from equatorial rain forests to hot desert belt (Jones, 
2002). 
The sub-regional economies depend mainly on agricultural production, which 
makes them vulnerable to natural shocks such as draughts. In addition to agriculture, 
mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, iron ore and bauxite can be found in countries 
like Ghana, Guinea-Conakry and Sierra Leone, while large deposits of petroleum and 
bauxite can be found in Nigeria. Although industrial manufacturing and processing is 
being promoted in all sub-regional countries at varying levels, however, the export of 
primary agricultural produce for foreign exchange is still the dominant sector of the 
domestic economies.   
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Economically, the West African economies are relatively small with a total GDP of 
US$ 75.9 billion in 1998. More than 40 percent of the populations are engaged in 
agricultural production in most of the countries and in some cases the proportion exceeds 
50 percent of national output. Agricultural activities, which is the mainstay of their 
economies, determines the living standards and levels of income per capita because the 
industrial sector is rather small to make a pronounced difference (Jones, 2002).   
A major share of most economies of the West African sub-region predominantly 
relies on the export of primary agricultural products to finance their imports of consumer 
goods and equipments needed for industrial development. As a result, movements in 
world market prices of these commodities may have an adverse effect in their foreign 
exchange earnings. Thus, their development options are constrained due to the size, poor 
and un-diversified economies. The activities of these countries have focused on the 
establishment of a comprehensive framework of harmonized policies, particularly in 
respect of trade and customs. The table below presents the structure of the West African 
economies in 1998 measured in percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 1.7 : The Structure of ECOWAS Economies in 1998 (Percentage of GDP) 
 
Country 
 
Agriculture 
 
Industry 
Of which 
Manufacturing 
 
Services 
Benin 38.6 15.3 8.2 47.9 
Burkina Faso 32.0 27.8 21.4 40.3 
Cape Verde 12.2 19.1 10.3 68.7 
Cote d’Ivoire 27.6 20.7 17.4 51.7 
The Gambia 27.4 13.7 5.8 58.9 
Ghana 37.6 24.8 8.2 37.6 
Guinea 22.3 35.3 4.1 42.4 
Guinea-Bissau 62.4 12.7 9.3 24.9 
Mali 44.9 20.7 6.5 34.4 
Mauritania 24.8 29.5 9.1 45.7 
Niger 41.4 17.0 6.2 41.6 
Nigeria 31.7 41.0 5.8 27.3 
Senegal 17.4 23.3 15.3 59.3 
Sierra Leone 45.1 24.3 N/A 30.6 
Togo 42.1 21.1 9.1 36.8 
ECOWAS Average 33.8 23.1 9.8 43.2 
Source: Jones, B, 2002. p. 21. N/A- not available 
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3.3.1 The Basic Indicators of West African Countries (ECOWAS) 
 
The scope for economic growth in the West African regional countries and the 
optimal path towards it is determined to a very large extent by the relative size of their 
economies, and most importantly, the economic policies pursued by the political 
authorities and their use of alternative economic instruments. The table below presents a 
comparative economic statistics on West African countries. From the table, it can been 
observed that important differences exist among the member countries in terms of 
population, land size, and per capita income.  
Most West African countries are very small in terms of their population, land 
mass, and also in gross domestic product. The output of some countries is equivalent to 
the output of some cities and towns in the developed world. The total population of the 16 
West African countries sum up to 223 million in 1998 with Nigeria accounting for 54 
percent of the total, while Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the next two largest, make up 8 
percent and 7 percent respectively. The rest of the countries have population sizes of less 
than 6 percent of the total, indicating that the economies of West African countries is 
relatively small in terms of market size (African Development Bank, 2002).   
The problems facing the ECOWAS states are similar, for example, the sub-region is 
having a 2.5 percent population growth rate, with a higher proportion of the population 
under the age of 15 years. This means that the ratio of dependency is higher in the 
regional member countries compared to other parts of the world. Moreover, the 
proportion of people who can read and write is very small, implying a relatively high 
illiteracy rate among the population. Infant mortality rate is also high, ranging from 64 to 
163 per thousand live births. Sizeable differences exist between these countries in per 
capita income, natural resources and factor endowments and their market sizes. The per 
capita GDP rages from US$ 140 in Sierra Leone to US$ 1060 in Cape Verde. 
Fifteen out of the sixteen member states of West Africa were classified in the 
World Development Report of 1999 as low-income countries (World Bank, 1999). This is a 
reflection of their low national output and per capita income. Cape Verde, which is the 
smallest economy in the sub-region, was classified as a lower middle-income country, 
reflecting the country’s growth performance and high national output. Although the 
region already have extensive, though informal, cross-border trade and interactions, 
however, they are facing limitations in resources and market sizes. To overcome such 
constraints requires the integration of the production processes and the formalization of 
regional trade.  
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Table 1.8: Basic Indicators for West African Countries in 1998 
Countries Population- 1998  
(in millions) 
Land Area 
(000 sq. km) 
GDP per capita 
(US$) 
Life Expectancy at 
birth (yrs) 
Illiteracy % of 
population age 
15+ 
Benin 6.0 113 380 58 66 
Burkina Faso 10.7 274 240 44 79 
Cape Verde 0.41 4 1060 68 29 
Cote d’Ivoire 14.5 322 700 53 67 
The Gambia 1.2 11 340 53 67 
Ghana 18.4 239 390 59 36 
Guinea Bissau 1.2 36 160 44 66 
Guinea 7.1 246 540 44 76 
Liberia 3.0 96 N/A 47 N/A 
Mali 10.6 1240 250 50 65 
Mauritania 2.5 1026 410 53 62 
Niger 10.1 1267 190 47 86 
Nigeria 121.3 924 300 54 40 
Senegal 9.0 197 530 52 67 
Sierra Leone 4.9 72 140 37 N/A 
Togo 4.5 57 330 49 47 
 
Source: Jones B, 2002 - by courtesy of World Bank country data, 2000. 
 
3.4 Factors that Explain Slow Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
According to growth theories, the accumulation of capital is a necessary pre-
condition for rapid and sustainable growth. While considerable productivity gains could 
be attained by more intensive and efficient use of existing resources, such gains could 
unlikely to lead to rapid and sustained growth unless translated into investment in 
productive capacity, including human and physical infrastructure (World Bank 2000; 
AfDB 1999; UNCTAD 1999). The difficulties in raising domestic savings to support rapid 
capital accumulation and growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is widely acknowledged. While 
appropriate policies may help in raising the savings rate once sustained growth has taken 
effect, in such countries sizeable increases in domestic savings cannot be expected to 
accelerate  investment and growth. 
The problem of inadequate resources to generate economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is further aggravated by the adverse terms of trade movement that had occurred in 
the region for the past three decades. The decline in real commodity prices have not only 
depleted the resources needed for investment and growth, but also constitute disincentive 
for private capital accumulation, particularly where government intervention has been 
abolished and producers left to face the constantly falling world prices. Under such 
conditions, attaining rapid and sustained growth could depend on the provision of 
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external financing, not only to compensate for the resource drain through terms of trade 
losses, but also to supplement domestic savings. 
Given that the inflow of private capital in the form of foreign direct investment 
promotes economic growth, such financial inflows have relied heavily on official sources 
(UNCTAD, 2000). The recent trend in official financing is very discouraging because the 
region is not only unable to attract private capital inflows, but is also faced with stagnant 
or falling official financing. There can be little doubt that, even under favourable external 
trading and financial environment, considerable domestic policy efforts would be needed 
to ensure that economies gradually become self-reliant in generating and sustaining rapid 
growth. Successful examples of growth in East Asia show that while foreign savings 
played an important role in the earlier stages of capital accumulation, high levels of 
domestic savings is also needed to support high rates of investment. 
Again, foreign markets play a crucial role in this process. An increase in exports 
volume support investment because it helps in earning the foreign exchange needed for 
the import of capital goods and technology. Similarly, new investment promote exports 
by providing the basis for productivity growth. Increased competitiveness allows 
production to be shifted towards products with high income elasticity, thus, help to avert 
terms of trade losses. While Sub-Saharan African countries have experienced surges of 
investment and growth in the past, they have not in general been able to establish a 
continuous circle of investment, savings and exports (Akyuz and Gore, 2001). The post-
colonial growth surges in Sub-Saharan Africa were too often followed by widespread 
investment slumps, rather than being translated into a virtuous growth process through 
complementary increases in domestic savings and exports. The recent trends and patterns 
of investment, savings and external trade suggest that the current configuration of 
domestic and external factors is far from establishing mutually reinforcing impulses of 
economic growth and structural change. 
The annual real per capita GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa averaged under 0.5 
percent from 1970 to 1996, while growth in Latin America and East Asia during the same 
period averaged about 1.5 percent and 6.5 percent respectively. This indicate that while 
the economies of Latin America and East Asia experience improvement in real per capita 
GDP growth during this period, Sub-Saharan African growth declined. As noted by 
Easterly (2001), the decline in growth in SSA is more than the increase in external debt, 
which explains the rapid increase in debt to GDP ratio in Africa than in Latin America.  
The growth process in Sub-Saharan Africa is influenced by many factors, some of 
which are non-traditional factors. However, the empirical literature suggest that 
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macroeconomic policy environment, macroeconomic instability, external shocks, human 
capital and regional spill-over effects, and institutional and political uncertainty are key 
factors that affect economic growth in the region. The recent literature on endogenous 
growth (for example, Barro, 1991) and investment explained the theoretical importance of 
the above variables in the growth process.  The literature laid emphasis on the role of non-
traditional determinants such as macroeconomic uncertainty, institutional, political and 
regional factors. We should, however, note that only a smaller set of policy variables and 
other fundamentals that have been shown to be significantly associated with the 
macroeconomic performance. Below are some of the factors that influence economic 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
3.4.1   Macroeconomic Policy 
 
Macroeconomic policies such as monetary and fiscal policies, are a set of macro 
policies used by government authorities to stabilize the economy. The effects of such 
policies on the economy depend on their prudence and period of adoption. Fiscal policy 
has three channels through which it influences the economic environment - the impacts of 
financing fiscal deficits; the macroeconomic uncertainty of large fiscal deficits; and the 
degree of substitutability and complementarity between public and private investment (J.-
P Azam et al, 2002) 
High fiscal deficit within an economy could be financed, on the one hand, 
internally by the use of domestic credit. However, this action would reduce real money 
balances and push down real interest rates, which in turn, either directly or indirectly 
crowds-out private investment, reduce exports and overall economic growth. Moreover, 
an expansion of the money supply could accommodate both private and public 
investment demands, but the associated inflation would have a negative impact on 
economic performance. If, on the other hand, large fiscal deficit is financed by external 
borrowing, the burden of external debt on the borrowing country could result to 
economic uncertainty, which has negative effects on growth.  
Although evidence on the complementarity of public and private investment is 
mixed, Serven (1996a), Mlambo and Kumar (1995), Serven et al (1993b) found 
complementarity using cross-country data, while Balassa (1998) observe that public 
investment crowds-out private investment. Some recent evidence suggest that there are 
certain categories of public investment that strongly crowd-in private investment, boost 
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private sector exports and enhance economic growth. Serven (1996b) argue that a 
threshold exists above or below which investment may not be effective. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, fiscal deficits is a common phenomenon within 
government finances since public expenditures surpasses domestic revenue. For instance, 
from 1985 to 1994 the ratio of Sub-Saharan Africa fiscal deficits to GDP reached an 
average rate of 4.33 percent, which was considered to be four time higher than that in East 
Asia. However, Collier (1996) indicate that the ratio of public investment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa has been consistently higher compared to other regions, but the decline in growth 
performance is blamed on low returns on public investment. Available data show that the 
growth of domestic credit in Sub-Saharan Africa declined steadily from 1970 to 1994. The 
stagnating growth performance in sub-Saharan has prompted the use of tight monetary 
policy to contain inflation, thus limiting the use of monetary policy to foster growth in 
domestic credit (Azam et al, 2002).  
Meanwhile, foreign exchange rate policies affect real macroeconomic variables 
through the real exchange rate, which is the price of the domestic currency relative to 
foreign currencies. Foreign exchange disequilibrium, especially an overvaluation could be 
very harmful to overall economic competitiveness and to investment and economic 
growth. In the short run, a real devaluation of the currency eliminates real exchange rate 
overvaluation and thus, would have a contractionary effect on private investment in 
countries where the overvalued currency had made capital goods cheaper. On the other 
hand, real exchange rate depreciation will cause the relative domestic currency price of 
tradables to rise. Despite the contractionary effects of the real exchange rate depreciation 
on investment and growth in the short-run, the expected positive incentive effects on the 
export sector should increase private investment and growth. 
Real exchange rate adjustment is been used to promote international 
competitiveness. The appreciation of a country’s currency makes her exports very 
expensive in the international market and vice versa. However, the appreciation of the 
real exchange rate could only reduce competitiveness if the evolution of its equilibrium 
value suggest that the rate should depreciate rather than appreciate. The real exchange 
rate of sub-Saharan African countries depreciated by 31 percent between 1970 to 1979 and 
1985 to 1994, which was a positive step in enhancing their economies competitiveness 
(Azam et al, 2002). 
Fiscal reforms in the context of structural adjustment programmes enhances 
macroeconomic performance in countries that adopt reforms. Easterly and Schmidt-
Hebbel, (1991) argued that the deeper the structural reforms, the greater the benefit of 
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fiscal adjustment beyond reducing fiscal deficit. For example, Blejer et al., (1984); and 
Serven et al., (1993) noted that fiscal consolidation often take the form of reduced public 
investment, which may be complementary to private investment. 
 
3.4.2      Macroeconomic Uncertainty  
 
Investors consider macroeconomic uncertainty as a paramount factor when 
making investment decisions. The importance of uncertainty arises from the nature of the 
investment to be undertaken. It is well known that under conditions of uncertainty, the 
risk-averse firms may find it difficult to make investment decisions since they could not 
determine what the future will hold on their investments. On the other hand, the risk-
neutral firms may prefer the option of waiting until the environment is favourable for 
investment. During this period of waiting, the firm will instead invest in information 
gathering to reduce the risks of uncertainty (Azam et al, 2002). 
Meanwhile, economic policy risks and uncertainties that may affect private 
investment decisions can be identified from two sources. The first emanates from the risk 
associated with the economic variables (for example, terms of trade, inflation, and real 
exchange rate) that determines the stability of the economy. This risk can manifest itself 
by the volatile movement of these variables. For example, fluctuations in the variables 
make it difficult to predict the level of prices and hence increases the risk of long-term 
investment. The second source of economic uncertainty is associated with the lack of 
policy implementation and future policy reversals by the government authorities. In this 
case, uncertainty is caused by lack of policy credibility, which encourages the 
postponement of investment decision. This source of uncertainty is common within the 
debt ridden sub-Saharan African countries undergoing structural reforms (Collier, 1996).  
In addition, an unstable macroeconomic environment is likely to generate 
fluctuations in capital formation. Thus, impacting adversely on output growth, via a 
reduction in the efficiency of the production process (Fosu, 1991). Even if investment 
levels were unaffected by uncertainty as may be the case with risk-neutral firms, 
economic growth could still be reduced by the investment instability generated in an 
unstable macroeconomic environment. 
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3.4.3    Human Capital and Regional Effects  
 
The growth literature reaffirms the importance of human capital in creating 
knowledge and technology that enhances productivity growth. In the developed nations, 
output growth is very high relative to developing countries due to their high stock of 
productive human capital. It can be argued that in a country endowed with high stock of 
human capital, the expected returns from investment would in general be high, especially 
in skilled intensive industries. This is because the overall cost of training would be lower 
and it would be easier to introduce more advanced equipment to raise productivity and 
lower per unit cost. The argument is consistent with the evidence from the empirical 
growth literature, which finds the stock of human capital to be among the major 
determinants of cross-country differences in growth.  
In sub-Saharan Africa, the stock of human capital is relatively very low and 
unproductive. The few skilled and educated manpower disserts the region in search of 
greener pastures abroad. Thus, the challenge of enhancing the stock of human capital in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is centred on cost effectiveness and mode of delivery. Here, the 
private sector could play a major role in supplying higher education and medical services. 
However, given that public service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa is generally lower than 
in other developing countries, higher expenditure on education and health care system 
may be required in order for the state to meet the needs of the people (Collier, 1996). 
Hoeffler (1999) highlights the impact of human capital on growth by using a panel 
data analysis of growth and investment. She finds that education does not directly affect 
total factor productivity and growth, but has an indirect impact on investment. This result 
supports the Schultzian argument that the contribution of education to growth does not 
come from its enhancing the productivity of labour, but results from its impact on 
adjustment costs, that is, educated people are more adaptive, and adapt to shocks faster 
and more efficiently.  In terms of the investment function, Hoeffler’s results suggest that 
education reduces the costs of adjustment of investment to its optimal value. However, 
while this approach only takes into account the quantity of education measured in terms 
of homogenous number of years, the quality of education seem to matter as well. 
 
3.4.4     Regional Spill-over Effects 
  
Regional spill-overs are common within Sub-Saharan African countries due to the 
close proximity of their porous borders. In addition, there is economic cooperation among 
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member states of the region. Economic cooperation has a positive impact on national 
policy credibility, and on investment and growth. This is because it provides a mechanism 
for collective commitment to economic reform in the context of reciprocal arrangement 
(Collier, 1991). Furthermore, deeper economic integration permits the expansion of the 
regional economies to generate the thresholds necessary to trigger strategic 
complementarity, and to attract the adequate levels of investment required for the 
development of modern manufacturing sectors and the transfer of technology within the 
region (Krugman, 1991). 
The empirical literature of Chua (1993a), Easterly and Levine (1997) support the 
investment and growth enhancing effects of economic integration. This literature finds 
that spill-over effects by regional investment, regional political instability and regional 
growth are significantly linked to variations in investment and growth across countries. 
However, doubts are being raised in the case of the West African francophone (CFA) 
monetary union, which is the longest serving regional integration scheme in Africa. 
Before the collapse of the African terms trade at the end of the 1980s, the empirical work 
of Devarajan and de Melo (1987), and Guillaumont et al., (1987) showed that member 
countries of the CFA monetary zone were growing faster than the non member countries. 
The favourable growth performance were associated with the benefits of the system that 
imposed some constraints on the behaviour of governments (Collier, 1992). 
The monetary union rules prevented member governments from adopting 
inflationary policies that were common within the non-member countries. The credibility 
features of the institutions of the CFA monetary union provided a conducive environment 
for investment and growth. However, the continued decline in the terms of trade, which 
lasted until the early 1990s changed the situation. Devarajan and de Melo (1991) and 
Devarajan and Rodrik (1992) showed that non-member countries adjusted much more 
easily to terms of trade shock with much better growth performance than the member 
countries of the CFA monetary zone during this period.  This illustrate the trade-off that 
may exist between credibility and flexibility, as the cost of adjustment that required 
making the institutions of the monetary zone credible, made it difficult to decide on the 
devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994. The devaluation put back most economies 
on the path to fast growth after a protracted period of depression. 
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3.4.5    External Shocks 
  
 External shocks do affect regional economies through the following channels: 
terms of trade, capital inflows, and international interest rates. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
most important external shock is associated with the terms of trade movement, while 
capital inflow and international interest rate shocks are manifested in the external debt. 
Terms of trade movement can affect a country’s macroeconomic performance through 
two possible channels. Firstly, a decline in the terms of trade reduces foreign exchange 
earnings and profitability of the exports sector, thus, diminishing export growth. The 
recurrent terms of trade shocks in many Sub-Saharan African countries in the past 
decades led to increased foreign borrowing to finance imports. 
 Secondly, a decline in the terms of trade may affect growth indirectly by 
worsening the current account balance. Many countries respond to a deficit current 
account by several means such as increasing controls on imports, devaluation of the 
exchange rate, or tightening fiscal and monetary policies. However, these methods of 
addressing a deteriorating current account have their own economic implications. 
Controls on intermediate or capital goods could have an adverse effect on private 
investment. Similarly, tight fiscal policies may reduce public investment, while monetary 
restraint could result in credit rationing, both of which adversely affect private investment 
and thus growth (Azam, et al., 2002). 
 Many empirical literature, for example,  Deaton and Miller (1996), Ghura (1995) 
and Wheeler (1984) find a negative impact of declining terms of trade on the African 
economies’ growth. Ghura (1995), for example, estimate the impact of terms of trade 
growth on per capita GDP growth from 1970 to 1990 on a sample of 33 Sub-Saharan 
African countries and find a 0.059 degree of importance. This value suggests that a 10 
percent decline in terms of trade would lead to a 0.6 percent reduction in per capita GDP 
growth, which is significant when compared with the 0.3 percent annual GDP per capita 
growth during the same period when the terms of trade declined by 2.3 percent. Thus, the 
decline in terms of trade during 1970 to 1990 was blamed on the dramatic decline in per 
capita GDP growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 In addition, increases in the world interest rate is also found to contribute to the 
negative economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. For example, the empirical study of 
Ghura (1995) finds that a one percentage point increase in real interest rate reduces per 
capita GDP growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa by 0.13 percent. Shocks through capital 
flows are deemed to be indirect since most Sub-Saharan African countries have very little 
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share of capital flows. However, the indirect effects can be large. For example, excess 
demand for capital can increase the world interest rate, which can have negative 
implications for growth. 
 External shocks can also have an impact on external debt sustainability by raising 
the level of debt acquired on variable interest if the world interest rate rises above the 
level the debt was acquired. Thus, foreign exchange earnings from exports would be used 
in servicing the foreign debt, thereby limiting the resources available for public 
investment and for growth (Fosu, 1996a, 1999b; Elbadawi et al., 1997). 
 
3.4.6 Institutional and Political Uncertainty 
 
Institutional and political instability is another important source of uncertainty 
that negatively affect economic growth and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Political 
instability that negatively influence economic performance ranges from frequent 
government change-over, which affect policy credibility by leading to unstable policy 
framework, thus raising investor’s option of waiting -  to more extreme forms of social 
and political unrest like demonstrations, protests or civil conflicts. Civil conflicts are the 
worst case scenarios of uncertainty that will lead to the collapse of state institutions and 
authority as well as civil society. In addition, it renders property and human lives 
vulnerable (Collier, 1996). 
Political instability may occur when there is sudden change in the political 
landscape that leads to changes in the internal political policies. Such abrupt changes may 
raise the risk of expropriation as well as nationalization of private investments. In the case 
of a military change of government, for example, the ensuing instability discourages the 
level of investment in physical capital by making future returns uncertain. Similarly, it 
decreases the inflow of foreign resources and thus, precipitates capital flight from the 
domestic economy. Moreover, the supply of skilled labour will dwindle, as workers 
abandon their domestic economy in search of a better and stable working environment in 
other countries. Hence, political instability adversely affect economic growth and 
investment. In Sub-Saharan Africa, political instability has been one of the major factors 
that affect per capita GDP growth since independence (Fosu, 1992a). 
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3.4.7   External Factors 
 
Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only influenced by domestic or 
internal factors, but also a plethora of foreign or external  factors can play a vital role in 
the output growth. Although internal factors, such as structural and institutional policies 
have been mostly acknowledged as factors responsible for low growth in Africa, external 
influence have also been found to contribute equally due to the increased globalisation of 
the world economy. In the global world of today, no economy is in autarky or self 
dependent. The prosperity of any one economy, be it developed or developing, depends 
on the mutual prosperity of the others. In the case of the indebted Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the international interest rates on which external loans are secured are beyond 
their control and have led to the accumulation of large debt stocks. The most notable 
external factors that influence economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa include openness 
to international trade and the external debt problem. 
 
3.4.7.1   Openness  to External Trade 
   
Trade openness simply means the extent to which an economy is involved in 
international trade with other countries. International forces have the capability of 
influencing national economies once they are open. However, the extent to which 
economies are affected by these forces depend on the degree of their openness. For 
example, domestic policies that promote export (such as exports subsidies) may enhance 
openness and increase growth through augmenting the size of the export sector. On the 
other hand, such a policy will harm other countries by distorting the international prices 
and thus reduce openness (Azam, J.P. et al., 2002). 
Easterly (1998) in a review of openness concludes that:  
‘open economies do grow more rapidly than closed economies….whether the measure of openness 
has to do with exchange rate overvaluation, relative price distortions, tariffs and quotas, share of 
trade in GDP, the black market premium or a composite measure combining some of these with 
state monopolization of commodity exports and general socialism’(Easterly, 1998, p. 12). 
The empirical studies that investigate the importance of openness on African countries 
include Fosu (1990a, 1992b, 1996a, 1998, and 1999), Gyimah-Brempong (1991), Ghura and 
Grennes (1993), Lussier (1993), Assane and Pourgerami (1994), Ojo and Oshikoya (1995), 
Ghura (1995), Savvides (1995) and Rodrik (1998).  Although variances exist in the 
empirical findings of these studies, the overall conclusion was that openness positively 
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affect economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a related empirical study on the region, 
Sachs and Warner (1997) conclude that the lack of openness is a major contributor to the 
poor economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 Sachs and Warner (1995) used the most comprehensive measure of openness. 
According to their definition, an economy is said to be open to trade if it satisfies the 
following conditions: maintains an average tariff rate of less than 40 percent; maintains an 
average quota and import licensing coverage of less than 40 percent; have a black market 
exchange rate premium of less than 40 percent; do not impose restrictions such as taxes, 
quotas, or state monopolies on exports; and  do not practice socialism. In their study, 
Sachs and Warner (1997) defined the openness variable to represent the proportion of 
years within the interval 1965 – 1990 in which an economy is open to international trade. 
Using a sample of between 77 – 79 countries including 23 Sub-Saharan countries, Sachs 
and Warner find that the average annual growth rate of GDP per capita between 1965 – 
1990 was positively associated with openness.  
 Sachs and Warner (1997) pointed out two channels through which openness to 
international trade can affect growth. These are the direct impact on growth and the speed 
of convergence to steady state. ‘For the average country in the sample,  a switch from a 
closed regime to a completely open regime is estimated to raise the annual growth rate by 
2.21 percentage points’ (p. 346). They also observed that the direct effect of pursuing 
relatively closed policies in Sub-Saharan Africa led to a reduction by 0.7 percentage point 
in growth compared to 1.4 percentage point if they had adopted open policies of fast-
growing East Asian countries. Thus, such fast-growing openness policies would have 
resulted to a 2.1 percentage point increase through the direct impact. However, Easterly 
(1998) cautioned that openness may also have negative effects as well. He argues that 
open economies are more likely to be vulnerable to terms of trade shocks and capital 
inflow interruptions than less open economies. 
 
3.4.7.2 External Debt 
 
The real per capita GDP growth of an economy may also be adversely affected by 
either the impact of large external debt stocks or by the impact of debt-service on current 
expenditure. The channels through which debt might impact on growth have been 
extensively explored in theoretical and empirical literature inspired mostly by the 
experience of Latin America and some HIPC countries since the 1980s. The general survey 
of the issues include Smith and Cuddington (1985), Diwan and Hussain (1989); including 
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a paper on Sub-Saharan Africa by Humphrey and Underwood (1989), Cline (1995), Iqbal 
and Kanbur (1997), and Pattillo et al (2002, 2004). 
To illustrate how debt may relate to growth in general, it is helpful to embed the 
fiscal deficit and government borrowing requirement in a model of economy-wide 
growth similar to that in Hermandez-Cata (1988) or Green and Khan (1990)17. Let the 
domestic output, y , be a function of the domestic physical and human capital stock, k , 
and labour, l . Technology and policy environment and other elements of total factor 
productivity are excluded for simplicity. 
 
                                                    ( , )y f k l=                                                                     (3.1) 
 
where 0kf >  is the marginal product of capital. Real national income, Ny , is the 
difference between real output and interest payments on foreign debt: 
 
                                                                Ny y rb= −                                                                    (3.2) 
 
where r  is the foreign interest rate and b  is the stock of external debt. Combining 
equations (3) and (4) and differentiating with respect to time yields: 
 
                                                     N k ly f k f l rb rb= + − −& & && &                                                          (3.3) 
 
Total saving in the economy is given by S, which consists of private saving, pS ,  plus 
government saving, ,gS  and foreign saving, fS . 
 
                                                                  p g fS S S S= + +                                                        (3.4) 
 
private saving is a function of the average propensity to save, s, and disposable 
income, ( )l t y− , where t  is the tax rate: 
 
                                                 
17
 Selowwsky and Van der Tak (1986) use a similar framework to derive necessary and sufficient conditions 
for declining long-run debt levels, namely that savings should grow faster than investment and interest 
payments and consumption should grow more slowly than GDP. In the context of a developing country with 
high import growth needs, exports have to grow even faster to generate the current account surplus and hence 
positive domestic savings necessary for declining debt-to-GDP ratios. 
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                                                                       ( )pS s l t y= −                                                        (3.5) 
 
government saving comprise of the fiscal balance, namely, revenue minus government 
expenditure on goods and services: 
 
                                                                          gS ty G= −                                                          (3.6) 
And foreign savings are equal to the current account balance: 
 
                                                                             fS b= &                                                               (3.7) 
 
Setting equilibrium savings equal to investment and substituting the expressions for 
private, government and foreign saving into the identity for total saving gives: 
 
                                                              [ ]( )k S s l t y t y G b= = − + − +& &                         (3.8) 
 
converting the expression for GNP into growth rates and substituting in the expression 
for investment gives: 
 
                                     ( ) ( )
N
k k lN
y G b bf s l t y t f r f l r
y Y y y
 
= − + − + − + −  
&
& &                             (3.9) 
 
Equation (3.9) indicate that the growth rate of GDP depend on the positive productivity of 
domestic and external saving relative to debt service generated and labour productivity, 
and negatively on real interest rate (World Bank, 1994).  
In Sub-Saharan Africa, unproductive investments (low growth) largely accounts 
for the increase in debt-to-GDP ratios. While HIPCs were largely protected from excessive 
debt-service burdens as a share of GDP or as a share of exports, debt-service payments 
have weighed heavily on fiscal budgets.  
 
3.4.8 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter described the characteristics of Sub-Saharan African economies and 
also provided a review of the historical and recent economic performance with particular 
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focus on output growth and sectorial developments. The chapter further discussed the 
economies of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and presented 
their basic economic indicators. Finally, the factors that explain slow economic growth in 
the entire region were elaborated.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of 45 countries with more than 22 million square 
kilometers and a growing population of more than 480 million. In 1999, the total GNP of 
the region amounted to about US$315 billion. The Agricultural sector remains the main 
driver of their domestic economies and the earner of foreign exchange. However, the 
sector is still dependent on traditional methods of production due to lack of technological 
development. While the countries share many common features and problems, they have 
distinct differences in their sizes, geographical and climatic conditions, populations, 
natural resource endowments, political, social and cultural features. Their economies are 
weak with very low per capita income. The population growth rate is very high and abject 
poverty is wide spread.  
The historical performance of the region is mixed with encouraging performance 
immediately after independence, but extreme economic disappointments during the 
1980s. The average annual GDP growth rate, which reached a level of 5 percent in the 
1960s and the 1970s,  declined considerably to 1.2 percent during the 1980s. Similarly, the 
agricultural and industrial sectors, which registered moderate growth for two decades 
after independence until 1980, declined dramatically during the 1980s. Moreover, the 
long-term external debt continued to rise during the 1980s, while inflation rate rose to 
unprecedented levels. 
The decline in economic performance reached an upturn in the 1990s when 
various initiatives were launched by the international community including the New 
Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) and the IMF and World Bank 
structural adjustment programmes, which constituted rapid liberalization, deregulation 
and privatization of economic activities. This resulted to growth in per capita income 
across Africa for the first time in many years. However, despite the upturn in growth, the 
per capita income level attained is 10 percent below the level achieved before 1980.   
Meanwhile, the West African (ECOWAS) economies are a subset of Sub-Saharan 
economies. They share the same characteristics as described above. However, they form a 
fifteen member regional economic grouping known as the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS). These countries represent 25 percent of Africa’s land area and 
34 percent of its population. The community depend on agricultural production, which 
makes them vulnerable to natural shocks such as draughts and terms of trade movement. 
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Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, and Sierra Leone are endowed with natural and mineral 
resources. In 1998, the community’s total GDP amounted to US$75.9 billion, mainly from 
the export of agricultural products and mineral resources.  
The problems facing the ECOWAS states are similar. For example, the population 
growth is about 2.5 percent with a higher proportion under the age of 15. The literacy rate 
is very low among the population and the infant mortality rate ranges from 64 to 163 per 
thousand live births. The per capita income and natural resource endowments differ from 
country to country. The per capita GDP ranges from US$140 in Sierra Leone to US$1060 in 
Cape Verde. 
Many factors can explain the slow economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
traditional growth theories emphasized the accumulation of savings and capital as a 
precondition to sustainable growth. But in Africa many factors do affect domestic savings, 
and consequently investment and growth. Some of these factors are internal while others 
are external. For example, macroeconomic policy environment, macroeconomic 
instability, external shocks, human capital and regional spillover effects, and institutional 
and political uncertainties are key among the factors that affect the African economic 
growth.  
In conclusion, Sub-Saharan African economies are complex set of economies 
whose economic growth trajectories are difficult to predict due to their vulnerability to 
both internal and external factors. Although they share many common characteristics, 
however, they also have distinct differences in their economic and geographical variables 
and natural resource endowments. To generate sustainable growth, these countries need 
to address the various factors that affect their growth prospects.      
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CHAPTER IV 
 
4.0.                           THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK   
 
 
This chapter deals with important aspects of events that led to the accumulation of 
external debt. It describes the theoretical framework of budget deficits, especially in the 
context of how it resulted to external indebtedness in Sub-Saharan Africa. It also presents 
the views of the Keynesian, Neoclassical and Ricardian economists with regard to the 
economic effects of budget deficits on an economy. The issue of capital flight, it causes, 
effects, and linkages with external indebtedness in general, but with particular emphasis 
on Sub-Saharan Africa is discussed. The chapter finally discusses debt sustainability and 
the controversy between solvency and liquidity problems in indebted developing 
countries are highlighted. The debt ratios, which are key determinants of debt 
sustainability were presented.  
 
4.1   Budget Deficit and External Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa 
  
In the last several decades, many developing countries around the world, 
especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced large and persistent budget deficits 
that promoted massive borrowing from external sources to fill the resource gap. The 
inflow of foreign money in the form of loans has resulted to the accumulation of large 
external debt stocks in developing countries. The persistence of budget deficits in national 
finances have been particularly alarming in African countries, whose external debt stocks 
are so high that they are now considered unsustainable, and thus, compound their 
economic growth prospects. 
  
4.2. The Nature and Measures of Budget Deficits  
 
 As Buiter (1983) pointed, there are several ways to measure the size of budget 
deficits. The simplest and most useful, perhaps, is the public sector borrowing 
requirement or the excess of expenditure over revenue for all levels of government. Other 
measures of budget deficits include: that which corrects for the inflation component of 
interest payments commonly referred to as ‘operational deficit’, and the other that 
exclude all interest payment, also known as the ‘primary deficit’. The nature of budget 
deficits determines the amount of resources the government may need to fill the existing 
gap in the budget. An important issue to consider is the benefits and costs of a balanced 
budget, which raises the question: why is it desirable to achieve a budget in which 
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government expenditure equal tax revenue? Economists hold varying views on the issue 
of budget deficits. Below are the views presented by the Keynesian and Ricardian schools 
of thought: 
 
4.2.1   The Keynesian View   
 
Most economists agree that there are at least some circumstances under which 
deficits are actually desirable. This perspective on deficits also known as the “Keynesian 
View” is based on the fact that the size of the deficit depends on two basic elements: 
discretionary tax and expenditure decisions, and the performance of the economy. When 
the economy moves into a recession, government expenditure automatically increase and 
revenue automatically decrease, due to the presence of automatic stabilizers in the 
government budget.  
Consequently, even if the government takes no direct action on spending or taxes, 
the deficit increases in such periods. Similarly, the deficit declines as the economy 
recovers, but again with no discretionary decision by government. These automatic 
changes in the “cyclical deficit” is viewed by most economists as favorable because the 
economy is stimulated when there is need for stimulus and restrained when there is need 
for restraint. However, if the deficit persist even when the economy is at full employment, 
then such a deficit is called a “structural deficit” (Alm and Barreto, 1999). 
 
4.2.2      The Neoclassical View 
 
Neoclassical economists hold a different view on government deficit. In their view, 
varying economic distortions are blamed to be responsible for structural deficits. The 
negative effect of government deficit that is most frequently mentioned emphasizes its 
impact on interest rates, which in turn reflects on private investment. We should recall 
that a deficit occurs when the government borrows from the public or foreign sources to 
finance its expenditure. This public borrowing necessarily competes with other borrowers 
for the available funds, so that increased government demand for funds puts upward 
pressure on interest rates, which eventually crowds-out private investors competing for 
the same funds. In the long-run these deficits would reduce the stock of private capital, 
and thus, lowers economic growth and future standards of living. In other words, the 
presence of government deficits means that public saving is negative, so that total 
national saving is reduced (Shojai, 1999). 
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However, if the government invests the borrowed funds in productive capital, 
then the deficit leads to a substitution of public sector capital for private sector capital, 
and the burden of debt on future generations is accordingly reduced. In fact, if public 
sector capital is more productive than the displaced private sector capital, then the deficit 
actually makes future generations better off. There is some evidence on the productivity 
of public infrastructure investments. However, deficits in most developing countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa do not appear to have contributed in a consistent and 
significant way to such investments. 
The deficits also affect the export sector of an economy in the sense that as 
government borrowing raises domestic interest rates, foreign investors sees domestic 
investment to be more attractive. Thus, capital flows from abroad to the domestic 
economy. These capital inflows in turn increase the demand for the domestic currency, 
which then appreciate relative to other currencies. An appreciated domestic currency 
enables domestic consumers to buy foreign goods at cheaper cost. However, an 
appreciated domestic currency makes it difficult for domestic products to be sold abroad 
since the goods appear more expensive to foreign buyers. Deficits therefore crowds out 
domestic exporters, which leads to loss of employment and income in the export sector of 
the economy (Alm; and Barreto, 1999).   
 Meanwhile, when the funds to finance the deficit are obtained from abroad, an 
additional debt-servicing problem emerges. The servicing of debt requires that interest on 
the debt be paid and that the principal ultimately be amortized. When these payments are 
made abroad, they constitute a transfer from the domestic country to individuals living 
abroad, thus, reducing the living standards of those domestic citizens that must make the 
payments. Current and future generations are deprived because past consumption was 
increased at the expense of the current and future consumption. For example, many sub-
Saharan African countries are today struggling with the burden of large external debt that 
was contracted many decades ago.    
One last adverse consequence of deficits, according to the neoclassical view, stems 
not so much from the deficit per se, but from the pressure that the existence of the deficit 
is thought to bring to bear on the government. That is, pressure is imposed on the 
monetary authority. There is some fear that large and persistent budget deficits may 
eventually force the monetary authority to monetize the debt; that is, the monetary 
authority may pay for the debt by printing more money. The result of this monetaization 
is a growth in the money supply, which eventually increases inflation. Such 
monetaization has been a fairly common experience in many developing countries, 
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especially those that have tried to repudiate large debt by inflation, for example 
Zimbabwe (Alm and Barreto, 1999).  
A deficit may also increase pressure on the agency that issues the debt. The 
presence of a large deficit may lead to government default on the debt, if limitations on 
the ability of the government to issue new debt imply that the deficit cannot be serviced. 
Many economists believe that deficits are harmful primarily because some individuals 
and sectors are burdened now by increased government borrowing and because future 
generations are burdened both by the involuntary taxes that they must pay to service the 
principal and the interest on the debt and also by the smaller capital stock that they 
receive from the current generation. 
 
4.2.3    The Ricardian View 
 
Many economists argue that the neoclassical view on deficit is unjustified, and 
believe that deficits are just symptoms rather than cause of bad economic policies. To 
support their argument, they put forward the following points. Firstly, they argue that tax 
and deficit finance are equivalent in the sense that the burden of each is on the current 
rather than future generations. This argument was first made by David Ricardo some 150 
years ago and reiterated by Barro (1974). The argument is based on the notion that 
individuals should recognize when the deficit increases, by say, € 1, that their future taxes 
must also eventually increase by €1 in present value terms, since the €1 of additional debt 
requires debt service of €1 over its lifetime. If individuals recognize that deficits now 
require taxes later, then tax and debt finance are equivalent ways of financing government 
expenditures and so have the same effects. In both cases, the burden is felt by generations 
at the time the expenditure is made (Shojai, 1999). 
 The Ricardian view is however, based on restrictive assumptions, which are that 
individuals must live infinitely; the capital markets are competitively perfect; there is no 
environmental uncertainty; individuals act rationally; and all taxes are non-distortionary 
or lump-sum taxes. These assumptions hardly exist in real life especially in developing 
countries like Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Secondly, the Ricardian view holds that empirical evidence only weakly supports 
the link between greater deficits and higher interest rates (Seater, 1993). Many other 
factors such as the overall state of the economy, the rate of inflation, monetary policy, 
international trade and financial developments, etc, interact to determine the level of 
interest rates. Neither the amount of deficit nor the amount of outstanding accumulated 
debt appears to be a major factor in the determination of interest rates. 
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Thirdly, deficits are seen as a symptom rather than cause of economic problems. 
The argument here is that government can finance any given level of its expenditure by 
imposing taxes, by borrowing from the public or abroad, or by printing more money. 
Although the composition of finance is important, the crucial issue is the level of spending 
that must be financed according to this argument, all the adverse consequences that are 
attributed to deficits are due to excessive levels of government expenditure, and not the 
deficit itself.  
 
4.3    Economic Effects of Budget Deficits 
 
 The initial effect of a budget deficit is to lower national saving, which consist of 
both private and public saving. The specific way in which deficits lower saving can be 
best understood by examining the national income and product accounts. Private saving 
is the difference between disposable income and consumption, which can be linearly 
represented as:  
,S Y Tr Int Tx C= + + − −                (4.1) 
 
where S is private saving, Y is gross national product, Tr  and Int  are government 
transfer and interest payments respectively, and Tx  is tax revenue and C  is consumption. 
Substituting for Y based upon the income expenditure identity, 
 
( ) ,S I G Tr Int Tx Nx= + + + − +              (4.2) 
 
where G  is government spending, I  is investment, and Nx  is net exports. This 
fundamental relationship points out that a deficit ( ) ,G Tr Int Tx+ + >  with private saving 
held constant, lowers national saving ( )S G Tr Int Tx− − − +  and thereby adversely affects 
investment or net exports or both. The mechanism through which a decline in national 
saving reduces investment and or net exports is the interest rate. When the government 
finances a deficit by borrowing from the financial markets, the interest rate rises, thereby 
reducing investment spending and causing an appreciation in the domestic currency. The 
appreciation, in turn, retards exports and stimulates imports. 
 The preceding analysis depends on the assumption that private saving does not 
respond to government deficits. Barro (1974), however, argues that private saving will not 
remain unchanged but instead will actually increase in response to the sale of government 
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bonds to finance the deficits. This argument is based upon the so-called Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem, which holds that the private sector fully anticipate higher future 
taxes to repay the borrowing undertaken to finance the deficit. In order to pay for the 
expected future increase in taxes the private sector will therefore increase saving 
accordingly. Bond-financed deficits in this case will have no adverse effect on investment 
or net exports because the budget deficit will be matched unit to unit by additional 
private saving, leaving the interest rate unchanged.  
 The view that deficits will have no effect on economic activity is disputed by both 
Keynesians and fiscal conservatives, who argue that it is based upon questionable 
assumptions (Bernheim, 1987). Regardless of the merit of the assumptions, substantial 
empirical evidence such as Evans (1987, 1988, 1993), fail to support the Ricardian 
Equivalence theorem. Ball and Mankiw (1995) explained that investment, net exports, and 
private saving all declined over the period 1982 to 1994, despite the existence of large and 
persistent deficits in the US. Since deficits appear to adversely affect both investment and 
net exports, it is important to trace out more fully their possible long-run consequences. In 
particular, the crowding out of investment translates into a smaller capital stock than 
otherwise. This implies a reduction in an economy’s productive capacity and hence long-
run growth (Barth, Russek and Wang, 1986).  
  A decline in net exports on the other hand, means that more claims on domestic 
assets will flow overseas than otherwise to finance those imports that are no longer 
financed by export earnings. As foreigners receive a greater share of the earnings on 
domestic assets, national income declines. Since large and persistent budget deficits must 
eventually be offset by budget surpluses to prevent unbounded growth in debt, future 
taxes must increase and spending must decrease to respond to such deficits. Tax increases 
clearly reduce disposable income as well as create economic inefficiencies through 
additional compliance and avoidance costs. Spending cuts also impose burdens on the 
public if transfer payments are reduced or government services are curtailed.   
 
4.4  Capital Flight and External Indebtedness in Developing Countries 
 
Although the current account position of many African countries have shown 
remarkable improvement in recent years, some are still plagued with large budget 
deficits. This situation is even worse for the non-oil exporting Sub-Saharan African 
countries, particularly those affected by civil conflicts, large external debt burden, 
declining terms of trade,  un-diversified export bases, and cumbersome trade policies 
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(Salisu, M, 2005). However, the flow of external resources from abroad in the form of 
foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment and official development assistance 
(ODA) could play a vital role in filling the resource gap and the deficit current accounts. 
But in the last three decades many highly indebted poor countries, including those in sub-
Saharan Africa have experienced heavy outflow of resources in the form of capital flight.   
 
4.4.1   The Meaning of Capital Flight 
 
The is a vast literature on the meaning of capital flight, and no attempt is made 
here to deliberate on all of the issues relating to the definition. The controversy 
surrounding the definition of capital flight is on the one hand, due to the lack of a 
universally accepted definition, and to the different meanings the term presents for both 
developing and developed countries on the other. However, this section tries to present 
the most commonly used definitions of capital flight. Economists often refer to the 
outflow of capital from developed to developing countries as foreign direct investment, 
while the same resource outflow from developing countries is considered as capital flight. 
The reason for this distinction is that developed countries have abundant stock of capital 
that moves in response to better investment opportunities abroad.  
But in developing countries like Africa, capital is very limited and scarce. 
Therefore, any movement of it out of the country could be an attempt to escape high risks 
at home. In general, it is believed that investors from all countries, whether developing or 
developed, will base their investment decisions on the relative returns and risks of 
investment at home and abroad. To differentiate between capital flight and normal 
resource flows, a distinction is often made between legal and illegal transactions. Since 
balance of payment statisticians do not document illegal transactions, it becomes difficult 
to establish how much capital that has flown out of the country. 
Walter (1986) and Kindleberger (1987), defined capital flight as capital that flees a 
country. Husted and Melvin (1990), described capital flight as the outflow of domestic 
capital in response to economic or political crisis. Lessard and Williamson (1987, p. 201) 
regard capital flight as an economically rational response to the portfolio choices that 
have confronted wealthy residents of some debtor countries in recent years.  Cuddington 
(1986, p.2), described capital flight as the short-term outflow of capital in response to risks 
such as political or financial crisis, heavier taxes, prospective tightening of capital 
controls, and devaluation of the domestic currency. Deppler and Williamson (1987) 
defined capital flight as “the acquisition or retention of a claim on non-residents that is 
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motivated by the owner’s concern that the value of his assets would be subject to discrete 
losses or impairment if his claims continue to be held domestically.”    
In a study conducted by the World Bank in 1985, capital flight was defined as the 
sum of the gross capital outflows and the current account deficit, less increases in official 
foreign reserves (World Bank, 1985). The Morgan Guaranty Trust Company (1986) 
defined capital flight as the reported and unreported acquisition of foreign assets by the 
non-bank private sector and some elements of the public sector. Therefore, capital flight is 
net investment inflows plus changes in gross external debt plus the current account 
balance and changes in selected gross foreign assets. However, this definition was 
criticized by Cline (1986), who argued that revenue from tourism and border transaction 
should be subtracted, since these earnings are beyond the control of the relevant foreign 
exchange authorities. He also argues that re-invested investment income should not be 
considered as capital flight, since this is also beyond the control of the authorities. In the 
context of Sub-Saharan Africa, I will adopt the definition given by Cuddington 
(1986)(Ajayi, 2001). 
 
4.4.2  General Causes of Capital Flight 
 
The causes of capital flight from developing countries is been acknowledged in a 
large literature, for example, recent studies that focus on capital flight from Africa include 
Ajayi (1997, 2001); Boyce and Ndikumana (2001, 2002); Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo 
(2001); Hermes et al. (2001); and Mohamed and Finnoff (2004). Since independence, 
domestic capital has been fleeing out of Africa either in debt service payment or escaping 
domestic risks, making the supply of capital in the region to be very limited and scarce in 
supply. Some of the key causes of capital flight in Sub-Saharan Africa are described 
below: 
 
4.4.2.1 Macroeconomic Instability 
 
  The macroeconomic factors that influences the movement of capital out of a 
country include inflation, fiscal balance, economic growth, and exchange rate movement. 
High inflation, for instance, make domestic asset holders react to the erosion of the real 
value of their assets by moving them to foreign countries. A high inflation rate 
undermines the government’s ability to manage the economy (Fisher, 1993). Although 
most of the empirical studies found evidence of a positive relationship between capital 
flight and inflation, Murinde et al., (1996); Lensink et al., (1998); Olopoenia (2000); Nyoni 
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(2000); and Ndikumana and Boyce (2002), found no statistically significant relationship 
for African countries. 
Exchange rate volatility and misalignment, which is often caused by inflationary 
pressure, may also stimulate capital flight. High inflation rate may create rising 
expectations about future exchange rate depreciation, and thus stimulate capital flight. In 
Africa, empirical evidence about such effects are relatively mixed. For example, Hermes 
and Lensink (1992) found positive evidence  between real effective exchange rate and 
capital flight in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Congo DRC for the 
period 1978 to 1988. However, Murinde et al., (1996); Lensink et al., (1998); and Ng’eno 
(2000), found no statistically significant relationship. 
The government fiscal balance, which reflects the extent of public sector borrowing 
requirement may also cause capital flight. Large budget deficits raises the expectations of 
future tax increases to meet government debt obligations, thus, resulting to capital flight. 
However, there is mixed empirical evidence on the effects of fiscal balance in African 
countries. For example, Ndikumana and Boyce (2002) found a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between budget surplus and capital flight in cross-sectional 
studies, but a positive and statistically significant relationship in panel data studies. 
It is important to note that most studies that focus on the effects of fiscal policy on 
capital flight only concentrate on taxation due to its impact on domestic capital formation. 
The reason is that high expected tax rates might reduce net expected returns to domestic 
investment, and that volatility of the tax rate might raise the investment risk, leading to 
lower risk-adjusted returns to domestic investment (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2002).    
Another cause of capital flight is the rate of growth of the economy, or the growth 
rate differentials between countries. It is believed that the lower the growth rate of a 
country the higher the flight of capital out of that country. In other words, the higher the 
growth differential between two countries, the higher the movement of capital from the 
country with lower growth rate. There is large empirical evidence to support this claim. 
However, in Africa very few studies have focused on this growth rate hypothesis. For 
example, Nyoni (2000) finds a positive relationship between capital flight and the growth 
rate differential between the UK and Tanzania. Other studies, for example, Hermes et al., 
(2002), find mixed results on the causality between the absolute level of growth and 
capital flight from Africa.  The reason for the mixed effects of the growth rate on capital 
flight is that economic growth itself is affected by some of the same factors that causes 
capital flight, thus making it difficult to isolate the independent effects (Ndikumana and 
Boyce, 2002). 
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4.4.2.2 Political Instability     
 
Capital flight from a country may be triggered by a volatile domestic political 
situation. This is very prevalent in Africa where many countries are engaged in civil or 
regional conflicts. Political instability leads to macroeconomic instability, which include 
economic mismanagement, rent-seeking economic activities and the illicit diversion of 
public funds. These factors, in addition to institutional weakness in protecting property 
rights, increases political unrest and the associated insecurity to life and property tend to 
encourage capital flight. Hermes and Lensink, (2000); and Lensink, (2000) show that 
political instability in Africa is associated with greater capital flight, while political 
freedom and democracy reduces the occurrence of capital flight.  
 
4.4.2.3 Risk-Adjusted Returns Differentials 
 
The link between the risk-adjusted returns to investment and capital flight has 
been found through portfolio choice theory. This theory is based on the assumption that 
investors attempt to maximize profits by diversifying their portfolios between foreign and 
domestic investments based on the relative risk-adjusted rate of return abroad and at 
home. Additionally, there are extensive controls on interest rate and other aspects of 
financial market behavior in developing countries. Government policies in the financial 
sector have resulted in nominal interest rates that are far below the rates on comparable 
foreign financial instruments. In such situations, it is expected that investors will seek 
alternative assets that will yield not only positive but also higher returns.  
In the empirical literature, a number of indicators have been used to operationalise 
the risk-adjusted returns to investment. These include exchange rate volatility, interest 
rate differential between home and abroad and other institutional risk perceptions 
(Ndikumana and Boyce 2002). All existing empirical studies such as Hermes and Lensink, 
(1992); Murinde et al., (1996); Nyoni (2000); and Ng’eno (2000), which use interest rate as 
explanatory variable on capital flight in Africa found no statistically significant 
relationship between interest rates and capital flight. However, studies that use exchange 
rate indicator on risk-adjusted returns found some evidence of a relationship between 
exchange rate overvaluation and capital flight in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
 
 
75   
 
 
4.4.2.4 Financial Market Development 
 
Financial market constraints and underdevelopment can lead to capital flight. It is 
well known that imperfect capital and money markets are prevalent in developing 
countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. These markets provide only a limited variety of 
financial instruments in which wealth can be held. Many developing countries also lack 
full or credible deposit insurance on assets held in the domestic banking sector. As a 
result of these constraints, investors in developing counties and in Sub-Saharan Africa 
look for alternatives abroad to invest their wealth.  
The financial intermediation literature postulate, on the one hand, an inverse 
relationship between financial market development and capital flight based on the 
assumption that liberalization of the financial markets can create opportunities for 
diversification of domestic portfolio. Financial deepening, on the other hand, could trigger 
capital flight by facilitating international capital transfers. In Africa, empirical evidence on 
this relationship is mixed. For example, Lensink et al., (1998) found a negative but 
statistically significant effect of financial development, while Collier et al., (2001) found no 
statistically significant relationship.  
 
4.4.3 The Effects of Capital Flight in Developing Countries 
 
The outflow of capital can result to liquidity shortage in the domestic economy 
and consequently, put an upward pressure on the domestic interest rate. If the monetary 
authorities are operating a floating exchange rate system, the shortage of liquidity could 
lead to a depreciation of the domestic currency as well as a loss in foreign reserves. The 
loss of resources from the domestic economy has several long-term effects: firstly, there 
would be a drastic shortage in resources available for domestic investment, as well as a 
decline in the rate of capital formation, thus, adversely affecting the country’s current and 
future growth prospects. The income that is generated abroad by the flown capital as well 
as assets held abroad are outside the reach of domestic authorities and cannot therefore be 
taxed. As a result government revenue, which could be used in domestic investment and 
external debt servicing is reduced (Ajayi, 1992, 2001).  
Secondly, if the domestic economy is experiencing a balance of payment difficulty, 
the outflow of resources in the form of capital flight could blow up the balance of 
payment problem into a crisis, thus, making domestic resources scarce to honor payment 
of imports. Similarly, in a situation where the donor or creditor community are reluctant 
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to provide more aid to an indebted country due to an unprecedented outflow of 
resources, a persistent outflow of capital could compound such financing problems for 
highly indebted countries like those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Thirdly, capital flight creates an adverse income redistribution against the poor 
masses. While those who have flown their capital abroad accrue interest on their 
investments, the poor citizens suffer the heavy taxes imposed by the domestic 
government to honor external debt-service obligations (Pastor, 1990). Similarly, the 
movement of private assets beyond the government tax jurisdiction encourage the 
shifting of tax burden from capital to less mobile factors. Such a shift is likely to be 
regressive (Deppler and Williamson, 1987).    
 
4.4.4 External Debt and Capital Flight Linkage      
 
The link between external debt and capital flight in developing countries, 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa is been cited in many studies. Some studies have 
indicated that the outflow of capital is enhanced by the availability of foreign exchange. 
However, in a perfect world with free capital mobility, it is expected that capital would 
flow in response to economic incentives such as rates of return and risks. Countries with 
favorable investment environment would attract an inflow of foreign capital for 
investment, while countries with hostile investment conditions would experience an 
outflow of capital. Capital usually flows to areas where there is capital scarcity (Ajayi, 
2001). 
While some economists have found a causal relationship between external debt 
and capital flight, others have found no link between the two. The Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company (1986), for example, argue that the simultaneous accumulation of debt 
and the outflow of capital from developing countries is not a natural coincidence. This is 
because these countries track record of bad policies that caused capital flight have also led 
to foreign borrowing at the same time. Boyce (1990) finds a positive relationship between 
external debt and capital flight in the Philippines. 
Meanwhile, economists have identified the relationship between external debt and 
capital flight in two main contexts: the first considers the various macroeconomic issues 
that relate to external debt and capital flight, while the second is strictly based in terms of 
causality between external debt and capital flight. The first linkage runs from external 
debt to capital flight, and the second from capital flight to external debt. Each of these 
linkages can also be subdivided into two. Thus, the direct linkage can be divided into four 
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groups on the basis of whether the direction of causality runs from debt to capital flight or 
vice versa or whether one simply provides the motive for the other or provide the means 
as well. The linkages are described below: 
 
4.4.4.1 Debt-driven Capital Flight 
 
In a debt-driven capital flight, residents of a country are motivated to move their 
assets to foreign countries due to excessive external borrowing by the domestic 
government. The outflow of capital is, therefore, in response to fear of the economic 
consequences of heavy external indebtedness. The consequences of debt-driven capital 
flight include, expectations of currency devaluation, expropriation risk, and the 
imposition of high taxes. In a debt crisis situation, the domestic investors may expect to 
pay higher taxes to government in order to meet debt service obligations. Such taxes 
would reduce the value of domestic financial assets (Dooley, 1987). The link between 
external borrowing and capital flight is established through the desire to avoid such taxes 
in the future (Boyce, 1990, p. 65). Similarly, external borrowing can drive down the 
domestic rate of return, thus, crowding out domestic capital and encouraging it to flee to 
foreign countries (Boyce, 1990). 
 
4.4.4.2  Debt-fueled Capital Flight 
  
In a debt-fueled capital flight the capital borrowed from abroad is itself transferred 
to foreign countries. This form of capital flight is motivated by the inflow of foreign 
capital in the form of loans, which are then siphoned away by corrupt leaders (Ajayi, 
1997). There are two processes through which money is siphoned abroad. Firstly, the 
domestic government could acquire foreign capital (foreign exchange) by external 
borrowing, and then sell the currency to domestic residents who transfer it abroad either 
by legal or illegal means. Secondly, the government can on-lend funds to private 
borrowers through a national bank, and the borrowers in turn transfer part or all of the 
capital abroad. In this case, external borrowing provides the necessary fuel for capital 
flight (Ajayi, 2001). 
The second linkage deals with the case of ‘flight-driven’ and ‘flight-fueled’ 
external borrowing. The flight-driven external borrowing is purely motivational, while 
the flight-fueled external borrowing is a case where capital flight provide the resources 
that re-enters the economy. 
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4.4.4.3   Flight-driven External Borrowing       
 
This is a situation where the government borrows more resources from external 
sources to fill the resource gap created by the outflow of capital in the domestic economy. 
Due to resource scarcity in the domestic economy, both the public and private sectors seek 
for a replacement of the lost resources by acquiring more loans from external creditors. 
The external creditor’s willingness to meet this demand can be attributed to different risks 
and returns facing residents and non-resident capital. “The systemic differences in the 
risk-adjusted financial returns to domestic and external capital could also arise from 
disparities in taxation, interest rate ceilings and risk-pooling capabilities” (Lessard and 
Williamson (1987, p. 215-218).  
 
4.4.4.4 Flight-fueled External Borrowing 
 
A flight-fueled external borrowing occurs when capital siphoned out of the 
country provide the resources that finances external loans to the same residents who 
transferred the capital. In other words, the domestic capital is converted to foreign 
currency and deposited in foreign banks, and the depositor then takes a loan from the 
same bank in which the deposit may serve as collateral. This phenomenon is also known 
as round tripping or back-to-back loans (Boyce, 1992). 
Empirical studies on each of the these causal linkages in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa are limited. However, available studies show mixed results. For example, 
using a panel data regression on ten African countries, including HIPCs, Ajayi (1997) 
found no evidence of causal links between external debt and capital flight. However, 
Collier et al., (2001) in cross-sectional study, which include some African countries, found 
evidence of debt-fueled capital flight. This positive relationship may have been influenced 
by the inclusion of non-African countries in the sample. In the Philippines for instance, 
Boyce (1992, 1993) found evidence of both debt-fueled capital flight and flight-fueled 
external borrowing. 
In addition to external debt, a number of studies have attempted to investigate the 
effects of other capital inflows, such as Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on capital flight. For instance, in a sample of African 
countries, Hermes and Lensink (2000) and Lensink et al., (2000) found evidence of ODA-
fueled capital flight. However, by introducing FDI into the model, Lensink (2000) found 
no evidence of causal relationship between FDI and capital flight. 
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4.5         Debt Sustainability in Debtor Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Debt sustainability simply means the ability of low-income countries to contract 
debt at levels that they are able to service now or in the future without leading to any debt 
servicing difficulties or recourse to debt relief/forgiveness. Low-income countries, 
especially those in sub-Saharan Africa have large financing needs, particularly that of 
meeting the Millennium Development Goals, without leading to unacceptable 
accumulation of debt.18 As a result, the challenge to development finance going forward is 
to ensure that poor countries continue to receive sufficient funds to meet their ambitious 
development objectives, while at the same time avoid future debt problems.  
It is apparent from history that despite access to low-cost borrowing, the external 
debt of many low-income countries including Sub-Saharan Africa, built-up at high levels 
that led to costly debt relief. To avoid a repetition of such an action, and to prevent HIPC 
graduates from experiencing rising levels of external debt stocks in the future, there is an 
urgent need for guidance on how much debt low-income countries should accumulate.  
The debt crisis of low-income countries, particularly that of Sub-Saharan Africa,  
developed slowly with debt-servicing being the first indication of the problem. However, 
this was initially solved through new net lending and debt rescheduling in the context of 
the Paris Club rescheduling. From 1984 to 1996, the net inflow to the affected countries 
increased with an average of 13 percent of GDP per country, but much of the new flows 
were in the form of new lending. This strategy pushed debt-service to the future without 
addressing the fundamental economic issues that compounded these countries solvency 
problems. It was only in early 1990s that the debt stocks of these countries were 
acknowledged to be unsustainable, and that indebtedness itself could be among the 
factors impeding investment and growth. The Paris Club creditors also acknowledged 
this by adopting the HIPC Initiative in 1996, which provided a comprehensive treatment 
of all outstanding obligations (Powell and Daseking, 1999). 
Many reasons could account for the unsustainable nature of Sub-Sahara African debt 
ratios. Although the problem differ across countries, the general problem was that the 
secured loans did not generate the growth envisaged in these countries. This implies that 
the borrowing decisions were tailored towards projected economic growth that never 
took place. (Brooks et al., 1998). 
                                                 
18 See IMF, Operational Framework for Debt Sustainability Assessments in Low-Income Countries- 
Further Considerations. IMF 2005. 
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Meanwhile, the lessons learnt from past mistakes have made both creditors and 
debtors to adopt policies that will lower the risks of future debt crises. Many low-income 
countries including those in Sub-Saharan Africa have introduced structural and 
institutional reforms, strengthened macroeconomic policies and prudent debt 
management strategies so as to generate sustainable growth. Some past weaknesses have 
been tackled by policy reforms; however, low-income countries need to urgently diversify 
and expand their export bases, and to lower their domestic vulnerability of exogenous 
shocks. Creditors, on their part, have substituted non-concessional financing with grants 
and concessional loans. Moreover, many low-income countries and graduating HIPCs are 
benefiting from favourable debt-service profiles as a result of the long grace periods and 
low interest rates on restructured debt and new financing (IMF and World Bank, 2004). 
However, even though policy reforms are yielding positive results, nonetheless, many 
weaknesses still remain to be addressed. Firstly, unless there is a clear understanding of 
the factors that promote and enhance growth, the risk of optimistic growth projections is 
obvious. It is also clear that many structural reforms will take time to bear fruits, and that 
most low-income countries will continue to suffer from weak institutions, volatile export 
and production bases, and limited administrative and debt management capacities for 
some time to come. In addition, risks of political crises and civil wars remain important in 
many of these countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, new borrowing even 
on concessional terms should be pursued with caution, based on prudent economic 
projections and recognition of country specific circumstances and risks. 
 
4.6        Debt Sustainability Evaluation 
 
The process of evaluating a country’s debt sustainability is complex and should 
consider country specific circumstances. The process, in most cases, require value 
judgement at various stages of the analysis such as projecting the country’s debt burden 
and its debt-servicing ability; choosing the appropriate indicators to assess debt 
sustainability; and deciding which debt level imposes burden on a country’s current or 
future finances. The World Bank and IMF have established debt indicative thresholds that 
reflect country-specific factors relevant for debt sustainability. These thresholds consist of 
public and publicly guaranteed external debt, which predominate low-income countries’ 
public sector.  
Predicting on whether a country will be able to honour its debt-service obligations 
depends on various factors such as its existing debt burden, its financing mix of loans and 
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grants, the situation of its current account, and the history of its debt-service capacity. 
Debt sustainability can be assessed on the basis of indicators of the debt stock or debt-
service relative to macroeconomic measures such as gross domestic product (GDP), 
Export of goods and services, and government revenue (IMF 2004). However, these 
reference indicators have their own advantages and disadvantages (IMF 2003a). 
 
4.6.1 Debt Service 
Debt service crowds out alternative uses of resources by debtor countries and is, thus, 
considered as the obvious indicator that immediately reveals the burden that debt 
imposes on a country’s economy. The ratio of debt-service indicates how much the debtor 
country is loosing in debt-service. The higher this ratio, the more the likelihood that debt 
could be unsustainable, and vice versa. However, current debt-service ratios may 
understate debtor countries debt burden because of the typical back-loaded repayment 
histories of concessional debt. 
 
4.6.2 Debt Stock 
 
 The Debt stock indicate the total amount of accumulated debt by the borrower. It 
provides information on the magnitude of future debt-service burden on the economy of 
the borrower. This burden is measured by the net present value of debt (NPV), which 
captures the concessionality of outstanding obligations. Projections are avoided when the 
net present value of debt indicators are used, but this procedure is problematic because 
the indicators compare only future debt-service obligations with the current payment 
capacity without considering the country’s ability to grow. In a similar vain, while net 
present value indicators can project debt-service problems in the future, it does not 
indicate when such problems will be serious. In addition, the net present value is 
determined by the discount rate, therefore, movements in the discount rate as a result of 
changes in market conditions may make it difficult to interpret the net present value.  
In evaluating debt sustainability, Buiter (1987) highlighted solvency in terms of the 
relationship between debt stock and the present value of future fiscal surpluses. He 
denoted the financing constraint of the consolidated public sector as an expression 
equating net borrowing, ' 'b , with interest payment ' 'rb , (where r  is the interest rate) and 
the fiscal deficit, ( ) ,t yλ−  where t  is the tax rate, λ  is the ratio of expenditure to GDP, y  
is the output and all variables are in real terms: 
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                     ( )t t tb rb t yλ= − −                                        (12) 
 
assuming a constant average growth rate of ,g  
             
                                   ( ) gtt t ob rb t y eλ= − −                                                    (13) 
 
Equation (13) constitute a first order, homogenous differential equation – the general 
solution is as follows: 
 
                      
( )( )rdt g r dtt ob e A t y eλ
− − ∫ ∫
= − −  ∫
                                      (14) 
 
             ( )( )rt rt g r tt ob Ae t e y eλ −= − − ∫                                                  (15) 
 
                ( )( )rt g r tt ob e A t y eλ− −= − − ∫                                       (16) 
 
A  particular solution can be found by computing the value of the debt stock at time zero: 
 
                     ( )o ob A t yλ= − −                                        (17) 
 
Hence 
 
                       ( )( ) g r to ob t y eλ −= − ∫                                                    (18) 
 
Provided the interest rate is greater than the growth rate, ,r g>  then debt ob  is defined as 
unsustainable if it is greater than the present discounted value of future fiscal surpluses. 
 As Cuddington (1997) noted, while the above arithmetic can be applied to the debt 
of any sovereign state, whether developed or developing, it should be modified to reflect 
certain factors that are more relevant in less developed countries than in developed 
countries. These include the relative importance of seigniorage in LDCs, the existence of 
concessional financing and the prevalence of external rather than domestic borrowing. In 
particular, seigniorage and concessional flows should be subtracted from the primary 
fiscal deficit to yield an adjusted primary deficit for use in net present value debt 
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sustainability tests. The existence of external as well as domestic categories of lenders 
would require the use of two different discount rates reflecting the marginal rates of 
substitution in consumption of external and domestic lenders respectively. 
 In practice, debt sustainability analyses have typically involved choosing a time 
horizon of up to 20 years and projecting forward the main macroeconomic variables 
together with estimated evolution of the debt stock and debt service. The resulting 
balance of payment projection is then used to examine whether the country is likely to 
encounter liquidity problems at any point in time and whether the stock of debt 
remaining at the end of the period has reached sufficiently low level (Claessens et al., 
1995). The latter condition is typically evaluated with reference to a number of indicators 
such as the debt-to-GDP ratio, debt-to-export ratio, and debt service-to-export ratio. Such 
an approach was used by Cline (1995) and is the basis for assessing debt sustainability 
under the HIPC Initiative. 
 Several studies have sought to estimate the magnitude of the various debt 
indicators that are consistent with debt sustainability. Such studies apply either logit 
analysis or growth with borrowing models, for example, Kharas (1981); and Lee and 
Barretto (1984).  Underwood (1990) ranked 111 developing countries by net present value 
of debt (net of official reserves)-to-export ratio and found that all countries that had 
avoided debt rescheduling had a debt-to-export ratio below 200 percent, while most 
countries with a history of debt rescheduling had ratios above this threshold. 
 Note that while the use of financial ratios can be useful indicators of debt 
sustainability, they do not necessarily have any causal or explanatory power. Sachs and 
Berg (1988), for example argue that indicators such as the debt-to-export ratio are 
themselves likely to be symptoms of the crisis than cause. Instead, they regress the 
likelihood of debt rescheduling on a number of structural factors, which they find to be 
significant, including openness to trade and political stability, proxied by income 
distribution and the urban and rural split. 
 
4.7 Solvency Versus Liquidity 
  
The above analysis suggests that to assess sustainability it is necessary to take 
account of the differing degrees of concessionality of debt in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
explosion of external debt since the 1980s has sparked a controversial debate among 
development experts as to whether the external debt crisis is a solvency or liquidity 
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problem. In this regard, several view points have been put forward to distinguish 
between a country’s solvency and liquidity situation. 
 Economic activity is a natural cause of creating debt. At any point in time, some 
countries and financial institutions have excess resources than they need for consumption 
and investment, while others especially those in the developing world have deficits in 
resources. Through borrowing and lending, both rich and poor countries are better able to 
realize their consumption and output preferences, thus encouraging economic growth. 
Creditors always assume that the debtors will meet the requirements of the debt contract. 
But if the income of the debtor is insufficient or there is a lack of sufficient assets to call 
upon in the event of income proving insufficient, debt problems occur, thus making the 
debtor not to be able to meet the repayment obligations. In such circumstances, the 
benefits arising from international financial flows for both creditors and debtors may not 
be fully realized (IMF, 2003). 
 
4.7.1 Solvency 
 
Solvency is defined as a country’s ability to honor its external debt obligations on a 
continuous basis without default. A solvency problem occurs when the real interest rate 
on the marginal external debt exceeds the increase in national income generated by the 
loan (Aliber, 1980). The solvency phenomenon is a real or structural phenomenon and 
reflects a country’s productive capacity. In theory, assuming debt can be rolled over at 
maturity, countries are solvent if the present value of the net interest payment does not 
exceed the present value of other current account inflows, primarily, export receipts net of 
imports.  
In practice, countries put their debt-servicing on hold long before this constraint is 
reached, that is, at the point where servicing the debt is perceived to be too costly in terms 
of the country’s economic and social objectives. Therefore, the relevant constraint is 
generally the willingness to pay, rather than the theoretical macroeconomic ability to pay. 
It is difficult to show that a country is solvent and willing to pay because solvency is very 
much like honesty: it can never be fully certified, and proofs take a long time to obtain 
(Calvo, 1996). 
In the process of analyzing solvency problems, the different implications of public and 
private sector debt is generally taken into account. If the public sector would be at risk in 
carrying out its functions, this in itself is likely to sharply curtail financial inflow to all 
economic sectors because governments can issue moratoria on debt-servicing and impose 
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exchange restrictions. Sizeable public external indebtedness may undermine the 
government’s commitment to allowing private sector debt repayment. Also, if private 
default take place on a significant scale, this too is likely to lead to a sharp reduction in 
financial inflow, and government intervention may follow in the form of exchange 
restrictions, a general moratorium or bailout. But problems of individual private sector 
borrowers may be contained to the concerned lenders. 
 
4.7.2 Liquidity    
 
Liquidity is defined as a situation where an economy has at its disposal sufficient 
convertible assets to meet its debt obligations. A liquidity problem occurs when a 
shortage of liquid assets affects the ability of an economy to discharge its immediate 
external obligations leading to a circumstance described as insolvency or unwillingness to 
pay. But it is also possible for a liquidity problem to arise independently of a solvency 
problem, following a “self-fulfilling run” (Krugman, 1996; Obstfeld, 1994) on a country’s 
liquidity as creditors lose confidence and undertake transactions that lead to pressures on 
the international reserves of the economy.  
Liquidity problems can be triggered, for example, by a sharp drop in export earnings, 
or an increase in foreign and/or domestic interest rates or prices of imports. The most 
important determinants of the vulnerability of an economy to external liquidity crisis 
include the currency and interest rate of debt, the maturity structure of the debt, and the 
availability of assets to pay the debts. Therefore, mechanisms that coordinate creditor 
actions can be useful in limiting or preventing the impact of liquidity crisis (IMF, 2003).   
 
4.7.3 Medium-Term Debt Scenarios 
 
An analysis of external debt sustainability is done in the context of medium term  
scenarios. This process involves numerical evaluations that take account of the behavior 
of economic variables and other factors to determine the conditions under which external 
debt and other indicators would stabilize at reasonable levels, such as major risks to the 
economy and the need and scope for policy adjustment. Uncertainties within the economy 
such as the current account outlook, policy uncertainties: fiscal policy for example, tend to 
dominate the medium term outlook. The current account balance is important because, if 
deficits persist, the country’s external position may eventually become unsustainable as 
would be reflected by a rising ratio of external debt to GDP. 
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In other words, financing of continually large current account deficits by the 
issuance of debt instruments will lead to an increasing debt burden, perhaps undermining 
solvency and leading to external vulnerability from a liquidity perspective, owing to the 
need of repaying large amount of debt (IMF, 2003). One advantage of the medium term 
scenarios is that borrowing is viewed within the overall macroeconomic framework. 
However, such an approach can be very sensitive to projections for variables such as 
economic growth, interest and exchange rates, and in particular, to the continuation of 
financial flows, which are potentially subject to sudden reversal. Consequently, a range of 
alternative scenarios may be prepared. 
 
4.8 Debt Ratios   
 
Debt ratios have been developed mostly to help indicate potential debt-related 
risks, and thus to support sound debt management. Debt indicators in medium-term 
scenarios can usefully sum up important trends. They are used in medium-term scenarios, 
preferably from a dynamic perspective. Debt ratios should be considered in conjunction 
with key economic and financial variables, in particular expected growth and interest 
rates, which determine their trend in medium-term. Another key factor to consider is the 
extent to which there is adequate contract enforcement -  that is, creditor rights, 
bankruptcy procedures, etc, that will help to ensure that private debt is contracted on a 
sound basis. 
More generally, the incentive structure within which the private sector operates 
could affect the soundness of borrowing and lending decisions; for example, whether 
there are incentives that favor short-term or foreign currency financing. As a result, there 
are conceptual problems in defining on a general level what are the appropriate 
benchmarks for debt ratios. In other words, the scope of identifying critical ranges for 
debt indicators is rather limited. While an analysis over time, in relation to other 
macroeconomic variables, might help to develop a system of early warning for a possible 
debt crisis or debt-service difficulties. Comparing the absolute value of overall debt ratios 
across heterogeneous countries is not very useful. For instance, high or low debt-to-export 
ratio in a particular year may have limited use as an indicator of external vulnerability; 
rather, it is the movement of the debt-to-exports ratio over time that reflects the debt 
related risks (IMF, 2003) 
For more homogenous country groupings and for debt of the public sector, there is 
more potential to identify debt-related indicators that suggest that debt or debt-service 
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ratios are approaching levels that in other countries have resulted in suspension or re-
negotiations of debt-service payments, or have caused official creditors to consider 
whether the debt burden may have reached levels that are too costly to support. For 
example, assistance under the HIPC Initiative is determined on the basis of a target for the 
ratio of public debt to exports (150 percent), or the ratio of debt to fiscal revenue (250 
percent). In these ratios, the present value of debt is used, and only a subset of external 
debt is taken into consideration, namely medium and long-term public and publicly 
guaranteed debt (Andrew et al., 1999). 
Broadly speaking, there two sets of debt indicators: those based on flow variables, 
for example, those related to exports or GDP – these are called flow indicators because the 
numerator or denominator or both are flow variables; and those based on stock variables 
– that is, both numerator and denominator are stock variables. 
 
4.8.1   Debt-to-Exports Ratio and NPV of Debt-to-Exports Ratio 
  
The debt-to-exports ratio is defined as the ratio of total outstanding debt at the end 
of the year to the economy’s exports of goods and services for any one year. This ratio can 
be used as a measure of sustainability because an increasing debt-to-export ratio over 
time, for a given interest rate, implies that total debt is growing faster than the economy’s 
basic source of external income, indicating that the country may have problems meeting 
its debt obligations in the future (IMF, 2003). 
 Indicators that use the stock of debt have several shortcomings in common. Firstly, 
countries that use external borrowing for productive investment with long gestation 
periods are more likely to exhibit high debt-to-exports ratios. But as the investments begin 
to produce goods that can be exported, the country’s debt-to-exports ratio may start to 
decline. So far these countries, the debt-to-exports ratio may not be too high from an inter-
temporal perspective even if in any given year it may be perceived as large. Therefore, 
this indicator can be based on exports after the average gestation lag, which is, using 
projected exports of one or several times ahead as a denominator. Generally, this also 
highlights the need to monitor debt indicators in medium-term scenarios to overcome the 
limitations of a snapshot. 
 Secondly, some countries may benefit from highly concessional terms, while 
others pay high interest rates. For such countries, to better capture the implied debt 
burden in terms of the opportunity cost of capital, it is useful to report and analyze the 
average interest rate on the debt or to calculate the present value of the debt by 
88   
 
 
discounting the projected stream of future amortization payments including interest, with 
a risk neutral commercial reference rate. As indicated above, in analyzing debt 
sustainability for the HIPC countries, the IMF and World Bank used such a present value 
of debt measure, notably, the present value of debt-to-exports, and to fiscal revenue. A 
high and rising present value of debt-to-exports ratio is considered to be a sign that the 
country is on an unsustainable debt path. 
 
4.8.2   Ratio of Debt to GDP and NPV of Debt to GDP  
 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is defined as the ratio of the total outstanding external debt 
at the end of the year to annual GDP. By using GDP as a denominator, the ratio may 
provide some indication of the potential to service external debt by switching resources 
from production of domestic goods to the production of exports. Indeed, a country might 
have a large debt-to-export ratio but a low debt-to-GDP ratio if exportables comprise a 
very small proportion of GDP. 
While the debt-to-GDP ratio is immune from export-related criticisms that mainly 
focus on the differing degree of value added in exports and price volatility of exports, it 
may be less reliable in the presence of over or under valuations of the real exchange rate, 
which could significantly distort the GDP denominator. Also, as with the debt-to-exports 
ratio, it is important to take account of the country’s stage of development and the mix of 
concessional and non-concessional debt. In the context of debt ratios, the numerator in the 
present value of debt-to-GDP ratio is again estimated using future projections of debt-
service payments discounted by market-based interest rates, that is, a risk-neutral 
commercial reference rate. (IMF, 2003). 
 
4.8.3   Ratio of Present Value of Debt to Fiscal Revenue 
  
The ratio of the present value of debt to fiscal revenue is defined as the ratio of 
future projected debt-service payments discounted by market-based interest rates, which 
is a risk-neutral commercial reference rate to annual fiscal revenue. This ratio can be used 
as a measure of sustainability in those countries with a relatively open economy facing a 
heavy fiscal burden of external debt. In such circumstances, the government’s ability to 
mobilize domestic revenue is relevant and will not be measured by the debt-to-exports or 
debt-to-GDP ratios. An increase in this indicator over time indicates that the country may 
have budgetary problems in servicing its debt. 
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4.8.4   Ratio of Debt-Service to Exports 
  
This ratio is defined as the ratio of external debt service payments of principal and 
interest on long-term and short-term debt to export of goods and services for any one 
year. The debt-service–to-exports ratio is a possible indicator of debt sustainability 
because its indicates how much of a country’s export revenue will be used up in servicing 
its debt and thus, also, how vulnerable the payment of debt-service obligations is to an 
unexpected fall in exports proceeds. This ratio tends to highlight countries with 
significant short-term external debt. A sustainable level is determined by the debt-to-
export ratios and the interest rates, as well as by the term structure of debt obligations. 
The latter may affect creditworthiness because the higher the share of sort-term credit is in 
overall debt, the larger and more vulnerable is the annual flow of debt-service obligations. 
 By focusing on payments, the debt-service-to-exports ratio takes into account the 
mix of concessional and non-concessional debt, while its evolution over time, especially in 
the medium-term scenarios, can provide useful information on lumpy repayment 
structures. Moreover, a narrow version of the debt-service ratio, focused on government 
and government-guaranteed debt-service, can be useful indicator of government debt 
sustainability and transfer risk: the risk that exchange rate restrictions are imposed that 
prevent the repayment of obligations because it may provide some insight into the 
political cost of servicing debt. 
 The debt-service-to-exports ratio has some limitations as a measure of external 
vulnerability, in addition to the possible variability of debt-service payments and export 
revenues from year to year. Firstly, amortization payments on short-term debt are 
typically excluded from debt service, and the coverage of private sector data can often be 
limited, either because the indicator is intentionally focused on the public sector or 
because data on private debt service are not available. 
 Secondly, many economies have liberalized their trade regimes and are now 
exporting a larger proportion of their output to the rest of the world. But at the same time 
they are importing more, and the import content of the exports is rising. Thus, a debt-
service-to-exports ratio not corrected for the import intensity of exports is biased 
downward for economies with a higher propensity to export (Kiguel, 1999); this argument 
applies similarly to the debt-to-export ratio. 
 Finally, the concept summarizes both liquidity and solvency issues, which may 
make it analytically less tractable than the measures that track only solvency - such as the 
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ratio of interest payments to exports or liquidity - the ratio of reserves to short-term debt 
(IMF, 2003).   
 
4.8.5   Ratio of International Reserves to Short-Term Debt 
  
This ratio is a pure liquidity indicator that is defined as the ratio of the stock of 
international reserves available to the monetary authorities to the short-term debt stock on 
a remaining maturity basis. This could be a particularly useful indicator of reserve 
adequacy, especially for countries with significant, but not fully certain access to 
international capital markets. This ratio indicates whether international reserves exceed 
scheduled amortization of short, medium, and long-term external debt during the 
following year; that is, the extent to which the economy has the ability to meet all its 
scheduled amortizations to non-residents for the coming year using its own international 
reserves. 
It provides a measure of how quickly a country would be forced to adjust if it were cut 
off from external borrowing- for example, because of adverse developments in the 
international capital markets. All scheduled debt amortization payments on both private 
and public debt to non-residents over the coming year are covered in such a ratio under 
short-term debt, regardless of the instruments or currency denomination. A similar ratio 
can be calculated focusing on the foreign currency debt of the government and banking 
sector only. This may be especially relevant for economies with very open capital markets, 
and significant public sector foreign currency debt. 
Interestingly, in most theoretical models the maturity structure of public debt is 
irrelevant because it is assumed that markets are perfect (Lucas and Stokey, 1983; Calvo 
and Guidotti, 1992). But markets are rarely perfect, even in developed countries. And as 
several currency crises in developing and emerging market countries in the mid to late 
1990s have shown, the risk associated with an excessive buildup of the stock of short-term 
debt relative to international reserves can be quite severe, even in countries that were 
generally regarded as solvent. One conclusion drawn has been that countries with 
excessively large short-term debt in relation to international reserves are more susceptible 
to liquidity crisis (Berg et al., 1999; Bussiere and Mulder, 1999; Furman and Stiglitz 1998). 
However, various factors need to be taken into account when interpreting the ratio of 
international reserves to short-term debt. Firstly, a large stock of short-term debt relative 
to international reserves does not necessarily lead to a crisis. Many advanced economies 
have higher ratios of short-term debt to reserves than many emerging economies, which 
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have shown vulnerability to financial crisis. Factors such as an incentive structure that is 
conducive to sound risk management, and a proven track record of contract enforcement, 
can help develop credibility, and help to explain this difference. Moreover, 
macroeconomic fundamentals, in particular the current account deficit and the real 
exchange rate, play an important role. Consideration should also be given to the exchange 
rate regime. For example, a flexible exchange rate can reduce the likelihood and costs of a 
crisis. Finally, the ratios assumes that measured international reserves are indeed 
available and can be used to meet external obligations; this has always been true 
historically.   
 
4.9    Summary and Conclusions 
 
Chapter four discusses the theoretical framework of budget deficits and how it is 
related to external indebtedness. It presents the nature of budget deficits and the views of 
prominent economists, notably, the Keynesian, Neoclassical and Ricardian schools of 
thought. The chapter further discusses the issue of capital flight, it causes and linkages 
with external indebtedness in developing countries. Finally, debt sustainability and debt 
ratios as a yardstick of measuring debt sustainability is discussed.  
Budget deficits in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa seem to 
have a direct relationship with external indebtedness. For several decades after 
independence, many African countries experienced large budget deficits that encouraged 
massive external borrowing from both bilateral and multilateral sources to fill the 
resource gap and to meet domestic expenditures. The continuous inflow of foreign funds 
in the form of loans led to the accumulation of large external debt stocks that became 
unsustainable. If national budgets were balanced, that is, revenue equals expenditure, 
governments may not need foreign resources to cover their domestic expenditures. 
Economists hold different views about budget deficits. For example, the 
Keynesians  believe that the size of the deficit depends on the discretionary tax, 
expenditure decisions and the health of the economy. They argue that during recessions 
government expenditure increases automatically while revenue  decreases. This is 
because automatic stabilizers are present in the government budget that regulates the 
economy. The Keynesians argue that with or without government intervention in the 
economy, the deficits increases during such periods. However, the budget deficits 
declines as the economy recovers from the recession.   
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The neoclassical economists on the other hand, blamed government deficits on 
varying economic distortions in the economy. They summarized the impacts of budget 
deficits in an economy as follows. Firstly, the deficit negatively affects domestic interest 
rates, which in turn affects private domestic investment. The neoclassical economists 
argue that large public borrowing puts an upward pressure on interest rates, thus, 
crowding out private investors competing for the same funds. Secondly, budget deficits 
affect the domestic export sector of the economy since government external borrowing to 
cover the deficit raises domestic interest rate, it also make domestic investment more 
attractive for foreign investors. Therefore, domestic investors loses export competitiveness 
due to the appreciation of the domestic currency. Thirdly, large budget deficit leads to 
external borrowing to finance domestic expenditure, and consequently results in debt-
servicing problems that may affect current and future generations. Fourthly, large deficits 
may either lead to government default on the debt or force the monetary authorities to 
embark on printing money to repay the acquired debt. This leads to an increase in the 
money supply and consequently, raises the inflation rate. 
The Ricardian view is contrary to the neoclassical’s  on budget deficits. The 
Ricardian economists believe that deficits are just symptoms rather than cause of bad 
economic policies. They argue firstly that tax and deficit finance are equivalent in the 
sense that the burden of each is on the current rather the future generations. Their second 
argument is that empirical evidence only weakly support the link between larger deficit 
and higher interest rates since many other factors such as the state of the economy, the 
rate of inflation, monetary policy, international trade and financial development etc, etc., 
all interact to determine the interest rate. The third argument is that deficit is seen as a 
symptom rather than a cause of economic problems. However, the initial effect of a 
budget deficit on an economy is lower national savings, which consists of both private 
and public saving. Low national saving consequently affect domestic investment or net 
exports. 
Furthermore, the chapter also highlighted the relationship between capital flight 
and external debt. From the literature, there is no generally accepted definition of capital 
flight since many people view the term differently. However, in the context of Sub-
Saharan African, this definition is applicable: capital flight is the movement of capital out 
of a poor developing country to a developed country. This  movement of capital often 
happens as an attempt to escape high domestic risks or to utilize the relative returns 
abroad. The causes of capital flight according to some literature including Ajayi, (1997, 
2001); Boyce and Ndikumana (2001, 2002); Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo (2001) etc include 
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macroeconomic instability (which comprises of inflation, fiscal balance, economic growth 
and exchange rate movements), political instability, risk adjustment returns differentials, 
and financial market development. Any of these factors may trigger the outflow of capital 
from developing to developed countries.  
The effects of such movement of capital on the domestic economy is summarized 
as follows: firstly, the outflow of capital can result to liquidity shortage in the domestic 
economy and consequently puts an upward pressure on the domestic interest rate. 
Secondly, in the event of a balance of payment difficulty, capital flight blows up the 
balance of payment difficulty into a crisis. Finally, capital flight creates an adverse income 
redistribution against the poor masses. Meanwhile, economists have studied the linkages 
between external debt and capital flight and concluded that external indebtedness may 
lead to capital flight and vice versa. Under the first linkage, we have debt-driven capital 
flight and debt-fueled capital flight, meaning external indebtedness leads to capital flight. 
The second linkage include flight-driven external borrowing and flight-fueled external 
borrowing, which shows that capital flight leads to external indebtedness through more 
external borrowing. 
Meanwhile, the external debt of developing countries could never have been a  
major problem if their debt stocks are at sustainable levels. Debt sustainability is therefore 
defined as the ability of low-income countries to contract debt at levels that they are able 
to service now or in the future without any debt-servicing difficulties or recourse to debt 
relief or forgiveness. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the deteriorating growth performance for 
many decades spurred the increase in external indebtedness. The nominal debt stocks for 
most HIPC countries in the early 1980s rose to about 800 percent of exports and 160 
percent of gross national income in the 1990s. Debt sustainability problems are reflected in 
the debt-service and debt stock ratios.  
Debt-service crowds out alternative uses of resources by debtor countries and is 
considered the obvious indicator that reveals immediately the burden that debt imposes 
on a country. The higher the debt-service ratio, the more the likelihood that debt could be 
unsustainable, and vice versa.     
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CHAPTER V 
 
5.0 DEBT RELIEF MEASURES FOR LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES 
 
Since the beginning of the external debt crisis of low and middle-income countries 
in the early 1980s, the debt situation of the debtor middle-income nations has improved 
significantly. Many of these countries have benefited from the collective assistance of the 
international financial community through the Paris Club reschedulings, the stock-of-debt 
reductions under the Brady Plan, and the adjustment programs initiated and supported 
by the Bretton Woods Institutions. These programs have been  effective in enabling debtor 
countries honor their external debt obligations and resume sustainable growth. In the 
recent years, many middle-income countries that had heavy external debt burden have 
again re-entered the international financial market.  
On the contrary, the heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), most of which are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, have continued to find it difficult to meet their external debt service 
obligations due to several factors. These include: (1) external shocks, such as the 
deterioration of terms of trade and adverse weather conditions; (2) civil strife; (3) lack of 
sustained adjustment and implementation of structural reforms; (4) the ill lending policies 
of many creditors, especially the provision of loans on commercial terms with short 
repayment periods; (5) the lack of prudent debt management policies by the debtor 
countries, driven in part by excessive optimism by creditors and debtors about the 
prospects for increasing export earnings to build debt-servicing capacity; (6) the lack of 
careful management of the currency composition of external debt. All these factors 
contributed to increasing the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries (Boote 
and Thugge, 1997).   
The HIPC countries are indebted to a variety of creditors, including Paris Club 
bilateral creditors, non-Paris club bilateral creditors, commercial banks, and multinational 
institutions. Recognizing the highly varied external positions among HIPCs, the 
international financial community has addressed the debt problems of these countries in a 
way that takes into account the total debt of the country concerned and ensures that debt 
relief is given in support of adjustment by debtors on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the 
individual circumstances of each debtor country.  
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5.1 The Conventional Approach to Debt Relief 
 
Traditionally, a country’s external debts were regarded as contractual international 
financial obligations that must be met in full and on time. If a country could not meet its 
debt-service payments to its creditors, it is assumed to have mismanaged its finances. It is 
also assumed that external debt problems would be avoided if the debtor country had 
exercised greater budgetary control and financial discipline. This approach not only 
blamed the debtor countries for accumulating debt, it also put the responsibility firmly on 
it for resolving the debt problem. Debt relief was only applied in special and compelling 
circumstances, and was limited to critical cases, for example, when there is a threat of 
default on existing claims. There were no operating criteria for debt relief. Each case for 
debt relief was treated on its own merits without reference to other cases. Abbott (1993) 
outlined the characteristic features of early debt relief approaches as follows: 
Firstly, they were essentially ‘ad hoc’ in nature, with relief being regarded as a last 
resort. Secondly, debt relief was only given on exceptional cases, and limited to the 
minimum amount necessary to restore the debtor’s credit-rating, enabling it to resume 
debt-service payments as quickly as possible. Thirdly, losses to the creditor were kept to 
the absolute minimum necessary to safeguard its investments. Fourthly, the cost of 
postponement of amortization and interest payment was to be borne by additional 
interest charged at commercial rates. Finally, the amount of disruption to the international 
monetary and financial system should be minimal (Abbott, 1993; Boote and Thugge, 
1997). 
The exercise of debt consolidation was an operation intended to help the creditor 
countries recover their foreign investments, and to prevent the debtors from getting into 
similar situations in the future. To this end, the exercise was accompanied by a series of 
economic measures and reforms which the debtor countries were required to implement 
in order to put their economies on a sound footing for the future. Consequently, the debts 
to be consolidated and the period of consolidation were kept to a minimum. 
 
5.2 Methods and Techniques of Debt Relief      
 
The conventional methods and techniques of debt consolidation include the following: (a) 
Debt rescheduling, (b) Debt refinancing, (c) Debt moratorium, and (d) Debt cancellation. 
These are not mutually and operationally exclusive methods, they allow for variant as 
well as combined forms. Each of these methods are described below: 
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5.2.1 Debt Rescheduling 
 
Debt rescheduling is the most commonly and widely used method in the history of 
debt relief. In this method, the repayment schedule of the existing debt is either adjusted 
or replaced by a new schedule that extends the date of repayment, reduce the rate of 
interest and/or grants a grace period. Rescheduling is intended to reduce the country’s 
debt profile and make its foreign debt burden more manageable. It is not intended to 
reduce the total outstanding debt stock. In fact, the stock of debt outstanding usually 
increases after rescheduling due to the capitalization of rescheduled interest payments.19     
Rescheduling is only appropriate when individual debts are involved in the 
process. However, the usual procedure of providing debt relief to indebted countries is 
when debts are combined over a period of two or three years, or when there is shortage of 
foreign exchange to honor debt service obligations. Debt rescheduling has not been useful 
for Sub-Saharan Africa since the level of their debt stocks are very high compared to other 
developing countries.  
 
5.2.2 Debt Refinancing   
 
Under this method the debtor country is given a new loan or line of credit in order 
to meet the existing debt service obligations, or to resume payment if this has been 
suspended. As an alternative method, the debtor country may decide to use its own 
foreign exchange reserves, including short-term bank loans. It would then receive a 
refund from the creditor country for the consolidated portion of the debt. This latter 
procedure has been widely used in debt consolidation, but is a more expensive method. 
Debt refinancing is more suitable for long-term structural debts because by 
providing new loans on softer terms, indebted countries with substantial long-term debt 
can find it very useful. But if the debtor country is forced to refinance on commercial 
terms, the effect will be the same as if it had rescheduled its debt with a moratorium 
market rate of interest. If new funds are acquired on commercial terms, refinancing can 
thus be an expensive exercise. Moreover, the process involves heavy budgetary cost 
(Abbott, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Abbott, 1993 
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5.2.3 Debt Moratorium 
 
Debt moratorium enables the debtor country to suspend debt-service payments on 
all or part of its external obligations temporarily or for a longer period, depending on a 
number of factors affecting its ability to service its debts. This method is particularly 
useful in a time of debt crisis. For example, in situations where the debtor country is 
under intense internal debt distress or when there is real danger of bankruptcy or default. 
The process provides an opportunity for the debtor and its principal creditors to 
undertake an assessment of the debtor’s external position. This method is applied when it 
is clear that rescheduling or refinancing cannot solve the debt problem. For example, in 
1987 Brazil declared a temporary moratorium on all debt-service payments. 
 
5.2.4 Debt Cancellation  
 
Debt cancellation is the process whereby a creditor decides to cancel either part or 
the entire bilateral debts owed to it by the debtor country. This is the last stage in the 
process of debt consolidation. The creditor may take this decision unilaterally, but usually 
it requires the principal creditors to act multilaterally and in concert to ensure that the 
losses are equitably distributed, and that relief given by one creditor is not used to pay the 
debts of another. This method is used reluctantly as a last resort when all other methods 
fail and there is no hope of recovering the creditor’s investment, and when the indebted 
country’s economy is on the verge of collapse. 
Debt cancellation measures are undertaken in mutual agreement between the 
creditors and debtor countries. However, there are instances when debtors have 
unilaterally acted and repudiated all or part of their external debts. This happened during 
the Great Depression when indebted countries were facing extremely difficult times. A 
change of government is also likely to encourage debt repudiation when the incoming 
government refuses to take responsibility for the external obligations of the outgoing 
government. This happened in Ghana following the overthrow of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah 
in February 1966.20   
In conclusion, the conventional methods of debt consolidation were used to settle 
the debt problems of developing countries. Although the methods and techniques of 
dealing with the problem are many, consolidation was confined to rescheduling and re-
financing. Moratoria and cancellation were only considered in extreme cases (Abbott, 
1993). 
                                                 
20
 www.seeingblack.com 
98   
 
 
5.3 The Traditional Creditors 
5.3.1   The Paris Club Creditors21 
 
Indebted low-income developing countries have been receiving debt rescheduling 
from the Paris Club creditors on non-concessional terms with relatively short grace and 
maturity periods, usually five and ten years respectively, and on commercial interest rates 
since the early 1980s. Although the reschedulings were more comprehensive in coverage 
and granted more cash relief than other creditors, many of the debtor countries still 
continue to have difficulties in meeting the repayment schedules. The repeated 
rescheduling of interest led to the accumulation of large external debt that became 
unsustainable. It was only in the late 1980s the Paris Club creditors recognized that 
repeated rescheduling on commercial terms could not solve the debt problems of these 
countries and that the need for debt reductions is urgent (Boote and Thugge, 1997). 
As a result of this recognition, the Paris Club agreed in late 1988 to provide 
concessional reschedulings for the low-income countries on the Toronto Terms, which 
offers debt and debt-service reduction on the net present value (NPV) of rescheduled 
amounts by up to one third. The Toronto rescheduling terms provided substantial debt 
reductions, but for many low-income countries it was clear that additional debt reduction 
measures were needed if their debt problems are to be resolved on a durable basis.         
Thus, in December 1991, the Paris Club Creditors introduced the London terms, 
which increased the level of debt relief on eligible debt in net present value (NPV) terms 
to 50 percent. Subsequently, the concessionality level was again increased to 67 percent of 
eligible debt in net present value (NPV) terms under the Naples terms in December 1994. 
Debtor countries that had a good track record on performance for a minimum of three 
years under an IMF supported program and on debt-service payment  are considered for 
a stock of debt operation by the participating creditors under both London and Naples 
Terms. Such a stock of debt operation was used as an exit rescheduling, and creditors had 
to be confident that the debtor country would be able to meet future debt-service 
payments without additional debt relief. In early 1995, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Mali, 
Uganda and Guyana agreed with the Paris Club on stock of debt operation under the 
Naples terms (Boote and Thugge, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Major Paris Club members include Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, Italy Japan, Holland, USA, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, UK and Russia. 
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5.3.2 Commercial and Bilateral Creditors  
 
In order to ensure that debt relief for low-income countries gain international 
support, the Paris Club creditors added a clause in the rescheduling agreement that 
commits the debtor countries to negotiating with non Paris club22 bilateral creditors for 
comparable debt relief. This was done to ensure that the burden of debt relief is shared 
among creditors and that the money saved from rescheduling is not used in servicing 
debts from other creditors. The Debt Reduction Facility of the World Bank’s IDA and 
from other donors have in the past enabled many low-income countries to buying back 
most of their debt to private creditors, which is then being traded in the secondary market 
at a large discount from the face value. However, the relation between non-Paris Club 
members and debtor countries has shown little improvement with regards to forgiving 
their debt. 
 
5.3.3 Multilateral Creditors    
 
These are international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and 
Regional Development Banks that often provide development finance on concessional 
terms to poor developing countries. These institutions were created to assist, through the 
provision of soft loans and technical assistance to member countries that have fiscal and 
budgetary difficulties.  Multilateral creditors have been helping debtor countries design 
and implement adjustment and structural reform programs in order to put their 
economies on sound footing.   
Three major trends can be observed from Multilateral financing: (1) as the 
multilateral creditors continue to make large-scale lending to low-income countries, the 
share of multilateral debt of the HIPC countries  have increased enormously; (2) financing 
has been concessional especially from the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and 
the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and the International Development 
Assistance (IDA) of the World Bank, which provides financial support to IDA-only 
eligible countries with outstanding debts to cover part of their interest obligations on 
these loans; (3) despite the increase in multilateral debt to the HIPCs, debt-service 
payments on multilateral debt have remained relatively stable at about 8 percent of 
exports each year during 1985 – 1995, reflecting the increased concessionality of loans 
(IMF, 1997). 
                                                 
22
 Major non-Paris Club bilateral creditors include China, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia  
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5.4 The HIPC Initiative 
 
As the external debt stocks of low-income countries, especially those of Sub-
Saharan Africa continues to accumulate to unsustainable levels despite the repeated 
reschedulings, it became clear to the international financial community that a 
comprehensive strategy of debt relief is needed to deal with the issue. In the mid 1990s, 
increasing poverty and a general perception of development failure in many least 
developed countries, mostly in Africa, reinforced the urgency of a relief mechanism. 
Distinct international actors started to come together and influence official thinking on 
debt relief (Callaghy, 2002). 
The growing influence of international civil society, with NGO networks as a key 
driving force, rallied the multilateral creditors and the G-8 governments to transform the 
international debt regime. The efforts of this alliance led to a call by the World Bank at its 
annual meetings in 1994 and 1995 to study multilateral debt and develop an effective 
strategy to deal with low-income countries debt. Concerns were raised within the Bank 
about the rising debt problem particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it was 
initially presumed that these poor countries only had a cash-flow constraint that can be 
resolved by policy reform. To this end, structural adjustment programs, which provided 
resources to resolve the short-run cash-flow problems were designed, targeting policy 
reform (Gautam, 2003).  
By early 1990s, however, structural adjustment programs failed to produce the 
expected results. The lack of ownership of reform programs combined with poor 
governance; weak management of public expenditures; inadequate investment on 
infrastructure, private sector development, and agricultural productivity had hindered 
supply responses to macroeconomic policy adjustment. As a way of resolving the rapidly 
increasing multilateral debt of low-income countries, the World Bank and IMF established 
a working group charged with the responsibility of assessing the magnitude of the 
multilateral debt problem and to develop possible ways of dealing with it. The group 
proposed a mechanism, “the multilateral debt fund”, which is designed to deal with the 
HIPC debt problem provided they adopt and pursue strong programs of adjustment and 
reform (World Bank, 2003).  
The development community welcomed the proposed mechanism, which was later 
transformed into a proposal for the HIPC Initiative in 1996. The Initiative, through more 
uniform rules, marked a significant advance from traditional debt relief mechanisms for 
eligible low-income countries. It transformed the debt regime towards more open and 
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accountable norms, and introduced some key innovations, including, for the first time, a 
systematic treatment of multilateral debt, the notion of debt sustainability, and the focus 
on poverty reduction (Callaghy 2002).    
The Initiative allows low-income countries to exit once and for all from debt 
rescheduling process and normalize relations with the international financial community 
by ensuring financial flows and meeting repayment obligations. In addition, repeated 
reschedulings involve significant financial costs for the creditors and creates uncertainty 
about future debt relief. The initiative would also reduce the “debt overhang”, which is 
the negative impact of large external debt on economic growth. A debt overhang can 
discourage domestic investment, and could delay private capital flows required to 
generate sustainable growth (IMF 1997). 
 
5.4.1   The Political economy of HIPC     
 
The HIPC Initiative was a comprehensive debt relief package compared to the 
traditional relief methods. It sought to reduce the debt stocks of low-income countries to 
sustainable levels subject to satisfactory policy performance of the debtors countries.  The 
initiative is a response to the emergence of a group of weak states and economies that 
have not been able to benefit from economic reform and globalization. The heavily 
indebted poor countries faces a structural dilemma that poses important difficulties to the 
functioning and evolution of the international political economy.  
Gautam (2003) argues that the structural dilemma is caused by many factors that 
are complex, and very deeply rooted, ranging from external trade patterns, external 
shocks, heavy reliance on primary commodities, weak economies, poor investment 
climates, corrupt and oppressive governments, weak domestic capacities, civil conflicts 
and war, environmental degradation, and disintegrating social and physical 
infrastructure. All of this is reinforced by limited access to private international capital 
flows, despite the knowledge that such access would sustain economic reform efforts. 
The traditional treatment of debt moved from debt collection, to debt 
rescheduling, to aid and structural adjustment, to debt sustainability, to debt cancellation 
and poverty reduction. This strategy was strongly influenced by major advocacy NGOs 
and civil society through their campaign on debt relief. The resulting momentum brought 
about the adoption of both the Original and Enhanced HIPC Initiative. All the 
stakeholders agreed that debt relief for low-income countries is essentially a political 
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issue, and that dealing with the problem requires political commitment of all creditors 
(World Bank 2003).  
 
5.4.2   The Objectives of the Original HIPC 
 
The HIPC Initiative was intended to deal with the overall debt burden of eligible 
low-income countries and to reduce it to sustainable level within a reasonable period of 
time. The initiative involves a commitment made at the decision point, by the 
international creditors to provide sufficient debt relief to sustainable levels, provided the 
debtor country can commit for a minimum period of time to strong policy performance. 
Only the poorest developing countries, most of them from Sub-Saharan Africa, were 
eligible for debt relief under the initiative (Boote and Thugge, 1997; UNCTAD 2004). 
These countries must be those that are only eligible for highly concessional assistance 
from the International Development Association (IDA) and from the IMF Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Moreover, they must also face an unsustainable 
debt burden even after benefiting from the traditional debt relief methods under the 
Naples Terms. 
A debtor country becomes eligible for debt relief under the Initiative only after 
satisfactorily demonstrating a good track record of macroeconomic policy reforms for a 
period of three years, reaching the decision point. Commitment for relief is then made by 
the international creditors subject to the debtor country completing a further three year 
period of strong policy performance reaching the completion point. Thus, a six-year good 
track record was required for full eligibility to irrevocable debt relief under the original 
HIPC.23  
Under the original HIPC, a country’s debt is considered to be sustainable when the 
debt ratios were within a certain thresholds after conducting debt sustainability analysis 
(DSA) by the World Bank, IMF and the debtor country itself. These thresholds were 
defined in the following: firstly, the ratio of the net present value (NPV)24 of a country’s 
external public and publicly guaranteed debt to exports of goods and services must be 
within a range of 200 to 250 percent; secondly, the debt service on public and publicly 
guaranteed external debt to exports ratio must be within the range of 20 to 25 percent. 
                                                 
23
 See www.worldbank.org/hipc 
24
 The NPV of debt is calculated using a discount rate, which in the case of the HIPC Initiative is chosen 
from the OECD’s six-month commercial reference interest rates (CIRRs). The CIRRs are commercial 
interest reference rates complied and published by the OECD. They may be applied under the OECD 
arrangements on Guidelines for officially supported export credits, and are provided in the table on discount 
and exchange rates in all HIPC Decision Point documents.   
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Since countries have different vulnerabilities, the exact ratios within the above ranges are 
determined using the country-specific vulnerability factors. GDP per capita levels and the 
variability and concentration of exports, the fiscal burden of external debt-service, 
external debt in relation to GDP, the level of international reserves, and the burden of 
private sector debt were key vulnerability factors used in the assessment (UNCTAD, 
2004). 
For extremely open economies, where the use of external indicators might not 
adequately reflect the fiscal burden of external debt, the Initiative provided that a country 
with an NPV of debt-to-export ratio below the range of 200 to 250 percent could qualify 
for relief if it meets two minimum threshold requirements such as an export-to-GDP ratio 
of 40 percent, and a fiscal revenue-to-GDP ratio of 20 percent. For countries that satisfy 
both of these thresholds, instead of the standard NPV of debt-to-exports target, a different 
target was set whereby the NPV of debt would be 280 percent of fiscal revenue. Uganda, 
Mozambique, Mali, Burkina Faso and Bolivia qualified under the export requirement, 
while Cote d’Ivoire and Guyana qualified under the NPV of debt-to-revenue requirement 
(UNCTAD, 2004). 
 
5.4.3   HIPC Co-ordination Issues 
 
A number of salient issues arose in the design and implementation of the original 
HIPC Initiative that were reminiscent of the 1980 debt crisis. Firstly, a key feature of the 
Initiative was an emphasis on equitable burden sharing among creditors. The cost of debt 
relief were to be shared among creditors in proportion to the amount owed to them after 
full application of the traditional debt relief mechanisms. The later comprised a reduction 
of the stock of debt on Naples terms by Paris Club creditors and a comparable treatment 
by non-Paris Club bilateral creditors. The sponsors of the Initiative attempted to elaborate 
clear rules to govern eligibility, burden sharing, and delivery of relief, while allowing 
enough flexibility to meet the differing needs of creditors and debtors. In practice, these 
became increasingly the subject of dispute with NGOs in the creditor nations. 
Secondly, in addition to the technical work of assessing debt sustainability, staffs 
of the World Bank and IMF played a crucial role in coordinating the large body of 
creditors involved in the Initiative including members of the Paris Club. The challenges of 
coordinating a large body of heterogeneous creditors were reminiscent of those facing the 
IMF in the conduct of the Brady Plan. Williamson (1988) presents some of the problems 
associated with comprehensive debt reduction schemes, which are: (1) bringing all 
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creditors to participate in the scheme in order to avoid free-riding; (2) determining the 
eligibility of countries and debt repurchase price – avoiding penalizing those countries 
that have made effort to service their debt; (3) the question of how to allocate debt relief to 
countries most in need of relief in the standpoint of poverty and equity; (4) how to avoid 
providing incentives to countries to adopt policies designed to depress the secondary 
market price of debt. 
Cooper and Sachs (1985), Krugman (1988), Detriaghe and Garella (1993) and 
Spiegel (1996) all explored the added complications of the co-ordination and diverging 
interests that arise when creditors are multiple and have heterogeneous characteristics. 
Faced with multiple creditors, it may be necessary to consolidate the debt. However, in 
order for this strategy to succeed, it would require tackling the problem of claims on 
individual holdings. Heterogeneity may escalate the problems, for instance, small and 
imprudent lenders may have a greater incentive to free-ride and take risks than the larger 
and prudent lenders. 
In Latin America, the IMF played a co-ordination role by providing balance of 
payment lending in the early 1980s and during the Brady Plan.25  In the case of the HIPC 
Initiative, both the World Bank and IMF played a crucial role by providing leadership and 
helping to coordinate the multilateral parties involved in the Initiative. However, a key 
issue is that the extent which international institutions like the World Bank and IMF can 
intervene may create expectations of future interventions, and thus, may lead to more 
imprudent lending by creditors.      
 
5.4.4   The Enhanced HIPC Initiative 
 
Three years after its launch in 1996, it became clear that the Original Initiative was 
not robust enough to provide the HIPC countries with a permanent exit from repeated 
debt rescheduling. Moreover, the Initiative did not provide enough resources to tackle 
poverty reduction in the debtor countries as expected. Thus, concerns were raised about 
the small number of countries that qualify, the slow pace of delivery and  the too little 
relief provided by the Initiative. Even those countries that have befitted from relief were 
still spending more on debt-servicing than on domestic social needs. In light of these 
concerns and the increasing public pressure from NGOs, civil society, development 
specialists and some HIPC countries, the IMF and World Bank agreed in September 1999 
to an enhanced HIPC Initiative. The primary objective of the enhanced version of the 
                                                 
25For example,  Kenen (1990) proposed the creation of an International Debt Discount Corporation with more 
resources for debt relief than provided by the Brady Plan. 
105   
 
 
Initiative was to strengthen the link between debt relief and policies tailored to a 
country’s circumstances in order to reduce poverty through the delivery of a deeper, 
broader and faster debt relief (UNCTAD, 2004). 
The enhanced HIPC Initiative reduced the ratio of net present value of debt-to-
exports to a minimum ratio of 150 percent, which was previously set at 200 to 250 percent 
in the original framework. It also lowered the fiscal threshold to an export-to-GDP ratio of 
30 percent, previously 40 percent; and a revenue-to-GDP ratio of 15 percent, previously 20 
percent. For countries that meet the new thresholds, the net present value of debt-to-
revenue ratio was reduced from 280 percent to 250 percent. Due to the dramatic 
reductions in the debt sustainability ratios in the enhanced version of the Initiative, seven 
additional countries, five of which are in Africa qualified for debt relief. These countries 
include Benin, Central Africa Republic, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, Honduras, and Lao PDR. 
 
Table 1.9 : Original and Enhanced HIPC Eligibility Thresholds 
 
 
Element                                                                                   Original                         Enhanced                                  
 
NPV of debt to export ratio                                                      200 to 250                              150 
 
NPV of debt to revenue ratio                                                           280                                  250 
 
Openness criterion (exports as % of GDP)                                      40                                    30 
 
Revenue threshold as a % of GDP                                                   20                                    15                              
 
Source: See UNCTAD 2004, p. 16; Gautam 2003 
 
Another major boost to relief is what is referred to as “frontloading” of debt relief.  
This is the provision of a proportion of debt relief to eligible countries at the decision 
point in order to maximize support for poverty reduction programmes. The enhanced 
HIPC is robust, in that it revised the eligibility criteria of the original initiative and re-
assessed countries that had already qualified under the original HIPC framework for 
additional relief based on the revised eligibility benchmarks. Moreover, the completion 
point, which must be reached within a fixed period of three years was allowed to float in 
line with the pace of each country’s reform process. Thus, the assessment of a country’s 
performance during the interim period is based on specific outcomes of policy reforms 
agreed at the decision point; which include the maintenance of macroeconomic stability, 
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and the preparation of poverty reduction papers (PRSP) for at least one year.26 A country 
reaches the completion point once these requirements are met, and the international 
community commits itself to providing debt relief to enable the country reach the 
sustainable debt levels. 
The HIPC Initiative is, in general, an additional boost to the traditional debt relief 
mechanisms. It provides for an equitable burden sharing of debt relief in proportion to the 
amount owed by the debtor country to the creditor community. Furthermore, the 
initiative ensures that the actions of the Breton Woods Institutions are in accordance with 
their status as preferred creditors; in the event of default or external debt servicing 
problems, sovereign borrowers make preferential allocations of foreign exchange to 
service the debt owed to these institutions without triggering remedial action on the part 
of the other creditors. If, however, the debtor countries fail to honour their debt service 
obligations, the creditor institutions will suspend debt rescheduling agreements or 
completely cease to allow new financial flows (UNCTAD, 2004). 
According to the United Nations classification, 34 of the 50 least developed 
countries are in Africa. Therefore, the external debt overhang problem is more serious in 
the African continent. Similarly, the 42 HIPC eligible countries worldwide as classified by 
the World Bank, 34 are in Africa, 4 in Latin America and 4 in Asia. Since the enhancement 
of the HIPC framework, only 23 African countries reached the decision point by February 
2004, seven of which were at their completion points during the same period. The 
estimated costs of the Initiative rose from $12.5 billion in 1998 NPV terms for 29 countries 
to $39.4 billion in 2002 NPV terms for 34 countries. 
 
5.5   The Gleneagles Debt Agreement  
 
Before the commencement of the G-8 (United States, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom) summit in Gleneagles in 2005, the finance 
ministers of the world’s most industrialised countries agreed on a 100 percent debt relief 
for HIPC developing countries, mostly Sub-Saharan African countries during their 
London meeting of June 2005. The announcement initially benefits 14 nations in Africa27 
                                                 
26
 Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) are documents prepared by the national authorities in 
collaboration with the IMF and World Bank. The paper is expected to enhance the country ownership of 
HIPCs macroeconomic adjustment and reform programmes, and developed transparently with the 
participation of elected institutions, stakeholders, such as civil society, donors, and regional banks. The PRSP 
provides a link between debt relief and appropriate macroeconomic, structural and social policies in a debtor 
country. 
27
 The fourteen beneficiaries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 
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and 4 countries in Latin America, which are already on their “completion point” under 
the HIPC Initiative launched by the IMF and World Bank in 1996.28 The total cost of this 
action is estimated at US $40 billion. Another set of nine African29 countries that are in 
their decision point were set to qualify for full debt write off 18 months after the first 
beneficiary countries, bringing the total cost of debt relief to US $55 billion (Brown, 2005). 
Under the agreement, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the 
African Development Bank will write off 100 percent of the money owed to them by the 
18 HIPC countries. However, the World Bank and the African Development Bank would 
be compensated dollar for dollar for the debt cancellation, while the cost of debt relief for 
the IMF would be met by the use of the existing IMF resources. The ministers also 
pledged to provide a fair and sustainable solution to Nigeria’s debt problems in 2005 
through the grouping of creditor nations known as the Paris Club. Nigeria owed about 
$35 billion of debt to the international creditor community, $31 billion of which is owed to 
the 19-nation-strong Paris Club. It has not received any fresh loans since 1992, but repaid 
$8 billion of debt since then (Global Policy Forum, 2005).  
Part of Nigeria's case in asking for debt relief is that most of the money it received 
was lent to corrupt military dictators, a fact the government says was well known by 
foreign banks and governments. The UK's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, 
said the debt relief combined with the debt buy-back would "mean that 100 percent debt 
relief for Nigeria is possible over the next six months". The UK is Nigeria's biggest 
creditor and has been attempting to persuade other G8 creditors of the need for debt 
write-off.  
  
5.6   Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter dealt with debt relief as a mechanism of alleviating the external debt 
burden of the third world countries. In particular, it elaborated on the conventional 
methods of debt relief used by external creditors vis-à-vis the debtors. The methods and 
techniques, which included debt rescheduling, refinancing, moratorium and debt 
cancellation were discussed. The chapter also clarified the composition of the traditional 
creditors, which include the Paris club, the commercial and bilateral creditors, and 
multilateral creditors. The  heavily indebted poor country initiative (HIPC) and its 
enhanced framework is also discussed.  
                                                 
28
 See www.allafrica.com 
29
 The next beneficiaries are Cameroun, Chad, Congo DRC, Gambia, Malawi,Guinea,Guinea Bissau, Sao 
Tome, and Sierra Leone.  
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Since the beginning of the debt crisis of developing countries the international 
creditor community has launched various programmes aimed at reducing the debt stocks 
of the debtor countries. Many of the debtor countries benefited from the collective 
assistance of the creditors through the Paris-Club reschedulings and refinancing under 
the Brady Plan, the Toronto Terms, the London Terms, the Naples Terms, the Lyon 
Terms, and the Cologne Terms. Under the conventional method of debt relief, a debtor 
country’s debt can be rescheduled, meaning that the repayment schedule of the existing 
debt is either adjusted or replaced by a new schedule that extends the date of repayment, 
reduce the interest rate or grants a grace period. This method is not intended to reduce the 
total debt stock, but to make the country’s debt profile manageable. 
Debt refinancing allows the creditors to grant the debtor a new loan or line of 
credit in order to meet its existing debt-service obligations or to resume payment if this 
has been suspended. Debt moratorium enables the debtor country to suspend debt-
service payments on all or part of its external obligations temporarily or for a longer 
period, depending on a number of factors that affect its ability to service its debts. Debt 
cancellation is only used as a last resort under the conventional method of debt relief. 
Here, the creditors (Paris-Club, Commercial and Bilateral, and Multilateral) decide to 
cancel either part or the entire bilateral debts owed to it by the debtor country.  
Despite the comprehensive application of the traditional methods of debt relief 
mechanisms, the debt stocks of developing countries continue to mount to unprecedented 
levels that threatens their growth and development prospects. In 1996, the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) was launched by the IMF and World Bank to 
provide a comprehensive reduction of the total debt stocks of the eligible developing 
countries. The  HIPC Initiative was enhanced in 1999 when it was clear that the original 
framework was not robust enough to provide the debtor countries with a permanent exit 
from repeated debt rescheduling.    
However, debt relief has not been an absolute solution to all the economic 
problems of the third world countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa whose economic 
growth trends have been declining. Even if all of the external debt of the region is 
cancelled, most countries would still continue to need large external assistance due to 
their weak economies, declining terms of trade, and recurrent natural disasters such as 
adverse climatic conditions and civil strife. Due to widespread poverty and the limited 
domestic resources to meet the cost of social programs for the poor, most of these 
countries are likely to continue to be dependent on foreign aid. To make debt relief 
beneficial to the debtor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa would require the continuous 
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inflow of financial resources in the form of aid, and strong institution building that is 
essential in attracting private investment as well as in providing support for the 
construction of the necessary infrastructure. 
Meanwhile, most of the indebted countries in Africa need to reform their 
governance system, especially to build investor confidence. To attract foreign investors, 
the debtor countries need to establish appropriate commercial codes of conduct, 
functioning judicial systems, and a strong and effective application of the rule of law. 
They also need to improve their financial management systems. In addition, structural 
adjustments and policy reforms need to be continued to meet the needs of the domestic 
population. The debt relief initiative is intended to complete an array of instruments 
available to the creditor community for dealing with debt problems of low-income 
countries. Therefore, it should eliminate debt as an impediment to economic development 
and growth and enable the debtor governments to concentrate on difficult policies and 
reforms for achieving sustainable development.      
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CHAPTER VI 
 
6.0                                            DATA AND ESTIMATION 
 
This chapter analyses empirically the impact of external debt burden on economic 
growth and investment in ECOWAS countries in Sub-Saharan Africa using spatial 
regression models. It also investigates the impact of spatial dependence and spatial 
interaction among the countries under investigation within the period from 1980 to 1999. 
The growth model has annual growth rate (Y) as the dependent variable, and on the right 
hand side include, as control variables, per capita income, gross domestic investment, 
terms of trade, and two debt variables (external debt-service to exports of goods and 
services and total debt stock to GDP). Similarly, the investment model has annual public 
investment rate as the dependent variable (PINV), and as explanatory or control variables 
include, per capita income, foreign aid, and the same debt variables as mentioned above. 
 
6.1 Data Description 
 
The analysis of this dissertation uses spatial regression models for twelve West 
African countries over the period 1980 - 1999. The data are collected from various sources. 
The total debt stock to GDP is from the World Debt Tables (WDT), which is the World 
Bank’s authoritative review of developing countries’ external debt and financial flows. 
The data in the World Debt Tables is compiled from the statistics provided by countries 
who are members of  the World Bank debtor reporting system. In 1997 the World Debt 
Tables (WDT) was renamed as Global Development Finance to reflect the significant 
change in global capital flows (World Bank, 1997). Per capita income (in 1995 prices), 
terms of trade, gross domestic investment, and public investment are from the World 
Bank database. The nominal value of debt service to exports of goods and services and 
official foreign assistance (foreign aid) are from the African Development Bank database, 
compiled by the Bank’s country offices for each country. Although country economic data 
compiled by the World Bank and the African Development Bank are used in most 
empirical studies, I would however, like to mention that these data are not completely 
reliable due to some discrepancies discovered in the data compilation.  
The set of control variables include, initial per capita income, terms of trade 
growth, gross domestic investment, and foreign aid (not loans), all in their natural 
logarithm. In the conditional convergence framework, the initial income per capita is 
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expected to have a negative coefficient, reflecting the convergence effect. The terms of 
trade growth reflects external shocks, and is expected to have a positive coefficient. The 
coefficient of gross domestic investment is expected to be positive, reflecting the positive 
impact of physical capital on growth, while foreign aid reflects the inflow of external 
assistance, and is expected to have positive coefficient.  
 
6.2  Spatial Models for Space -Time Data 
 
This section briefly discusses spatial models that incorporate both space and time 
data sets. While spatial linear regression models for cross-sectional data are designed to 
account for specifications that pertains to situations where observations are available for a 
cross-section of spatial units at a point in time, space-time regression models are designed 
to take into account patterns of cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity among 
regional entities or countries (Anselin, 1988).  
The specification below expresses potential space-time dependencies and forms of 
heterogeneity: 
                   it it it ity Xβ ε= +                            (6.1) 
 
where itX  is a row vector of observations for spatial unit i  at time t , itβ  is vector of 
space-time specific parameters, and itε  is a vector of error terms. The error is 
characterised by the following conditions: 
 
                        [ ]itE 0ε =                            (6.2) 
                                                 
            itE . 0jsε ε  ≠                                         (6.3) 
 
while equation (6.2) is a familiar expression, the structure of equation (6.3) constitutes a 
number of space-time dependencies and spatial heterogeneity. For instance, with 
 and  ,i j t s= =  the residual variance can either be used as a constant in the standard case, 
or as varying in the heteroskedasticity case.  The variation can be across space indexed by 
i , over time indexed by t , or over space and time indexed by ,i t (Anselin 1998).  
This relation can be expressed formally as: 
 
[ ]itE . ,itε ε σ=   constant variance 
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[ ]it ,E . it iε ε σ=   spatial heterogeneity 
 
[ ]it ,E . it tε ε σ=   time-wise heterogeneity 
 
[ ]it ,E . it itε ε σ=   space-time specific variance 
 
With ,  and  ,i j t s≠ =  the dependence is a contemporaneous spatial correlation, which 
can either be specific to each time ,t  or can be the same for all the periods under 
consideration. This is formally depicted as: 
 
  itE .  (t),jt ijε ε σ  =    contemporaneous correlation. 
 
With  and  ,i j t s= ≠  the dependence is contained in the time domain, again, either 
constant over all spatial units, or varying with location index .i  Formally, it is depicted as: 
 
  [ ]itE .  ( ),is ts iε ε σ=    time-wise correlation. 
 
When both ,  and  ,i j t s≠ ≠  the dependence pattern is across space and time 
simultaneously:  
 
  it  E . ( ),js ij tsε ε σ  =    space-time correlation. 
 
Meanwhile, due to the lack of degrees of freedom to estimate itβ  for every observation, 
equation (6.1)  cannot be operationalised. The constraints are imposed in such a manner 
that allows for several space-time modelling situations. An operational form that is 
different from equation (6.1) in terms of the variability of the coefficient is given as: 
 
                               it it ity Xβ ε= +                                        (6.4) 
 
In this case, the parameters are fixed across all observations in space and in time.  
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6.3   Spatial Autocorrelation 
 
Spatial autocorrelation is defined as the coincidence of value similarity with 
locational similarity (Anselin and Bera 1998). A positive spatial autocorrelation occurs 
when similar values for a variable are clustered together, while a negative spatial 
autocorrelation occurs when dissimilar values are clustered in space. Spatial econometrics 
generally deals with spatial effects – specifically spatial autocorrelation and spatial 
heterogeneity. In regression analysis, spatial effects pertains to two categories of 
specifications. The first is spatial dependence, also known as spatial autocorrelation and 
the second is spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 1999). In a regression model, Spatial 
heterogeneity means structural instability either in the form of non-constant error 
variances or in the form of variable regression coefficients.  
The formal framework used for statistical analysis of spatial autocorrelation is a 
collection of random variables ,y  indexed by location ,i  
 
                                                                    ,iy i D∈                                                                     (6.5) 
 
where the index D  is either a continuous surface or a finite set of discrete locations 
(Cressie, 1993). Being that every random variable represents a location, spatial 
autocorrelation is expressed in the moment condition as: 
 
       [ ]cov ,  . 0,  for i j i j i jy y E y y E y E y i j     = − ≠ ≠                                           (6.6) 
 
where ,i j  represent individual locations or observations and ,  i jy y  is the value of the 
random variable at that location. The covariance is said to have meaning in a spatial 
context when the particular configuration of non-zero ,i j  pairs has interpretation in 
terms of spatial structure, spatial interaction or spatial arrangement of the observations 
(Anselin, 1999). For example, this would be the case when assessing the extent of spill 
over effects among the West African countries under investigation.  
 Meanwhile, the most often used approach to formally express spatial 
autocorrelation is through the specification of a functional form for the spatial stochastic 
process that relates to the value of a random variable at a given location to its value at 
other locations. For example, consider an 1N ×  vector of random variables, ,y  observed 
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across space, and an 1N ×  vector of iid  random errors ,ε a simultaneous spatial 
autoregressive process is defined as 
 
                                                   ( ) ( )y i W y iµ ρ µ ε− = − +                           (6.7) 
 
where µ  is the constant mean of 
,iy and i  is an 1N × vector of ones, and ρ  is the spatial 
autoregressive parameter. Equation (6.7) consist of an N N× spatial weights matrix ,W  
which means that for each location in the system, the weight matrix specifies which of the 
other locations in the system affect the value at that location. The structure of the spatial 
weights depend on the definition of a neighbourhood set for each observation. This can be 
obtained by selecting for each location i  as the row and the neighbours as the columns 
corresponding to non-zero elements ijw  in a fixed and positive N N×  spatial weights 
matrix W . A spatial lag for y  at location i  then follows as 
 
                                                     
,
1,...,
( )i ij j
j N
Wy W y
=
= ∑                                                                   (6.8) 
in matrix form, it is written as: 
                                                                      Wy                                                                (6.9) 
 
since for each i  the matrix elements ijw  are only non-zero for those j  that are elements of 
iS . Where iS  is the neighbourhood set. The elements of the spatial weights matrix are 
typically row standardised, such that for each , 1.ijji W =∑  As a result, the spatial lag may 
be interpreted as a weighted average of the neighbours (Anselin, 2001). 
 It should be noted that the elements of the weight matrix are non-stochastic and 
exogenous to the model, meaning that they are based on geographic arrangement of the 
observations, or contiguity. Anselin described weights to be non-zero ( 0)w ≠ when two 
locations shares a common boundary or are within a given distance to each other. The 
constraints imposed by the weights structure (the zeros in each row), together with 
specific form of the spatial process (autoregressive) determine the variance-covariance 
matrix for y as a function of two parameters, the variance, 2 ,σ  and the spatial coefficient, 
.ρ  For the spatial autoregressive structure in equation (6.7), since [ ] 0,E y iµ− =  this 
yields: 
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         cov[( y iµ− )], ( y iµ− )]= 2 1[( )( ) '] [( ) '( )]E y i y i I W I Wµ µ σ ρ ρ −− − = − −                 (6.10) 
 
This is a full matrix, which implies that shocks at any location affect all other locations, 
through a so-called spatial multiplier effect or spatial interaction.  
 A major distinction between the processes in space compared to the time domain 
is that even with iid error terms ,iε the diagonal elements in (6.10) are not constant. 
Furthermore, the heteroskedasticity depends on the neighbourhood structure embedded 
in the spatial weights matrix W. Consequently, the process in y is not covariance-
stationary (Anselin 2001). 
 
6.4    Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis 
 
In the literature of spatial data analysis, several indexes have been proposed to 
assess the presence of spatial autocorrelation. In this study we employ the Moran’s I 
statistic, which is the most widely known measure of spatial autocorrelation. The Moran’s 
I is a test statistic for spatial autocorrelation and is expressed as 
 
                                               
1 1
2
1
( )( )
( )
n n
ij i j
i j
n
o
i
i
W y y
nI
s y
µ µ
µ
= =
=
− −
 
=  
 
−
∑∑
∑
                                          (6.11) 
 
where n  is the number of observations, ijW  is the elements in the spatial weights matrix 
W  corresponding to the countries ( , ),i j µ  is the mean of all y observations for country’s 
i  and j  respectively, and os  is a normalising factor equal to the sum of the elements of 
the weights matrix, that is, o iji js W= ∑ ∑ (Anselin 1992). 
 Different definitions of spatial interactions cause different spatial weight matrices. 
This study employs the simplest, but also the most popular definition – that is, the binary 
contiguity matrix where the elements ( , )i j  of the spatial weights matrix, 1ijw =  if 
country i  and  country j  share a common border. However, if country i  and country j  
do not share a common border, 0ijw =  (Upton and Fingleton1 985; Haining 1990;  Anselin 
1992). When the spatial weights matrix is row-standardised such that the elements in each 
row sum to 1, the expression in equation (6.11) simplifies to the form below: 
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where W is a spatial weights matrix and y  is a vector of observed values of 
,iy  in 
deviation from the mean. The value of the Moran’s I  statistic ranges from –1 for negative 
spatial autocorrelation to 1 for positive spatial autocorrelation. Across all geographic 
locations, if similar values are more likely than dissimilar values between neighbours, the 
Moran’s I  statistic tends to be positive, and vice versa. Comparing the change in spatial 
autocorrelation of growth for each year from 1980 to 1999, this study will trace the 
trajectory of dynamic distribution patterns of ECOWAS growth levels over time. 
 From a more disaggregated view of the nature of spatial association, the Moran 
scatter-plot suggested by Anselin (1996) is also employed to capture the local structure of 
spatial association among the ECOWAS countries. Since the elements in the vector y  in 
equation (6.13) are in deviations from the mean, the Moran’s I  statistic is formally 
equivalent to the slope coefficient in the linear regression of the spatial lag Wy  on y . This 
interpretation of the Moran’s I  statistic provides a way to visualize the linear association 
between y  and the spatially weighted average of the neighbouring values, or spatial lag 
Wy  in the form of a bivariate scatter plot of Wy  against .y  
 The Moran scatter plot decomposes global spatial association into four different 
quadrants, which corresponds to the four types of local association between a country and 
its neighbours described as follows: Quadrant 1: High-High (HH) – represents a high 
income growth country surrounded by high income growth neighbours. Quadrant 2: 
Low-High (LH) – represents a low income growth country surrounded by high income 
growth neighbours. Quadrant 3: Low-Low (LL) – represents a low income growth country 
surrounded by low income growth neighbours. Quadrant 4: High-Low (HL) – represents 
a high income growth country surrounded by low income growth neighbours. 
Consequently, quadrant 1 and 3 represent positive spatial association indicating spatial 
clustering of similar growth values while quadrants 2 and 4 represents negative spatial 
association. 
 The Moran scatter-plots and the LISA Maps of this study, which are in appendix B 
and C are valuable for gaining a local understanding of the extent and nature of spatial 
clustering in the data set. The Moran scatter plot visualizes the type and strength of 
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spatial autocorrelation in the data distribution. It provides a statistic that determine the 
extent of linear association between the values in a given location (the x-axis), with values 
of the same variable in neighbouring locations (the y-axis). In the Moran scatter-plot of 
dependent variable ,Y  the data are standardised so that units on the graph are expressed 
in standard deviation from the mean. The horizontal axis shows the standardised value of 
growth Y for the twelve ECOWAS countries under observation. The vertical axis shows 
the standardised value of the average growth Y for the countries’ neighbours as defined 
by the weights matrix.  
In this study, neighbours are defined under the first-order rook contiguity 
convention. The Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) on the other hand, indicate 
the presence or absence of significant spatial clusters or outliers for each location. LISA 
maps are particularly useful in assessing the hypothesis of spatial randomness and to 
identify local hotspots. However, since LISA maps are univariate, they may mask 
multivariate associations. The upper right quadrant of the Moran scatter-plots shows 
those countries with high growth rates ( )Y  and which also share common boundaries 
with neighbours that have high growth rates (HH). The lower left quadrant shows 
countries with low growth rates sharing common borders with neighbours with low 
growth rates (LL). The lower right quadrant displays countries with high growth rates 
surrounded by countries with low growth rates (HL), and finally, the upper right 
quadrant contains the reverse of the latter (LH). Anselin (1996) has demonstrated that the 
slope of the regression line through these points expresses the global Moran’s I  statistic, 
which for this study varies across time.  
With the exception of five time periods: 1983, 1984, 1985, 1991, and 1993, whose 
Moran statistic show positive spatial autocorrelation, the rest of the fifteen periods 
indicate negative spatial autocorrelation for ECOWAS countries. As can be observed from 
the Moran scatter-plots in appendix B, for most of the periods the observations are 
clustered in quadrants 2 and 4, which make them to display negative spatial 
autocorrelation.  This spurious results of the Moran’s I  statistic indicate that there is 
serious instability in the data set of the region across time and space. Similarly, the Moran 
scatter-plots for the five year average in appendix B shows three periods (1980-84, 1985-
89, and 1994-99) with negative spatial autocorrelation, while sub-period 1990-94 indicates 
a positive spatial autocorrelation.    
The LISA maps of the ‘local’ Moran’s I  statistic for our dependent variable 
Y provides a corollary to the Moran scatter-plots by displaying the same data in a 
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different way. The LISA maps show the geographic distribution of the various 
combinations of high-high, low-high, low-low, and high-low observations within 
ECOWAS countries where the local Moran statistic is significant at (p-value = 0.05) level 
and below. From the LISA maps in appendix C, it can be observed that some ECOWAS 
countries fall within various quadrants that are insignificant across time, and are therefore 
not shaded on the maps. Cape Verde, which is the only island in ECOWAS falls in the 
low-high of the upper right quadrant across all the periods with significance level of p-
value=0.01.  The table below presents a summary of the LISA maps across space and time.   
 
Table 2.1: Quadrants Distribution Across Country and Time in the LISA Maps 
Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Mali           
Niger           
Cape Verde L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H 
Senegal    H-L       
Burkina Faso        H-L H-L  
Nigeria           
Gambia           
Guinea Bissau           
Benin           
Ghana           
Togo   L-H       H-L 
Ivory Coast           
Note: high-high (H-H), low-high (L-H), low-low (L-L), and high-low (H-L). The insignificant 
observations are not shaded. 
 
Table 2.2: Quadrants Distribution Across Country and Time in the LISA Maps 
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Mali       L-H L-H H-L  
Niger   L-H        
Cape Verde L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H L-H 
Senegal        L-L  H-L 
Burkina Faso           
Nigeria L-L   L-L       
Gambia  L-H         
Guinea Bissau H-L          
Benin        L-H   
Ghana           
Togo           
Ivory Coast    H-H       
Note: high-high (H-H), low-high (L-H), low-low (L-L), and high-low (H-L). The insignificant 
observations are not shaded. 
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6.5  The Spatial Lag and Spatial Error Models 
 
In testing regional growth and income convergence, numerous studies have 
employed the traditional Baumol model, which treats countries or regions in isolation 
(Quah 1996a). This model does not capture the fact that one country’s or region’s 
economic destiny may be dependent upon those of other countries or regions that shares 
common borders. Indeed, the evolution of each country or region is closely related to the 
evolution of at least the neighbouring countries or regions. In this context of spatial 
dependence, the distribution of each country’s growth level is unlikely to be independent 
and random. When models are estimated for cross-sectional data on spatial units, the lack 
of independence across these units can cause serious problems of model misspecification 
(Anselin 1998).  
Two kinds of spatial econometric models can be used to deal with spatial 
dependence of observations. These include the spatial lag model and the spatial error 
model (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Bera 1998). The spatial error model is appropriate when 
spatial dependence works through the error process which can result from measurement 
problems (Rey and Montouri, 1999). In addition, the model can be used when the concern 
is to correct for the potential biasing influence of spatial autocorrelation due to the use of 
spatial data (Anselin 2001). Spatial error dependence may be interpreted as nuisance 
dependence since it reflects spatial autocorrelation in measurement errors or in variables 
that are otherwise not crucial to the model. The spatial error model is defined as 
 
             
y X
W
β ε
ε λ ε ξ
= +
= +
                                     (6.14) 
 
where y  is a vector of N observations of dependent variable, β  is vector of regression 
coefficients, X  is a N K×  matrix of observations on the explanatory variables, λ  is the 
residual spatial autocorrelation coefficient and represents un-modelled shocks, ε  is a 
vector of residuals, W  is an N N×  spatial weight matrix, and ξ  is an independently and 
normally distributed error term with constant variance.   
In the spatial lag model, spatial dependence, which occur through spatial 
externalities and spillover effects, can be incorporated as an additional regressor in the 
form of a spatially lagged dependent variable ( ).Wy  The model is given as follows: 
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∑            (6.15) 
 
where y  is a vector of N observations of dependent variable (growth),   and ρ β  is a 
spatial autoregressive coefficient and parameter respectively, Wy  is a spatially lagged 
dependent variable for weights matrix ,W  X  is a N K×  matrix of observations on the 
explanatory variables including the key external debt variables, and µ  is a vector of iid 
error terms. The subscript (it) refers to space or country and time periods respectively 
(Anselin 1988). 
 The spatial lag model is appropriate in this study because of my interest in 
assessing the existence and strength of spatial interaction among the observed countries in 
ECOWAS Sub-Saharan Africa. The spatial lag term Wy  is correlated with the 
disturbances, which can be seen when equation (6.13) is reduced to the form below: 
 
                                          1 1( ) ( ) ,y I W X I Wρ β ρ µ− −= − + −                                     (6.16)  
 
the inverse in equation (6.14) can be expanded into an infinite series, which would include 
both the explanatory variables and the error terms at all locations. Since the spatial lag 
term is an endogenous variable, OLS estimation of the model specification would yield a 
biased and inconsistent estimates for the coefficients due to the simultaneity between the 
error terms and the spatially lagged dependent variable. Instead, an alternative estimator 
based on maximum likelihood is suggested to provide consistent estimators and is being 
used in this study (Anselin 1988; Anselin and Bera 1998). 
 According to the decision rule based on the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests 
suggested by Anselin et al., (1996), and Anselin and Florax (1995), if LM-Lag is more 
significant than  LM-Error and Robust LM-Lag is significant but Robust LM-Error is not, 
the appropriate alternative is to estimate the spatial lag model. Conversely, if LM-Error is 
more significant than LM-Lag and Robust LM-Error is significant but Robust LM-Lag is 
not, then the appropriate alternative is to estimate the spatial error model. In this study, 
the LM tests, which are carried but not reported here, mostly support the estimation of the 
spatial lag model.  
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6.6   Estimation Results of the Spatially Lagged Growth  and Investment Models 
 
In this section, we present the results of the estimated spatially lagged growth and 
investment models for ECOWAS countries across space and time from 1980-1999. In order 
to net out the effects of short-run fluctuations, while maintaining the ability to utilize the 
time series dimension of the data, we have also calculated five year averages for all 
variables in the data set. That is, for sub-periods 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 
1995-1999. This feature of data compilation is quite important, given that understanding 
how debt affects growth and investment over time (the within-country variability of the 
data) is at least as important as understanding how countries with different levels of debt 
experienced different growth and investment patterns (the between-country variability of 
the data). 
The year by year regression results are reported in tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5. The 
estimated regressions yield significant spatial lag coefficients with the expected signs in 
most of the periods except 1990, 1994, 1995 and 1997. The R-square listed in both Spatial 
Lag and Spatial Error models are a so-called pseudo R-square, which are not directly 
comparable with the measure and interpretation in OLS estimation. The proper measures 
of fit are the Log-Likelihood (LIK), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz 
Criterion (SC). The smaller the values of these measures, the better the regression fit. As 
indicated in the Log Likelihood and Akaike Criterion, the models display similar fits 
across time with some periods exhibiting better regression fits than the others. The overall 
results are mixed across periods, which indicate instability in the data sets of ECOWAS 
countries across time. The spatially adjusted Breusch-Pagan Tests are not significant in all 
the models, indicating the absence of heteroskedasticity problems across time. 
From the results of the growth equation presented in the tables below, the initial 
per capita income variable, which is included to capture the speed of convergence among 
countries in the region shows mixed results across time. The coefficient of this variable is 
expected to be negative under the conditional convergence framework, since due to 
diminishing returns to inputs, the higher the initial values of per capita income the lower 
the growth rate. However, the variable does not display the expected negative sign for 
most of the periods (or models) and is statistically insignificant except for the periods of 
1981, 1986, 1987 and 1991, which show the expected signs with statistical significance. 
Moreover, the periods of 1982, 1988, 1996 and 1997 have the expected negative signs but 
are statistically insignificant.  
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Table 2.3: Spatial Lag Growth Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Growth Models 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
R. Squared 0.793 0.519 0.370 0.688 0.719 0.128 0.830 0.939 
LIK -29.728 -25.490 -35.662 -31.215 -25.691 -36.631 -16.484 -10.734 
AIC 73.456 64.981 85.324 76.430 65.383 87.263 46.969 35.468 
SC 76.850 68.375 88.718 79.824 68.777 90.657 50.364 38.863 
Moran’s I -0.237 -0.179 -0.351 0.099 0.281 0.085 -0.237 -0.047 
Lag Coefficient ρ  -1.066 
(0.000) 
-0.997 
(0.000) 
-0.992 
(0.000) 
0.769 
(0.000) 
0.554 
(0.008) 
0.889 
(0.000) 
-0.619 
(0.000) 
-0.631 
(0.000) 
Constant -23.602 
(0.081) 
25.381 
(0.010) 
-3.095 
(0.900) 
8.105 
(0.667) 
-1.397 
(0.922) 
-42.524 
(0.243) 
20.526 
(0.007) 
14.094 
(0.022) 
Log Per Capita Income 4.195 
(0.029) 
-4.510 
(0.000) 
-1.213 
(0.685) 
3.267 
(0.122) 
2.429 
(0.126) 
4.694 
(0.126) 
-4.001 
(0.000) 
-2.193 
(0.000) 
Log Debt Service to Exports -3.259 
(0.002) 
-1.780 
(0.013) 
-0.579 
(0.760) 
-4.940 
(0.010) 
-3.488 
(0.208) 
-0.890 
(0.900) 
-3.678 
(0.006) 
-3.921 
(0.000) 
Log Total Debt Stocks 1.580 
(0.038) 
0.231 
(0.687) 
0.227 
(0.859) 
-1.808 
(0.041) 
-2.058 
(0.001) 
0.557 
(0.785) 
-0.746 
(0.003) 
0.116 
(0.467) 
Log Terms of Trade -0.727 
(0.708) 
3.008 
(0.034) 
1.337 
(0.735) 
0.816 
(0.797) 
5.201 
(0.066) 
2.662 
(0.768) 
6.402 
(0.000) 
6.776 
(0.000) 
Log Gross Domestic Invest: 2.211 
(0.204) 
0.298 
(0.807) 
3.048 
(0.235) 
-1.989 
(0.341) 
-4.144 
(0.001) 
0.351 
(0.937) 
-0.537 
(0.686) 
-4.840 
(0.000) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) -2.662 
(0.162) 
-3.488 
(0.000) 
5.261 
(0.034) 
-1.366 
(0.492) 
1.186 
(0.280) 
-3.941 
(0.213) 
1.432 
(0.000) 
1.151 
(0.000) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 2.887 
(0.717) 
2.966 
(0.705) 
3.055 
(0.691) 
1.158 
(0.948) 
4.198 
(0.521) 
5.525 
(0.355) 
2.845 
(0.723) 
0.933 
(0.967) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 9.406 
(0.002) 
1.023 
(0.311) 
1.939 
(0.163) 
0.900 
(0.342) 
1.164 
(0.280) 
0.520 
(0.470) 
7.874 
(0.005) 
11.161 
(0.000) 
 
Table 2.4: Spatial Lag Growth Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Growth Models 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
R. Squared 0.807 0.732 0.715 0.936 0.697 0.835 0.550 0.387 
Log Likelihood Function -15.241 -25.707 -23.216 -12.354 -25.654 -21.205 -28.735 -22.672 
Akaike Info. Criterion 44.482 65.414 60.433 38.709 65.308 56.410 71.471 59.344 
Schwarz Criterion 47.876 68.808 63.827 42.104 68.703 59.804 74.865 62.738 
Moran’s I -0.251 -0.242 -0.179 0.273 -0.124 0.327 -0.104 -0.081 
Lag Coefficient ρ  -0.707 
(0.000) 
-1.117 
(0.000) 
-0.249 
(0.331) 
0.580 
(0.000) 
-0.886 
(0.000) 
0.991 
(0.000) 
0.291 
(0.254) 
-0.288 
(0.295) 
Constant 17.034 
(0.109) 
-32.592 
(0.121) 
-78.614 
(0.000) 
85.712 
(0.000) 
11.811 
(0.660) 
47.524 
(0.004) 
-14.272 
(0.706) 
-4.557 
(0.662) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.735 
(0.226) 
1.791 
(0.181) 
4.926 
(0.000) 
-3.604 
(0.000) 
2.300 
(0.064) 
1.022 
(0.239) 
1.597 
(0.331) 
1.241 
(0.309) 
Log Debt Service to Exports -1.431 
(0.034) 
-0.209 
(0.855) 
0.321 
(0.720) 
0.474 
(0.086) 
-1.203 
(0.236) 
3.095 
(0.002) 
-7.351 
(0.000) 
-1.048 
(0.291) 
Log Total Debt Stocks 0.414 
(0.086) 
1.143 
(0.045) 
0.496 
(0.295) 
0.127 
(0.417) 
1.090 
(0.059) 
-0.707 
(0.063) 
0.407 
(0.602) 
0.250 
(0.574) 
Log Terms of Trade -0.133 
(0.954) 
-1.047 
(0.807) 
9.452 
(0.007) 
-16.071 
(0.000) 
-9.469 
(0.070) 
-14.797 
(0.000) 
9.470 
(0.248) 
0.383 
(0.618) 
Log Gross Domestic Invest: 0.627 
(0.539) 
9.092 
(0.000) 
2.460 
(0.199) 
3.208 
(0.000) 
5.768 
(0.000) 
4.067 
(0.000) 
-6.380 
(0.020) 
0.790 
(0.605) 
Log FAID -1.147 
(0.001) 
2.871 
(0.028) 
1.149 
(0.325) 
-0.470 
(0.329) 
-0.169 
(0.925) 
2.344 
(0.000) 
0.629 
(0.671) 
1.366 
(0.039) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 7.677 
(0.174) 
1.790 
(0.877) 
2.260 
(0.812) 
7.179 
(0.207) 
2.861 
(0.721) 
6.269 
(0.280) 
1.333 
(0.931) 
3.180 
(0.672) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 12.632 
(0.000) 
6.568 
(0.010) 
0.446 
(0.503) 
18.545 
(0.000) 
1.784 
(0.181) 
12.516 
(0.000) 
0.266 
(0.605) 
0.353 
(0.552) 
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Notes: Annual percentage growth (Y) is the dependent variable. p-values are in parentheses. LIK is the value 
of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike information criterion and SC is the Schwarz 
information criterion. 
 
Table 2.5: Spatial Lag Growth Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Growth Models 1996 1997 1998 1999 
R. Squared 0.403 0.091 0.657 0.860 
LIK -25.339 -29.390 -29.195 -17.516 
AIC 64.679 72.781 72.391 49.032 
SC 68.073 76.175 75.785 52.426 
Moran’s I -0.256 -0.058 -0.329 -0.136 
Lag Coefficient. ρ  -0.779 
(0.000) 
-0.250 
(0.414) 
-1.124 
(0.000) 
0.649 
(0.000) 
Constant 5.013 
(0.836) 
5.987 
(0.926) 
47.646 
(0.173) 
-5.076 
(0.738) 
Log Per Capita Income -1.009 
(0.442) 
-0.442 
(0.793) 
1.353 
(0.361) 
0.581 
(0.376) 
Log Debt Service to Exports 1.156 
(0.426) 
-0.861 
(0.780) 
-4.609 
(0.028) 
4.244 
(0.000) 
Log Total Debt Stocks -0.327 
(0.639) 
-0.617 
(0.519) 
-0.187 
(0.801) 
-1.540 
(0.000) 
Log Terms of Trade 1.030 
(0.841) 
2.242 
(0.881) 
-5.412 
(0.506) 
-4.631 
(0.221) 
Log Gross Domestic Investment 1.840 
(0.388) 
0.123 
(0.973) 
-3.801 
(0.347) 
8.496 
(0.000) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) 1.377 
(0.337) 
-0.728 
(0.758) 
2.750 
(0.012) 
0.660 
(0.293) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients)  
Breusch-Pagan Test 6.193 
(0.287) 
6.275 
(0.280) 
1.412 
(0.922) 
1.022 
(0.960) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 2.877 
(0.089) 
0.261 
(0.609) 
5.560 
(0.018) 
4.607 
(0.031) 
Notes: Annual percentage growth (Y) is the dependent variable. p-values are in parentheses. LIK is the value 
of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike information criterion and SC is the Schwarz 
information criterion. 
 
The external debt ratios (debt-service to exports of goods and services and total 
debt stock to GDP), which are the key variables that capture the impact of external debt 
on economic growth in ECOWAS countries also show mixed results across time. Fifteen 
periods show the expected negative signs, eight of which have significant effects on 
economic growth (1980, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1994 and 1998), meaning that 
external debt-service is negatively correlated with economic growth in ECOWAS 
countries. These findings directly imply that, using the twelve ECOWAS countries and 
twenty years of coverage, the debt overhang hypothesis is only empirically supported by 
eight periods, while the other periods did not, contrary to what many literature have 
shown. Empirical support for the debt overhang hypothesis is achieved if the coefficient 
of the debt-service ratio has a negative sign with statistical significance. Similarly, the 
coefficients of the total debt stock to GDP in the growth model have the expected negative 
signs in eight periods (1983, 1984, 1986, 1993, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999) but with only five 
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periods being statistically significant. This implies that total debt stock to GDP negatively 
affects economic growth in ECOWAS countries during the period of 1983, 1984, 1986, 
1993, and 1999. The remaining periods show the incorrect sign and are statistically 
insignificant. 
The terms of trade variable is intended to capture the external shocks to these 
economies since ECOWAS countries depend mainly on the export of primary products 
and is expected to have either positive or negative coefficients depending on the 
international market forces. Positive coefficients will indicate that favourable terms of 
trade contributes positively to growth, while negative coefficients would affect growth 
otherwise. The estimated results show that the terms of trade have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on growth during the following five periods (1981, 1984, 
1986, 1987, and 1990).  
Similarly, seven periods (1982, 1983, 1985, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997) have positive  
but statistically insignificant coefficients, while eight periods (1980, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 
1993, 1998, and 1999) show negative signs that are not significant except 1991 and 1993. 
These results indicate that ECOWAS economies are highly vulnerable to external shocks 
since they rely mainly on the export of primary agricultural products as their foreign 
exchange earner. However, the external shocks that are reflected in the terms of trade 
depend on the international market forces. When these forces are in their favour, the 
prices of their export commodities rise relative to other commodities in the world market 
and vice versa.   
  The coefficients of the gross domestic investment variable is predicted to be 
positive since a higher domestic investment, all things being equal, is expected to 
contribute positively to economic growth. The results of this study show that fourteen 
periods have positive coefficients, but only five periods (1989, 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1999) 
are statistically significant. However, some periods such as 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1994 
and 1998 indicate negative coefficients that are statistically insignificant except 1984, 1987 
and 1994. The latter show negative signs and are statistically significant. The findings 
indicate that gross domestic investment, contrary to what most literature have shown, 
contributes both positively as well as negatively to economic growth in the ECOWAS 
countries. This is probably because not all investments in the region yielded a rate of 
return higher than the cost of investment due to poor investment decisions, 
mismanagement of investment funds, and internal political and macroeconomic 
stabilities. 
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Finally, the foreign aid variable (log FAID) is included in the model to capture the 
effects of foreign resource inflow in the form of grants into ECOWAS countries. The 
coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive since the higher the inflow of 
resources, the more it contributes positively to economic growth in the region, assuming 
that all things remain equal. However, the results indicate only twelve periods with the 
expected positive signs (1982, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 
1998) and seven (1982, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1993, 1995 and 1998) having highly significant 
effects on economic growth in ECOWAS countries. In addition, eight periods (1980, 1981, 
1983, 1985, 1988, 1991, 1992, 1997 and 1999) have negative coefficients but all are 
insignificant except two (1981 and 1988). 
In order to examine the behaviour of the data for ECOWAS within the twenty 
years period (1980-1999), we have aggregated the data set into five years average, thus, 
producing four sub-period models. That is, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-
1999. For comparism purposes, these models were estimated using both the spatial lag 
and spatial error dependence framework. The estimated results of the four spatial 
dependence models are presented in table 4 below. The R-square listed in both Spatial 
Lag and Spatial Error is a so-called pseudo R-square, which is not directly comparable 
with the measure and interpretation it gives in OLS estimation. The proper measures of fit 
are the Log-Likelihood (LIK), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz Criterion 
(SC).  
From the table, we can notice an increase in the Log Likelihood (from –6.163, -
6.207, -1.213, and -3.591) in the spatial lag models to (-6.117, -5.955, -1.304, and -4.846) in 
the spatial error models respectively. Similarly, the values of the Akaike Information 
Criterion and the Schwarz Criterion decreases in the spatial error models relative to the 
spatial lag models, suggesting an improvement of fit for the spatial error specification, 
which is a compensation for the average aggregation of the spatial data. The 
autoregressive coefficients are negative and highly significant in the spatial error 
specification relative to the spatial lag estimation, which is positive and highly significant 
in the first model (1980-1984), negative and significant in the second model (1985-1989), 
positive and insignificant in the third model (1990-1994), and negative but insignificant in 
the fourth model (1995-1999).  
A limited number of regression diagnostics are provided in the maximum 
likelihood estimations. The Breusch-Pagan Tests for heteroskedasticity in the error terms 
of both the spatial lag and spatial error models are insignificant, suggesting that 
heteroskedasticity is not a problem in both models. As can be observed from the table, the 
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explanatory variables behaved differently in both models. The coefficients of the initial 
per capita income is negative in the two sub-periods (1980-1984) and (1985-1989) of the 
spatial lag models, with the later being statistically significant (p-value = 0.001). The 
remaining two sub-periods (1990-1994) and (1995-1999) have positive but statistically 
insignificant coefficients. In the spatial error models, the coefficients of the initial per 
capita income are negative in three sub-periods (1980-1984, 1985-1989, and 1990-1994), but 
only the first sub-period shows statistical significance (p-value = 0.011). The last sub-
period (1995-1999) has the wrong sign and is statistically insignificant. 
The external debt-service variable in the spatial lag model shows negative 
coefficients in three sub-periods (1985-1989), (1990-1994), and (1995-1999), but only the 
second sub-period is statistically significant. This means that the negative relationship 
between debt-service to growth is only empirically supported by the third model (1985-
1989), but not in the remaining sub-periods. In the spatial error models, the coefficients of 
debt-service variable are negative and statistically insignificant in three sub-periods, 
meaning that contrary to the literature, the debt overhang theory is not supported. 
Similarly the coefficients of the total debt stock to GDP variable, which is expected to be 
negative, is positive and statistically insignificant in both the spatial lag and spatial error 
models except in sub-period 1995-1999, which show negative coefficients, but statistically 
insignificant. 
The terms of trade coefficients are negative in three sub-periods (1980-1984, 1990-
1994, and 1995-1999) and are statistically insignificant in the spatial lag models except the 
sub-period of 1980-1984, which is statistically significant (p-values = 0.000). One sub-
period (1985-1989) has a positive but insignificant coefficient. In the spatial error 
framework, the sub-period models have negative signs that are statistically significant, 
except the model of 1985-1989, which has a positive sign and statistically insignificant. In 
short, it can be interpreted that external shocks, which are reflected in the terms of trade 
variable contributed negatively to economic growth during the sub-periods of 1980-1984, 
1990-1994, and 1995-1999. 
The gross domestic investment variable, which is expected to contribute positively 
to economic growth in ECOWAS countries show positive coefficients in all sub-periods in 
the spatial lag models, but only two sub-periods (1980-1984 and 1990-1994) that are highly 
significant (p-value = 0.000). Similarly, in the spatial error models, all the coefficients of the 
gross domestic investment variable are positive and highly significant except the sub-
period of 1985-1989, which is statistically insignificant. We can thus, say that gross 
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domestic investment contributed positively to economic growth in the ECOWAS 
countries, supporting empirically the results of other studies.  
Finally, both in the spatial lag and spatial error models, the coefficients of the 
foreign aid variable are positive in sub-periods 1985-1989 and 1995-1999, and negative in 
sub-periods 1985-1989 and 1995-1999 respectively. However, the variable has no 
significant effect on economic growth in both models except in the sub-period 1980-1984 
in the spatial error model.  
 
Table 2.6: Regression Results - Five Year Average (Maximum Likelihood Estimation)  
Growth Models 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
 Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
R. Squared 0.726 0.743 0.650 0.817 0.623 0.766 0.517 0.771 
LIK -6.163 -6.117 -6.207 -5.955 -1.213 -1.304 -3.591 -4.846 
AIC 26.327 24.234 1.584 -7.510 16.426 9.391 6.816 -3.773 
SC 29.721 27.143 4.978 -4.601 19.821 12.301 10.210 -0.864 
Moran’s I -0.0642 -0.0642 -02354 -02354 0.0774 0.0774 -0.0931 -0.0931 
Lag Coeff. ρ  
 
1.001 
(0.000) 
-1.046 
(0.000) 
-0.305 
(0.003) 
-1.022 
(0.000) 
0.038 
(0.875) 
-1.106 
(0.000) 
-0.032 
(0.851) 
-1.106 
(0.000) 
Constant 
 
2.465 
(0.261) 
9.451 
(0.006) 
1.906 
(0.150) 
-0.760 
(0.637) 
1.273 
(0.727) 
8.647 
(0.040) 
7.682 
(0.130) 
8.493 
(0.004) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.179 
(0.495) 
-0.557 
(0.011) 
-0.318 
(0.001) 
-0.101 
(0.098) 
0.022 
(0.899) 
-0.078 
(0.516) 
0.212 
(0.126) 
0.180 
(0.019) 
Log Debt Service/ 
Exports 
 
0.464 
(0.041) 
-0.093 
(0.725) 
-0.372 
(0.022) 
-0.227 
(0.199) 
-0.095 
(0.548) 
0.117 
(0.370) 
-0.052 
(0.734) 
-0.126 
(0.254) 
Log Total Debt 
Stock/GDP 
0.282 
(0.014) 
0.114 
(0.133) 
0.017 
(0.722) 
0.076 
(0.017) 
0.059 
(0.392) 
0.012 
(0.807) 
-0.022 
(0.752) 
-0.061 
(0.198) 
Log Terms of Trade -1.871 
(0.000) 
-2.092 
(0.001) 
0.609 
(0.091) 
0.537 
(0.276) 
-0.636 
(0.400) 
-2.376 
(0.006) 
-1.771 
(0.179) 
-1.746 
(0.012) 
Log Gross Domestic 
Invest 
 
1.536 
(0.000) 
1.442 
(0.000) 
0.117 
(0.540) 
0.246 
(0.200) 
0.820 
(0.000) 
1.177 
(0.000) 
0.366 
(0.149) 
0.338 
(0.001) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) -0.284 
(0.617) 
-0.649 
(0.024) 
0.014 
(0.920) 
0.051 
(0.403) 
-0.266 
(0.220) 
-0.114 
(0.489) 
0.201 
(0.214) 
0.164 
(0.120) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients)  
Breusch-Pagan Test 5.079 
(0.406) 
2.504 
(0.775) 
2.046 
(0.842) 
3.772 
(0.582) 
1.950 
(0.855) 
3.179 
(0.672) 
8.661 
(0.123) 
14.071 
(0.015) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix)  
Likelihood Ratio Test 4.343 
(0.037) 
4.436 
(0.035) 
5.090 
(0.024) 
12.185 
(0.000) 
0.008 
(0.925) 
5.043 
(0.024) 
0.026 
(0.871) 
8.616 
(0.003) 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the annual growth rate (%); p-values are in parentheses. LIK is the 
value of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike information criterion and SC is 
the Schwarz information criterion.  
 
6.7 The Investment Model 
 
The Public Investment models for ECOWAS countries are also estimated using 
spatial lag dependence framework to determine the impact of external debt stocks and 
external debt-service on investment for the period covering 1980-1999. Additionally, other 
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variables are included as explanatory variables to control for other factors that may affect 
public investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results of the spatial regression across time 
are presented in the tables below. As already mentioned, the R-square listed in the Spatial 
Lag model  are a so-called pseudo R-square, which are not directly comparable with the 
measure and interpretation in OLS estimation. The proper measures of fit are the Log 
Likelihood (LIK), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz Criterion (SC). The 
smaller the values of these measures, the better the regression fit. As indicated by the Log 
Likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion, and Schwarz Criterion, the models show 
different fits across time, indicating regional instability in the data set. The autoregressive 
coefficients are negative in eight periods, but only four periods are statistically significant 
(i.e., from 1980 to 1983). The remaining periods display positive coefficients with five 
being statistically significant (i.e., from 1989 to 1993). The spatially adjusted Breusch-
Pagan Tests are not significant in all the models across time, indicating the absence of 
heteroskedasticity problems in the model specifications.   
Like the regression results of the spatially lagged growth models presented above, 
the  explanatory variables of the spatially lagged public investment models are also mixed 
across time. The coefficients of the initial per capita income show positive but statistically 
insignificant effect on public investment in ten periods (1980, 1982, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 
1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999), where as the remaining periods display negative signs but are 
also statistically insignificant, suggesting that the variable has no statistical impact on 
public investment in ECOWAS countries. The external debt-service variable, which is 
expected to have a negative relationship with public investment because it drains the 
indebted economies of resources for investment have positive but insignificant 
coefficients in all the periods except 1985 and 1989, which do not only have positive 
coefficients, but also have statistically significant effect on public investment. These 
findings are puzzling  because even though the coefficients are highly insignificant, the 
positive signs may mean that external debt-service has a positive impact on public 
investment in ECOWAS countries, which is contrary to the results of many studies. 
The coefficients of the total debt stock to GDP have the expected negative signs in 
seventeen periods, with ten having statistically significant effects on public investment. 
However, three periods (1989, 1990 and 1991) show positive coefficients but do have any 
significant effects on public investment. The periods that have negative coefficients with 
significant p-values confirms that total debt stock to GDP has negative correlation with 
public investment in ECOWAS countries during those periods.  
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Table 2.7: Spatial Lag Investment Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Investment Model 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
R. Squared 0.746 0.630 0.622 0.485 0.722 0.806 0.590 0.549 
LIK -6.432 -9.116 -10.094 -10.988 -5.290 -2.145 -5.883 -3.683 
AIC 24.864 30.233 32.189 33.976 22.580 16.291 23.767 19.366 
SC 27.774 33.142 35.099 36.885 25.489 19.201 26.676 22.275 
Moran’s I -0.202 -0.005 -0.051 -0.072 -0.058 -0.009 -0.016 0.083 
Lag Coefficient ρ  -0.860 
(0.000) 
-1.093 
(0.000) 
-0.826 
(0.000) 
-0.914 
(0.000) 
-0.268 
(0.129) 
0.094 
(0.553) 
0.078 
(0.667) 
0.037 
(0.818) 
Constant 8.315 
(0.000) 
13.452 
(0.000) 
9.971 
(0.000) 
9.854 
(0.000) 
7.613 
(0.000) 
4.374 
(0.012) 
7.360 
(0.001) 
6.542 
(0.000) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.203 
(0.465) 
-0.281 
(0.378) 
0.046 
(0.890) 
-0.053 
(0.875) 
-0.103 
(0.629) 
-0.059 
(0.731) 
-0.229 
(0.357) 
-0.251 
(0.204) 
Log Debt Service/exports 0.040 
(0.817) 
0.030 
(0.867) 
0.060 
(0.780) 
-0.185 
(0.527) 
0.100 
(0.766) 
0.698 
(0.000) 
-0.098 
(0.691) 
0.100 
(0.550) 
Log Debt Stocks/GDP -0.404 
(0.000) 
-0.422 
(0.001) 
-0.402 
(0.002) 
-0.237 
(0.116) 
-0.387 
(0.000) 
-0.405 
(0.000) 
-0.207 
(0.035) 
-0.182 
(0.018) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) -0.669 
(0.000) 
-1.021 
(0.000) 
-0.861 
(0.000) 
-0.814 
(0.008) 
-0.479 
(0.006) 
-0.310 
(0.005) 
-0.419 
(0.013) 
-0.359 
(0.017) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 2.308 
(0.679) 
3.819 
(0.430) 
0.538 
(0.969) 
2.472 
(0.649) 
0.905 
(0.923) 
2.902 
(0.574) 
3.612 
(0.460) 
8.577 
(0.072) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 6.659 
(0.009) 
4.285 
(0.038) 
3.247 
(0.071) 
3.807 
(0.051) 
1.182 
(0.276) 
0.239 
(0.624) 
0.077 
(0.780) 
0.031 
(0.859) 
 
Table 2.8: Spatial Lag Investment Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Investment Model 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
R. Squared 0.509 0.611 0.588 0.441 0.560 0.315 0.446 0.529 
LIK -4.726 -3.180 -2.749 -6.247 -6.819 -10.328 -9.418 -5.928 
AIC 21.453 18.361 17.5 24.495 25.638 32.656 30.836 23.856 
SC 24.363 21.270 20.409 27.404 28.547 35.566 33.746 26.766 
Moran’s I 0.143 0.065 -0.050 0.054 0.156 0.180 0.067 0.105 
Lag Coefficient ρ  0.095 
(0.587) 
0.436 
(0.009) 
0.385 
(0.022) 
0.395 
(0.048) 
0.411 
(0.037) 
0.686 
(0.000) 
0.279 
(0.257) 
0.115 
(0.574) 
Constant 5.803 
(0.000) 
3.079 
(0.085) 
3.128 
(0.079) 
2.988 
(0.197) 
1.330 
(0.574) 
-2.063 
(0.454) 
1.114 
(0.700) 
1.984 
(0.378) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.289 
(0.192) 
-0.094 
(0.640) 
-0.108 
(0.574) 
-0.074 
(0.776) 
0.194 
(0.463) 
0.464 
(0.190) 
0.215 
(0.529) 
0.258 
(0.306) 
Log Debt Service to Exports 0.152 
(0.376) 
0.370 
(0.018) 
0.259 
(0.119) 
0.116 
(0.487) 
0.380 
(0.067) 
0.284 
(0.434) 
0.224 
(0.616) 
0.215 
(0.339) 
Log Total Debt Stocks/GDP -0.090 
(0.336) 
0.117 
(0.267) 
0.115 
(0.217) 
0.109 
(0.354) 
-0.047 
(0.753) 
-0.025 
(0.886) 
-0.385 
(0.014) 
-0.269 
(0.028) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) -0.354 
(0.036) 
-0.570 
(0.004) 
-0.479 
(0.005) 
-0.424 
(0.047) 
-0.319 
(0.243) 
-0.078 
(0.798) 
0.243 
(0.393) 
-0.039 
(0.829) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 7.0.84 
(0.131) 
1.815 
(0.769) 
1.676 
(0.795) 
1.700 
(0.790) 
1.975 
(0.740) 
1.779 
(0.776) 
1.302 
(0.860) 
1.998 
(0.735) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 0.155 
(0.693) 
2.843 
(0.091) 
2.387 
(0.122) 
1.459 
(0.227) 
1.520 
(0.217) 
1.971 
(0.160) 
0.289 
(0.590) 
0.163 
(0.686) 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the annual growth rate (%); p-values are in parentheses. LIK is the 
value of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike information criterion and SC is 
the Schwarz information criterion.  
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Table 2.9: Spatial Lag Investment Model Results (Maximum Likelihood Estimation) 
Investment Model  1996 1997 1998 1999 
R. Squared 0.567 0.331 0.269 0.237 
LIK -3.163 -4.962 -3.590 -5.002 
AIC 18.327 21.924 19.181 22.004 
SC 21.236 24.833 22.090 24.913 
Moran’s I -0.053 -0.010 -0.124 -0.089 
Lag Coefficient ρ  -0.051 
(0.766) 
-0.025 
(0.901) 
-0.012 
(0.947) 
0.415 
(0.038) 
Constant 3.282 
(0.099) 
3.526 
(0.149) 
2.623 
(0.177) 
-0.625 
(0.780) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.170 
(0.446) 
0.031 
(0.897) 
0.072 
(0.731) 
0.215 
(0.344) 
Log Debt Service to Exports 0.116 
(0.597) 
-0.381 
(0.287) 
-0.419 
(0.067) 
0.300 
(0.470) 
Log Total Debt Stocks/GDP -0.261 
(0.008) 
-0.193 
(0.087) 
-0.033 
(0.762) 
-0.093 
(0.462) 
Log Foreign Aid (FAID) -0.079 
(0.583) 
0.165 
(0.398) 
0.072 
(0.651) 
0.104 
(0.563) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 2.197 
(0.699) 
3.340 
(0.502) 
0.339 
(0.987) 
0.697 
(0.951) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 0.062 
(0.803) 
0.011 
(0.916) 
0.002 
(0.956) 
1.293 
(0.255) 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the annual public investment rate (PINV); p-values are in 
parentheses. LIK is the value of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike 
information criterion and SC is the Schwarz information criterion. 
 
Finally, a foreign aid variable is included to capture the impact of the inflow of 
official external assistance in the form of grants (not loans) to domestic public investment 
in ECOWAS countries. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive, since all 
thing being equal, the higher the inflow of foreign aid, the more it contributes positively 
to public investment. However, contrary to our expectations, the coefficients of the 
foreign aid variable have negative signs in sixteen periods with twelve having highly 
significant effects on public investment. These findings indicate that instead of boosting 
public investment in ECOWAS countries, foreign aid contributes negatively to public 
investment during those periods.  However, the coefficients of four periods (1994, 1997, 
1998, and 1999) have positive signs but are statistically insignificant.      
Meanwhile, in order to net out the effects of short run fluctuations, while 
maintaining the ability to utilize the time series dimension of the data in the spatial 
investment models of ECOWAS within the twenty years period (1980-1999), we have also 
aggregated the data set into five year averages, thus, producing four investment models. 
That is, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, and 1995-1999. For comparism purposes, these 
models have been estimated using both spatial lag and spatial error dependence 
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framework. The regression results of the four spatial dependence models are presented in 
table 5 below.  
Note that the R-square listed in both Spatial Lag and Spatial Error models are a so-
called pseudo R-square, which are not directly comparable with the measure and 
interpretation in OLS estimation. The proper measures of fit are the Log-Likelihood (LIK), 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz Criterion (SC). The smaller the values of 
these measures, the better the regression fit. From the values of the Akaike Information 
and Schwarz Criterion, the spatial lag models display a better regression fit than the 
spatial error models. However, the log likelihood values are better in the spatial error 
than spatial lag models except in sub-period 1980-1984. 
The autoregressive coefficients are negative and statistically significant for all the 
sub-periods in both the spatial lag and spatial error models except the sub-period of 1980-
1984, whose coefficient is negative and insignificant in the spatial lag, but positive and 
highly significant in the spatial error model (p-value = 0.000). The coefficients of the initial 
per capita income carries the expected negative signs in all sub-periods in both spatial 
models, but only statistically significant in three sub-periods (1985-1999, 1990-1994, and 
1995-1999) in the spatial lag model. These results indicate per capita income convergence 
among ECOWAS countries during the said periods. However, although the variable is 
negative in the sub-period of 1980-1984, it is statistically insignificant. 
The external debt-service variable, whose coefficient is expected to be negative, 
carries positive signs in all sub-periods in the spatial lag models, with 1980-1984 and 1985-
1989 sub-periods being statistically significant (p-values = 0.004 and 0.003) respectively. In 
the spatial error models, the coefficients of debt-service have positive signs in two sub-
periods (1980-1984 and 1985-1989) but only one is highly significant. The last two sub-
periods have negative signs but are statistically insignificant.   
Similarly, the coefficients of the total debt stock to GDP have the expected negative 
signs in the spatial lag models in all sub-periods but not statistically significant. 
Conversely, the spatial error models display two sub-periods with negative coefficients 
(1980-1984 and 1995-1999) and the other two sub-periods with positive coefficients, but all 
are not statistically significant.   
Finally, the coefficients of the foreign aid variable, which is expected to contribute 
positively to public investment have negative signs in two sub-periods (1980-1984 and 
1985-1989) in the spatial lag model, with the first sub-period being statistically significant. 
The last two sub-periods (1990-1994 and 1995-1999) have positive signs but are not 
statistically significant. Similar results can be found in the spatial error models. 
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Table 3.1: Regression Results - Five Year Average  (Maximum Likelihood Estimates) 
Investment Model 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
 Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
Spatial 
Lag 
Spatial 
Error 
R. Squared 0.834 0.914 0.835 0.413 0.822 0.416 0.886 0.425 
LIK -2.884 -0.878 -1.324 -6.461 -0.095 -7.109 -5.853 -3.173 
AIC 19.769 10.243 11.550 24.922 13.809 26.218 0.292 18.347 
SC 23.163 13.153 14.944 27.832 17.203 29.128 3.687 21.256 
Moran’s I -0.258 -0.258 -0.303 -0.303 -0.238 -0.238 -0.197 -0.197 
Lag Coeff. ρ  
 
-0.173 
(0.225) 
1.000 
(0.000) 
-0.637 
(0.000) 
-1.083 
(0.000) 
-0.689 
(0.000) 
-1.077 
(0.000) 
-0.573 
(0.000) 
-1.129 
(0.000) 
Constant 
 
9.739 
(0.000) 
11.718 
(0.000) 
8.238 
(0.000) 
4.721 
(0.051) 
5.933 
(0.000) 
1.614 
(0.528) 
5.861 
(0.000) 
1.413 
(0.436) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.578 
(0.112) 
-1.059 
(0.000) 
-1.054 
(0.000) 
-0.688 
(0.158) 
-0.680 
(0.015) 
-0.246 
(0.631) 
-0.511 
(0.001) 
-0.046 
(0.897) 
Log Debt Service to Exports 
 
0.832 
(0.004) 
1.211 
(0.000) 
0.596 
(0.003) 
0.215 
(0.612) 
0.272 
(0.231) 
-0.123 
(0.783) 
0.114 
(0.376) 
-0.133 
(0.677) 
Log Total Debt Stock/GDP -0.151 
(0.095) 
-0.086 
(0.151) 
-0.009 
(0.884) 
0.056 
(0.642) 
-0.006 
(0.927) 
0.069 
(0.589) 
-0.040 
(0.299) 
-0.006 
(0.940) 
Log FAID -1.322 
(0.000) 
-1.577 
(0.000) 
-0.140 
(0.367) 
0.079 
(0.803) 
0.163 
(0.341) 
0.479 
(0.153) 
0.033 
(0.736) 
0.296 
(0.215) 
Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 8.197 
(0.145) 
1.440 
(0.919) 
1.906 
(0.861) 
3.562 
(0.613) 
0.633 
(0.986) 
2.663 
(0.751) 
0.410 
(0.995) 
3.692 
(0.594) 
Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence (Spatial Lag Dependence for Weight Matrix) 
Likelihood Ratio Test 0.996 
(0.318) 
8.522 
(0.000) 
15.640 
(0.000) 
0.268 
(0.604) 
14.610 
(0.000) 
0.200 
(0.654) 
22.140 
(0.000) 
2.085 
(0.148) 
Notes: Dependent Variable is the annual public investment rate (PINV); p-values are in 
parentheses. LIK is the value of the log likelihood function. AIC is the value of the Akaike 
information criterion and SC is the Schwarz information criterion. 
 
 
6.8 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation (OLS) 
   
 In order to compare the results of the estimated spatial models with the results of 
non spatial models, using the same economic data of ECOWAS over the period of the 
debt crisis from 1980-1999, we have estimated both growth and investment models using 
ordinary least squares method, which does not incorporate space in its framework. The 
results of the OLS estimation of both growth and investment models  differ considerably 
with the results of the spatial models. The coefficients of both the key and explanatory 
variables have mostly insignificant effects on economic growth and investment in 
ECOWAS countries. The estimated OLS results are presented in appendix A.  
 In the growth model, the key debt variables, for example, the debt service variable 
has positive coefficients in seven periods but all have insignificant effects on economic 
growth in ECOWAS countries. However, thirteen periods show negative coefficients, 
which also have insignificant effects on growth except the period of 1987. This means that 
without taking spatial effects into consideration, debt service only had a negative 
correlation with growth on ECOWAS countries in 1987. Furthermore, the coefficients of 
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total debt stock variable have both positive and negative signs in twelve and eight periods 
respectively. However, all have no significant effects on economic growth in ECOWAS 
countries. 
  In addition, the explanatory variables, which include per capita income, terms of 
trade, gross domestic investment, and foreign aid inflow, have both positive and negative 
coefficients but all have insignificant relationship with economic growth except in one 
period each. In other words, when spatial effects are ignored, these variables show no 
significant effects on economic growth in ECOWAS countries during the crisis. 
Meanwhile, the OLS results of the aggregated data also have both positive and negative 
coefficients but all have insignificant effects on growth.      
In the investment model, the coefficients of the debt service variable has positive 
signs in sixteen periods, but only one (1985) with significant effect on investment. The 
remaining four periods have negative coefficients and all have insignificant effects on 
investment. Similarly, the total debt stock variable has positive but insignificant 
coefficients in two periods, while eighteen periods show negative coefficients but only 
two (1984 and 1985) with significant effects on investment. Moreover, the explanatory 
variables (per capita income and foreign aid inflow) have both positive and negative 
coefficients. However, all have insignificant effects on investment except the foreign aid 
variable in the period of 1980.  
Meanwhile, like in the growth model, the OLS results of the aggregated data of the 
investment model have both positive and negative coefficients, but all have insignificant 
effects on investment except the foreign aid variable in sub-period 1980-1984.   
 
6.9 Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter describes the data set of this dissertation and the estimation methods 
used to investigate the impact of external debt on economic growth and investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. It discusses the spatial econometric models, in particular, the spatial 
lag and spatial error models and their specific uses. It also highlights the concept of 
exploratory spatial data analysis with particular emphasis on the use of the Moran’s I 
statistic to determine spatial autocorrelation. The chapter ends by estimating the spatial 
growth and spatial investment models for ECOWAS countries.  
Spatial econometrics is the main tool in the analysis of this study. The time series 
data for twelve ECOWAS countries covering the period 1980-1999, is mainly collected 
from the World Bank and the African Development Bank data bases. The spatial 
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econometric software, GeoDa, developed by Luc Anselin (2003) is employed in the growth 
and investment model estimations across time. The annual GDP growth rate and annual 
public investment rate are the dependent variables in the growth and investment models 
respectively. The results of the spatial regressions are mixed across time, reflecting the 
spuriousness and instability in the data set. The coefficients of the control variables, which 
include, initial per capita income, terms of trade, gross domestic investment, and the 
external debt variables (debt-service and total debt stock to GDP) in the growth model, 
plus foreign aid in the public investment model show inconsistent signs across time.   
For example, in the growth model, the coefficients of per capita income have the 
expected negative signs for eight periods, but only four are statistically significant, 
indicating conditional income convergence among ECOWAS during those periods. 
However, the remaining twelve periods have positive signs, but are not significant. The 
key debt variables, external debt-service to exports of goods and services have the 
expected negative coefficients in fifteen periods, but only eight periods are statistically 
significant, confirming the debt overhang hypothesis during those periods. However, five 
periods show positive coefficients, which are statistically insignificant.  
Similarly, the coefficients of the total debt stock to GDP display the expected 
negative signs in eight periods, but only five show statistical significance. The remaining 
twelve periods, however, have positive coefficients that are statistically insignificant. 
Further, the  terms of trade coefficients have positive signs in twelve periods, with only 
five being statistically significant. In addition, eight periods have coefficients which are 
negative, but do not have significant effects on growth except two. In addition, the 
coefficients of gross domestic investment are positively correlated with growth in 
fourteen periods, but only five have statistical significance. Moreover, the coefficients of 
six periods have negative and insignificant correlation with growth except three, which 
are not only negative but also have significant effect on growth.   
Furthermore, the coefficients of the foreign aid variable show significantly positive 
effects on economic growth in seven periods, while only two periods indicate significantly 
negative correlation with growth on ECOWAS countries. The five year average regression 
results, which are estimated using both spatial lag and spatial error framework also 
indicate mixed results across sub-periods. A comparative description of the findings are 
already presented and can also be depicted in table 2.6. 
Meanwhile, in a similar framework, the spatial investment models are estimated 
and the results, like in the growth models, are also mixed across time. Contrary to most 
literature and empirical results of many studies, external debt service does not appear to 
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have any negative correlation with investment in most periods in ECOWAS countries. 
However, the total debt stock to GDP variable is found to have negative and significant 
correlation with investment. A comprehensive description of the yearly, together with the 
five year aggregated results are presented in tables 2.7 to 3.1.   
Finally, the results of the OLS estimation for both growth and investment models 
differ considerably from the results of the spatial models. The coefficients of the debt 
service variable in the growth model have positive and negative signs in seven and 
thirteen periods respectively, but all have insignificant effects on growth except the period 
of 1987, which has statistical significance on growth. Similarly, the coefficients of the total 
debt stock variable also have positive and negative signs but all have insignificant effects 
on growth in all periods. The explanatory variables have both positive and negative 
coefficients but all also have insignificant effects on economic growth except in one period 
each.   
In the investment model, the debt service coefficients are positive in sixteen 
periods, but only one with significant effect on investment. The total debt stock to GDP 
variable has positive and insignificant coefficients in two periods, while eighteen periods 
have negative coefficients with only two (1984 and 1985) having significant effects on 
investment. In addition, the explanatory variables also show both positive and negative 
coefficients. However, they are all insignificant except the foreign aid variable of 1980. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
7.0                                           SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has addressed the question “what are the impacts of External Debt on 
Economic Growth and Investment in Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980-1999?” 
Since independence, the region has relied heavily on foreign capital, mostly in the form of 
foreign loans to supplement their low domestic savings and to boost growth and 
investment. The scarcity of domestic financial resources for development is not only 
persistent, but also acute in many developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
culminating to what is referred to as “the financing gap problem.” The financing gap 
model predicts that by injecting foreign capital even in the form of external loans into the 
domestic economy would generate economic growth. However, this prediction is not 
supported by the current external debt problem in the region.  
Since the inception of the debt crisis, the debtor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
have transferred billions of dollars in debt-service payments to the richer creditor nations. 
This outflow of resources has crippled many African economies, retarding their economic 
growth and making them unable to meet the cost of domestic social needs of the 
population such as education, health care systems, infrastructure, electricity and water 
supply, etc. A major part of the African debt stock was officially contracted from 
multilateral and bilateral creditors. Starting with an average debt stock of US $39 billion in 
the 1970s, Africa’s debt exploded to more than US $317 billion by the late 1990s. External 
debt-service for the entire continent rose from US $3.5  billion to US $26 billion in the 
1970s and 1990s respectively.  
The explosion of the debt crisis in Africa is blamed on many factors, key among 
them were the two oil shocks of the early and late 1970s, which created fiscal deficits and 
worse  current account balance for many African countries. Moreover, the deteriorating 
terms of trade during the global recession of the early 1980s catalysed the problem by 
creating adverse balance of payment problems. In addition, weak and inappropriate 
macroeconomic and structural policy response to shocks contributed to the explosion of 
the problem. To finance the fiscal and external imbalances, these countries resorted to 
large external borrowing, thus, accumulating large and unsustainable external debt 
stocks. 
Meanwhile, the idea of the financing gap is itself based on the Harrod-Domar 
growth model, which predict that growth will be proportional to the rate of investment. 
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The Harrod-Domar growth model, however, has been heavily criticised for its 
shortcomings, which state firstly that the equilibrium is unstable since it requires the 
equalization of warranted and natural growth rates. Secondly, the model used production 
function with little substitutability among the inputs. Thirdly, the model use the Leontif 
type production function that have fixed proportion of inputs. 
However, the work of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956), which is known today as the 
neoclassical growth theory is an attempt to solve the shortcomings of the Harrod-Domar 
growth model. The production function of Solow and Swan exhibits constant returns to 
scale, diminishing returns to each input, and positive substitutability among the inputs. 
By assuming a constant saving rate the model predicts that growth in the long-run is only 
a function of technical change and not of saving and investment. Saving will have an 
effect on the level of income but not on its growth rate. An increase in saving, which is 
reflected in investment, will generate additional growth only temporarily. When the 
diminishing returns take effect, the economy will move back to its long-run or steady 
state level. 
Moreover, the Solow-Swan model predicts the occurrence of absolute as well as 
conditional convergence. Absolute convergence is a situation whereby a country with a 
lower capital-labour ratio has a higher per capita growth rate than a country with a high 
capital-labour ratio. Conditional convergence, on the other hand, is a situation in which a 
country has a higher growth rate when its initial level of real per capita income is low 
relative to its long-run or steady-state position. The Ramsey model, which is also a 
neoclassical model, refines the Solow-Swan model. The Ramsey model is basically an 
inter-temporal model with one of the key features being the assumption that households 
optimise their utility over time. This assumption essentially makes the model dynamic. 
The saving rate, which is exogenous in the Solow-Swan model, is endogenous and not 
constant in the Ramsey model. As in the Solow-Swan model, the Ramsey model also 
predicts the occurrence of conditional convergence. 
This study uses spatial econometric models, in particular, spatially lagged growth 
and investment models that incorporate the influence of spatial interaction and spill-over 
effects to investigate the impact of external debt on economic growth and investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa over the period 1980-1999. The spatial growth model has annual GDP 
growth rate as the dependent variable, while per capita income, terms of trade, gross 
domestic investment, external debt ratios, and foreign aid inflow as control or 
independent variables. Similarly, the spatially lagged investment model has annual public 
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investment rate as the dependent variable, while the independent variables are the same 
as above, excluding the terms of trade variable.      
The regression results of both growth and investment models are mixed across 
time. This is due to the considerable variations in the data set both within countries and 
across time. The data highly fluctuate across time, which is attributed to the 
macroeconomic and political instability that occurred in many of these countries during 
certain periods. While some countries had internal political crisis that affected their 
macroeconomic policies, and consequently, their productive capacities, others suffer from 
economic difficulties due to the absence of functional economic institutions that provide 
the foundation for profitable investment and growth. 
In the growth model, the autoregressive coefficients are negatively correlated in 
most periods with ten being highly significant. However, seven have positive and 
significant spatial autoregressive coefficients except one (1994). While the positive 
coefficients indicate the presence of a positive spatial dependence on economic growth 
among ECOWAS countries, the negative coefficients show a negative spatial relationship 
in some periods. The autoregressive coefficients are negative in some periods because 
growth in one country may impact negatively on growth in neighbouring countries due 
to the strong competition among them for resources (both natural and financial) and in 
the export of goods and services. If one country becomes more competitive in obtaining 
natural and financial resources than the others, it grows faster while the neighbours 
(competitors) experience slower growth.     
 The independent or explanatory variables in the model carry different signs across 
time. For example, the initial per capita income (log PINC) has significantly negative 
impact on growth in ECOWAS countries in only four periods. The estimated coefficients, 
which  also represent the speed of convergence, are higher in absolute terms compared to 
the  result found by Barro (1997). The speed of convergence is higher since the estimation 
is done in a credit constrained open economy assumption. That is, assuming that 
countries may not be able to borrow freely due to creditors’ fear of debt repudiation.    
The external debt-service to exports of goods and services (log DS/EXP) and total 
debt stock to GDP (log TDS/GDP) ratios, which measure the impact of external debt on 
economic growth in ECOWAS countries have significantly negative relationship with 
growth in eight and five periods respectively. These findings support the hypothesis that 
debt-service, which require the use of foreign exchange earnings in repaying loans to 
creditors, divert resources from productive domestic investment and consequently, 
hinders economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. On the contrary, the coefficient of the 
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total debt stock to GDP indicate a significantly positive impact on growth in three periods, 
which support the assumption that foreign loans may contribute positively to growth but 
only up to a certain level, above which growth begins to decline. That is, the probability of 
economic growth falls below unity at debt levels above a critical threshold. An illustration 
of this phenomenon is presented in page 28.  
Meanwhile, in the remaining periods under investigation, external debt service 
and total debt stock to GDP ratios show no significant effect on growth. The reason for 
this could be that the gross inflow of foreign capital in the form of new lending to 
ECOWAS countries was much larger than debt service payment during these periods. In 
other words, despite their debt servicing obligations, ECOWAS countries received more 
foreign capital (FAID) than they paid out to their creditors. Evidence of this could be 
affirmed on the result of the foreign aid variable, which is presented on the third 
paragraph below. 
The terms of trade (log TOT) variable, which capture the effect of exogenous 
shocks on ECOWAS countries, has a significantly positive relationship with growth in 
only five periods, while two other periods show significantly negative correlation with 
growth. The results indicate that there were periods in which movement in the terms of 
trade occurred in ECOWAS countries. All things remaining the same, the higher the terms 
of trade, the more they contribute to economic growth and vice versa. However, due to 
the gloomy world economy during certain periods under investigation, the exports of 
many Sub-Saharan countries, including ECOWAS suffered declining world market prices 
that dwindled their foreign exchange earnings. Similarly, the changing weather 
conditions also affected the output of many export crops.  
The gross domestic investment variable (log GDI) has the expected positive signs 
in fourteen periods, but only five have statistically significant effect on economic growth 
in ECOWAS countries. This finding indicate that most of the domestic investment that 
took place during that period did not yield a rate of return that could influence the rate of 
growth in annual GDP. The reason for this is that these countries’ land and sea boarders 
are porous to such an extent that any internal instability in one country could easily spill-
over to neighbouring countries and destabilize the economic environment that may have 
been friendly to investment and growth. 
The foreign aid variable (log FAID), which is intended to capture the amount of 
foreign resources flowing into ECOWAS countries during that period in the form of 
grants has the expected positive signs in twelve periods, with seven having significantly 
positive effects on economic growth. However, eight periods have negative coefficients, 
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which are statistically insignificant to economic growth except two. This implies that 
grants received by ECOWAS countries during certain periods were not invested in sectors 
that could contribute to economic growth.    
In addition, the results of the aggregated data set (five year averages), which were 
estimated using both spatial lag and spatial error framework are also mixed across sub-
periods. Some sub-periods show significantly positive spatial dependence while others 
indicate negative spatial dependence in both models, suggesting as usual, data instability. 
The key debt variables, the external debt service and total debt stock to GDP ratios carry 
the expected negative signs but are statistically insignificant in both models in all sub-
periods except one. This means that, contrary to the literature, the debt overhang theory is 
not supported by this empirical finding. 
Meanwhile, the estimated investment model also show similar results like the 
growth model. There is a presence of significant positive and negative spatial dependence 
in the region across time. Unlike in the growth model, the external debt service (log E 
DS/EXP) variable, which is expected to have a negative correlation with public investment 
since it depletes available investment resources from the debtor nations, show positive 
but statistically insignificant correlation with public investment in all periods except 1985 
and 1989. This finding contradicts the results of most empirical studies done on 
developing countries in the past. Even though the results do not have any statistical 
significance, however, it could be interpreted that ECOWAS countries received more 
foreign resources in the form of new loans, the more they meet their debt service 
obligation during these periods. The two exceptional periods do not only have positive 
coefficients, but also have statistically significant effect on public investment.  
However, the total debt stock to GDP (log TDS/GDP) ratio has significantly 
negative correlation with public investment in almost half of the periods under 
investigation. This result imply that the more foreign loans were received by ECOWAS 
countries, the more public investment was discouraged. In other words, the acquired 
foreign capital was either not invested domestically or the investments were not 
productive enough to be sustainable in the longer-term. Another explanation could be 
that the borrowed resources were either consumed or diverted to foreign accounts by the 
then corrupt African leaders, who were mostly military dictators.   
Finally, the results of the aggregated data (five year averages) indicate 
significantly negative autoregressive coefficients in both models except one, for reasons 
already explained above. The key debt variables, (the external debt service and total debt 
stock to GDP ratio) have similar results with the yearly estimations in both spatial lag and 
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error models. The general conclusion is that while external debt service tend to have an 
inverse relationship with economic growth in ECOWAS countries in most of the periods 
under investigation, the total debt stock to GDP ratio only affect growth in fewer periods 
than expected. With regards to public investment, external debt service is found to have 
no negative impact on public investment in ECOWAS countries.  
However, the total debt stock to GDP ratio is found to have a negative relationship 
with public investment in most of the periods, which suggest that relying on foreign 
capital to boost growth and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa could be counter 
productive. The region could be better off if the countries could promote higher domestic 
savings and create investment friendly environment that could attract foreign direct 
investment, rather than depending on the inflow of foreign capital in the form of loans to 
generate economic growth and development in their domestic economies.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Growth Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
R-Squared 0.591 0.598 0.349 0.685 0.693 0.148 0.853 0.856 
Adjusted R-
Squared 
0.100 0.117 -0.431 0.308 0.326 -0.873 0.676 0.684 
F-Statistic 1.204 1.243 0.447 1.818 1.887 0.145 4.836 4.983 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.428 0.414 0.822 0.264 0.251 0.982 0.052 0.049 
Log Likelihood -33.261 -24.325 -35.810 -31.252 -26.235 -36.401 -15.599 -15.842 
Akaike Inf. 
Criterion 
80.523 62.650 85.621 76.504 66.470 86.803 45.199 45.684 
Schwarz Criterion 83.917 66.045 89.015 79.898 69.864 90.197 48.594 49.078 
Constant 10.359 
(0.827) 
26.692 
(0.275) 
-20.473 
(0.743) 
7.082 
(0.865) 
12.424 
(0.651) 
27.725 
(0.801) 
-12.178 
(0.401) 
-7.716 
(0.652) 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
6.066 
(0.217) 
-2.956 
(0.180) 
0.028 
(0.995) 
4.703 
(0.210) 
1.079 
(0.688) 
0.023 
(0.996) 
-2.372 
(0.034) 
-0.684 
(0.472) 
Log Debt Service -2.400 
(0.405) 
-0.722 
(0.522) 
-1.098 
(0.745) 
-4.675 
(0.178) 
-5.636 
(0.282) 
2.815 
(0.870) 
-0.293 
(0.867) 
-4.021 
(0.021) 
Log Total Debt 
Stock 
2.312 
(0.231) 
1.192 
(0.207) 
0.150 
(0.944) 
-1.755 
(0.270) 
-2.485 
(0.061) 
0.416 
(0.899) 
-0.426 
(0.303) 
0.430 
(0.288) 
Log Terms of Trade -7.212 
(0.230) 
-0.027 
(0.992) 
-1.507 
(0.856) 
0.738 
(0.899) 
7.528 
(0.159) 
-3.884 
(0.874) 
3.189 
(0.242) 
7.533 
(0.038) 
Log Gross Dom. 
Invest 
1.647 
(0.735) 
0.716 
(0.707) 
4.443 
(0.343) 
-1.806 
(0.626) 
-5.093 
(0.078) 
-0.048 
(0.994) 
4.136 
(0.093) 
-4.279 
(0.048) 
Log Foreign Aid -4.644 
(0.347) 
-2.463 
(0.260) 
3.886 
(0.430) 
-1.871 
(0.576) 
-0.324 
(0.864) 
-3.359 
(0.542) 
1.743 
(0.055) 
0.504 
(0.550) 
Multicollinearity 
No. 
80.623 81.493 86.571 84.934 92.529 186.788 97.808 129.766 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 1.311 
(0.519) 
0.173 
(0.916) 
0.289 
(0.865) 
0.314 
(0.854) 
0.837 
(0.657) 
1.971 
(0.373) 
1.143 
(0.564) 
1.300 
(0.521) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 0.654 
(0.995) 
4.272 
(0.639) 
7.496 
(0.277) 
5.485 
(0.483) 
4.877 
(0.559) 
7.231 
(0.299) 
4.118 
(0.660) 
1.761 
(0.940) 
Koenker-Bassett 
Test 
2.032 
(0.916) 
4.356 
(0.628) 
5.686 
(0.459) 
6.400 
(0.379) 
5.676 
(0.460) 
5.405 
(0.493) 
10.002 
(0.124) 
4.657 
(0.588) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
164   
 
 
 
 
 
Growth Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
R-Squared 0.493 0.512 0.704 0.711 0.651 0.575 0.548 0.566 
Adjusted R-Squared -0.113 -0.071 0.349 0.365 0.233 0.065 0.007 0.047 
F-Statistic 0.813 0.877 1.986 2.057 1.559 1.128 1.013 1.090 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.601 0.568 0.234 0.222 0.321 0.456 0.504 0.472 
Log Likelihood -20.997 -28.908 -23.438 -21.439 -26.487 -26.835 -28.763 -
20.597 
Akaike Info Criterion 55.995 71.817 60.876 56.879 66.975 67.671 71.526 55.195 
Schwarz Criterion 59.390 75.211 64.271 60.273 70.370 71.065 74.921 58.59 
Constant 0.958 
(0.974) 
-60.316 
(0.326) 
-86.071 
(0.052) 
80.241 
(0.087) 
26.555 
(0.629) 
0.122 
(0.998) 
-7.942 
(0.902) 
-9.824 
(0.443) 
Log Per Capita 
Income 
0.179 
(0.906) 
2.719 
(0.407) 
5.091 
(0.035) 
-4.284 
(0.040) 
1.563 
(0.484) 
0.165 
(0.942) 
0.741 
(0.795) 
1.281 
(0.424) 
Log Debt Service -1.632 
(0.385) 
0.237 
(0.929) 
0.375 
(0.801) 
0.615 
(0.534) 
-1.240 
(0.489) 
1.782 
(0.553) 
-7.552 
(0.125) 
-1.135 
(0.420) 
Log Total Debt Stock 1.139 
(0.114) 
1.318 
(0.363) 
0.491 
(0.605) 
0.237 
(0.743) 
1.446 
(0.281) 
-1.354 
(0.269) 
0.157 
(0.903) 
-0.245 
(0.733) 
Log Terms of Trade 1.460 
(0.810) 
1.057 
(0.909) 
11.472 
(0.078) 
-12.473 
(0.088) 
-13.180 
(0.184) 
-3.384 
(0.743) 
8.254 
(0.567) 
0.410 
(0.698) 
Log Gross Domestic 
Invt 
0.082 
(0.979) 
9.921 
(0.134) 
1.125 
(0.677) 
2.268 
(0.297) 
5.513 
(0.096) 
4.256 
(0.095) 
-5.046 
(0.266) 
0.696 
(0.737) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.850 
(0.515) 
0.848 
(0.802) 
-0.063 
(0.973) 
-0.662 
(0.706) 
0.616 
(0.833) 
1.706 
(0.491) 
0.674 
(0.777) 
1.391 
(0.191) 
Multicollinearity No. 155.638 144.566 141.861 189.606 171.823 175.032 191.073 60.762 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 1.074 
(0.584) 
0.487 
(0.783) 
0.194 
(0.907) 
1.709 
(0.425) 
0.869 
(0.647) 
0.938 
(0.625) 
1.233 
(0.539) 
1.326 
(0.515) 
  Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients)  
Breusch-Pagan Test 3.043 
(0.803) 
4.335 
(0.631) 
8.783 
(0.186) 
1.516 
(0.958) 
5.038 
(0.538) 
2.490 
(0.869) 
1.698 
(0.945) 
2.297 
(0.890) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 6.497 
(0.369) 
5.747 
(0.452) 
8.956 
(0.176) 
8.154 
(0.227) 
4.975 
(0.546) 
3.250 
(0.776) 
2.136 
(0.906) 
2.746 
(0.839) 
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Growth Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
R-Squared 0.245 0.095 0.663 0.803 
Adjusted R-Squared -0.659 -0.990 0.259 0.567 
F-Statistic 0.271 0.087 1.642 3.407 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.928 0.994 0.301 0.099 
Log Likelihood -26.757 -29.369 -28.724 -19.576 
Akaike Info Criterion 67.514 72.739 71.448 53.152 
Schwarz Criterion 70.909 76.134 74.843 56.546 
Constant -1.636 
(0.979) 
44.387 
(0.770) 
61.408 
(0.323) 
10.080 
(0.772) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.447 
(0.853) 
0.080 
(0.976) 
2.661 
(0.319) 
0.727 
(0.639) 
Log Debt Service 2.438 
(0.370) 
-0.958 
(0.850) 
-7.620 
(0.075) 
2.193 
(0.308) 
Log Total Debt Stock -0.482 
(0.839) 
0.212 
(0.938) 
-0.578 
(0.709) 
-1.426 
(0.136) 
Log Terms of Trade -0.659 
(0.964) 
-7.764 
(0.829) 
-10.069 
(0.465) 
-5.575 
(0.566) 
Log Gross Domestic Invt 0.955 
(0.827) 
1.428 
(0.850) 
-8.350 
(0.238) 
8.092 
(0.044) 
Log Foreign Aid 0.340 
(0.898) 
-1.275 
(0.735) 
3.958 
(0.116) 
-0.549 
(0.668) 
Multicollinearity Number 231.241 450.374 175.834 253.337 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 0.895 
(0.638) 
9.358 
(0.009) 
0.361 
(0.834) 
0.918 
(0.631) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 3.790 
(0.704) 
7.168 
(0.305) 
5.054 
(0.536) 
1.964 
(0.922) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 7.383 
(0.286) 
2.571 
(0.860) 
6.019 
(0.421) 
3.384 
(0.759) 
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Five Year Average Growth Estimation (OLS) 
 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
R-Squared 0.620 0.466 0.729 0.655 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.164 -0.173 0.405 0.243 
F-Statistic 1.361 0.728 2.249 1.589 
Prob. F-Statistic 0.375 0.648 0.195 0.313 
Log Likelihood -8.003 3.675 0.767 5.618 
Akaike Info Criterion 30.007 6.648 12.465 2.762 
Schwarz Criterion 33.402 10.042 15.860 6.156 
Constant 3.616 
(0.617) 
0.414 
(0.892) 
5.469 
(0.373) 
0.296 
(0.972) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.150 
(0.766) 
-0.167 
(0.353) 
-0.054 
(0.818) 
0.203 
(0.194) 
Log Debt Service 0.108 
(0.817) 
-0.237 
(0.465) 
-0.090 
(0.676) 
-0.027 
(0.897) 
Log Total Debt Stock 0.140 
(0.535) 
0.071 
(0.438) 
0.051 
(0.594) 
-0.076 
(0.416) 
Log Terms of Trade -0.937 
(0.339) 
0.378 
(0.601) 
-1.057 
(0.329) 
-0.192 
(0.923) 
Log Gross Domestic Invt 1.025 
(0.133) 
0.240 
(0.527) 
0.664 
(0.076) 
0.211 
(0.568) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.284 
(0.617) 
0.014 
(0.920) 
-0.266 
(0.220) 
0.201 
(0.214) 
Multicollinearity Number 101.312 137.113 183.456 468.879 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 0.730 
(0.693) 
0.243 
(0.885) 
0.906 
(0.635) 
1.045 
(0.592) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 4.616 
(0.593) 
7.921 
(0.243) 
1.925 
(0.926) 
4.964 
(0.548) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 8.151 
(0.227) 
5.858 
(0.439) 
2.567 
(0.860) 
6.717 
(0.347) 
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Five Year Average Investment Estimation (OLS) 
 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 
R-Squared 0.649 0.384 0.335 0.268 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.449 0.033 -0.043 -0.149 
F-Statistic 3.249 1.094 0.884 0.643 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.083 0.428 0.519 0.648 
Log Likelihood -7.384 -6.629 -7.773 -4.272 
Akaike Info Criterion 24.768 23.258 25.547 18.545 
Schwarz Criterion 27.193 25.683 27.971 20.970 
Constant 5.046 
(0.055) 
5.343 
(0.036) 
5.592 
(0.043) 
4.057 
(0.048) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.244 
(0.662) 
-0.732 
(0.188) 
-0.859 
(0.164) 
-0.419 
(0.344) 
Log Debt Service 0.260 
(0.567) 
0.498 
(0.261) 
0.406 
(0.395) 
0.044 
(0.899) 
Log Total Debt Stock -0.188 
(0.291) 
-0.118 
(0.470) 
-0.057 
(0.747) 
-0.060 
(0.647) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.815 
(0.033) 
0.127 
(0.673) 
0.174 
(0.603) 
0.170 
(0.498) 
Multicollinearity Number 48.142 48.142 48.142 48.142 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 9.503 
(0.008) 
1.222 
(0.542) 
2.896 
(0.235) 
4.438 
(0.108) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 1.945 
(0.745) 
3.910 
(0.418) 
2.785 
(0.594) 
3.921 
(0.416) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 0.713 
(0.949) 
2.866 
(0.580) 
1.546 
(0.818) 
1.818 
(0.769) 
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Investment Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
R-Squared 0.559 0.463 0.506 0.293 0.693 0.802 0.588 0.593 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.307 0.157 0.223 -0.110 0.518 0.689 0.353 0.361 
F-Statistic 2.219 1.513 1.792 0.726 3.959 7.120 2.500 2.558 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.168 0.296 0.627 0.601 0.054 0.012 0.136 0.131 
Log Likelihood -9.762 -
11.259 
-
11.718 
-
12.891 
-5.881 -2.265 -5.922 -3.698 
Akaike Info Criterion 29.524 32.518 33.437 35.783 21.762 14.531 21.844 17.397 
Schwarz Criterion 31.948 34.942 35.862 38.208 24.186 16.955 24.269 19.822 
Constant 4.660 
(0.142) 
4.935 
(0.188) 
4.866 
(0.201) 
4.259 
(0.308) 
6.053 
(0.037) 
4.977 
(0.026) 
7.970 
(0.014) 
6.819 
(0.007) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.294 
(0.558) 
0.325 
(0.537) 
0.252 
(0.627) 
0.156 
(0.775) 
-0.048 
(0.871) 
-0.092 
(0.680) 
-0.279 
(0.382) 
-0.272 
(0.291) 
Log Debt Service 0.353 
(0.274) 
0.341 
(0.274) 
0.379 
(0.264) 
0.189 
(0.686) 
0.244 
(0.608) 
0.668 
(0.031) 
-0.123 
(0.710) 
0.094 
(0.672) 
Log Total Debt Stock -0.127 
(0.463) 
-0.267 
(0.239) 
-0.226 
(0.291) 
-0.163 
(0.505) 
-0.358 
(0.049) 
-0.425 
(0.002) 
-0.221 
(0.108) 
-0.189 
(0.076) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.881 
(0.036) 
-0.797 
(0.079) 
-0.799 
(0.064) 
-0.556 
(0.273) 
-0.449 
(0.100) 
-0.311 
(0.074) 
-0.416 
(0.103) 
-0.360 
(0.110) 
Multicollinearity 
Number 
41.383 40.893 39.893 39.527 41.902 42.871 43.874 39.681 
 
Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 2.511 
(0.284) 
1.064 
(0.587) 
3.521 
(0.171) 
11.178 
(0.003) 
1.802 
(0.405) 
0.529 
(0.767) 
0.971 
(0.615) 
1.593 
(0.450) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 1.533 
(0.820) 
1.221 
(0.874) 
0.516 
(0.971) 
4.639 
(0.326) 
1.259 
(0.868) 
2.191 
(0.700) 
3.674 
(0.451) 
9.039 
(0.060) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 0.797 
(0.938) 
2.356 
(0.670) 
0.285 
(0.990) 
1.540 
(0.819) 
1.100 
(0.894) 
2.162 
(0.705) 
5.950 
(0.202) 
5.358 
(0.252) 
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Investment Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
R-Squared 0.503 0.507 0.498 0.369 0.501 0.194 0.432 0.522 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.219 0.225 0.211 0.009 0.216 -0.265 0.108 0.249 
F-Statistic 1.773 1.802 1.738 1.026 1.762 0.423 1.335 1.916 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.238 0.232 0.245 0.455 0.240 0.787 0.345 0.212 
Log Likelihood -4.804 -4.602 -3.943 -6.977 -7.579 -11.314 -9.562 -6.009 
Akaike Info Criterion 19.609 19.205 17.887 23.954 25.158 32.628 29.125 22.019 
Schwarz Criterion 22.033 21.629 20.312 26.379 27.583 35.053 31.550 24.444 
Constant 6.481 
(0.014) 
5.770 
(0.028) 
5.680 
(0.020) 
5.637 
(0.065) 
4.695 
(0.116) 
2.966 
(0.413) 
2.992 
(0.350) 
2.759 
(0.278) 
Log Per Capita Income -0.335 
(0.253) 
-0.295 
(0.306) 
-0.257 
(0.346) 
-0.226 
(0.525) 
0.000 
(0.999) 
0.178 
(0.725) 
0.159 
(0.726) 
0.225 
(0.505) 
Log Debt Service 0.153 
(0.518) 
0.298 
(0.220) 
0.160 
(0.503) 
0.062 
(0.788) 
0.333 
(0.280) 
0.063 
(0.902) 
0.225 
(0.714) 
0.212 
(0.495) 
Log Total Debt Stock -0.112 
(0.362) 
-0.029 
(0.833) 
0.029 
(0.828) 
0.036 
(0.821) 
-0.087 
(0.679) 
-0.115 
(0.660) 
-0.406 
(0.091) 
-0.274 
(0.125) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.365 
(0.145) 
-0.463 
(0.146) 
-0.490 
(0.089) 
-0.483 
(0.148) 
-0.494 
(0.228) 
-0.232 
(0.609) 
0.090 
(0.807) 
-0.093 
(0.695) 
Multicollinearity Number 40.175 42.960 40.880 43.078 41.467 41.129 42.965 43.824 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 1.409 
(0.494) 
0.969 
(0.615) 
0.969 
(0.615) 
1.178 
(0.554) 
1.132 
(0.567) 
0.592 
(0.743) 
0.774 
(0.679) 
1.413 
(0.493) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 8.190 
(0.084) 
3.152 
(0.532) 
1.344 
(0.853) 
0.782 
(0.940) 
2.071 
(0.722) 
4.983 
(0.288) 
1.961 
(0.742) 
2.041 
(0.728) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 5.532 
(0.236) 
5.336 
(0.254) 
2.757 
(0.599) 
2.019 
(0.732) 
4.467 
(0.346) 
5.792 
(0.215) 
3.298 
(0.509) 
5.841 
(0.211) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170   
 
 
 
 
Investment Regression: Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
R-Squared 0.565 0.330 0.269 0.151 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.317 -0.051 -0.148 -0.333 
F-Statistic 2.278 0.864 0.644 0.312 
Prob. F-Staistic 0.160 0.529 0.648 0.861 
Log Likelihood -3.194 -4.967 -3.592 -5.648 
Akaike Info Criterion 16.389 19.935 17.184 21.297 
Schwarz Criterion 18.813 22.359 19.608 23.721 
Constant 2.867 
(0.182) 
3.294 
(0.169) 
2.530 
(0.197) 
3.120 
(0.173) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.198 
(0.486) 
0.048 
(0.864) 
0.080 
(0.752) 
-0.046 
(0.874) 
Log Debt Service 0.137 
(0.637) 
-0.363 
(0.422) 
-0.415 
(0.193) 
-0.264 
(0.613) 
Log Total Debt Stock -0.260 
(0.078) 
-0.190 
(0.217) 
-0.032 
(0.821) 
-0.155 
(0.360) 
Log Foreign Aid -0.064 
(0.741) 
0.167 
(0.534) 
0.074 
(0.732) 
0.215 
(0.404) 
Multicollinearity Number 46.486 42.272 41.931 40.781 
 Tests on Normality of Errors 
Jarque-Bera Test 0.991 
(0.609) 
0.211 
(0.899) 
1.224 
(0.542) 
1.624 
(0.443) 
 Heteroskedasticity (Random Coefficients) 
Breusch-Pagan Test 2.592 
(0.628) 
3.258 
(0.515) 
0.275 
(0.991) 
0.918 
(0.921) 
Koenker-Bassett Test 4.526 
(0.339) 
2.482 
(0.647) 
0.774 
(0.941) 
3.324 
(0.505 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Growth Scatter-plots Across Space and Time 
 
 
Figure 1.0: Moran Scatter plot for 1980 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Moran Scatter plot for 1981 
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Figure1.2: Moran Scatter plot for 1982 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: Moran Scatter plot for 1983 
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Figure 1.4: Moran Scatter plot for 1984 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Moran Scatter plot for 1985 
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Figure 1.6: Moran Scatter plot for 1986 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Moran Scatter plot for 1987 
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Figure 1.8: Moran Scatter plot for 1988 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Moran Scatter plot for 1989 
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Figure 2.0: Moran Scatter plot for 1990 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Moran Scatter plot for 1991 
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Figure 2.2: Moran Scatter plot for 1992 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Moran Scatter plot for 1993 
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Figure 2.4: Moran Scatter plot for 1994 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Moran Scatter plot for 1995 
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Figure 2.6: Moran Scatter plot for 1996 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: Moran Scatter plot for 1997 
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Figure 2.8: Moran Scatter plot for 1998 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Moran Scatter plot for 1999 
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Five Year Average Moran’s I  Scatter-plots 
 
 
 
Figure 3.0: Moran Scatter plot for 1980-84 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Moran Scatter plot for 1985-89 
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Figure 3.2: Moran Scatter plot for 1990-94 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Moran Scatter plot for 1995-9 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Growth LISA Maps Across Space and Time 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: LISA Map for 1980 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: LISA Map for 1981 
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Figure 3.6: LISA Map for 1982 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: LISA Map for 1983 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: LISA Map for 1984 
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Figure 3.9: LISA Map for 1985 
 
 
 
Figure 4.0: LISA Map for 1986 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: LISA Map for 1987 
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Figure 4.2: LISA Map for 1988 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: LISA Map for 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: LISA Map for 1990 
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Figure 4.5: LISA Map for 1991 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: LISA Map for 1992 
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Figure 4.7: LISA Map for 1993 
 
 
Figure 4.8: LISA Map for 1994 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: LISA Map for 1995 
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Figure 5.0: LISA Map for 1996 
 
 
Figure 5.1: LISA Map for 1997 
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Figure 5.2: LISA Map for 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: LISA Map for 1999 
 
 Five Year Average Growth LISA Maps 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: LISA Map for 1980-84 
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Figure 5.5: LISA Map for 1985-89 
 
 
 Figure 5.6: LISA Map for 1990-94 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: LISA Map for 1995-99 
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APPENDIX D 
Investment Scatter Plots Across Space and Time 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Moran Scatter Plot for 1980 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Moran Scatter Plot for 1981 
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Figure 6.0: Moran Scatter Plot for 1982 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Moran Scatter Plot for 1983 
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Figure 6.2: Moran Scatter Plot for 1984 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Moran Scatter Plot for 1985 
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Figure 6.4: Moran Scatter Plot for 1986 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Moran Scatter Plot for 1987 
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Figure 6.6: Moran Scatter Plot for 1988 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Moran Scatter Plot for 1989 
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Figure 6.8: Moran Scatter Plot for 1990 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Moran Scatter Plot for 1991 
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Figure 7.0: Moran Scatter Plot for 1992 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Moran Scatter Plot for 1993 
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Figure 7.2: Moran Scatter Plot for 1994 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Moran Scatter Plot for 1995 
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Figure 7.4: Moran Scatter Plot for 1996 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.5: Moran Scatter Plot for 1997 
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Figure 7.6: Moran Scatter Plot for 1998 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: Moran Scatter Plot for 1999 
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Figure 7.8: Moran Scatter Plot for 1980-1984 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Moran Scatter Plot for 1985-1989 
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Figure 8.0: Moran Scatter Plot for 1990-1994 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Moran Scatter Plot for 1995-1999 
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